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Introduction 
 
For the citizens of Europe, the late nineteenth century was marked by the beginning of 
mass mobilization. In many states, including the Habsburg Empire, people were 
transformed from subjects into citizens and the representatives of certain political 
preferences and national identities. I research the beginning of this mass mobilization 
process with specific attention to the role of the Catholic Church in Austrian Galicia, as 
the Church was a leading social institution and set an example of action for its laity. With 
this thesis, I aim to contribute to the history of mass mobilization and social history by 
emphasizing the changes and challenges that the mass mobilization process brought to 
the Catholic Church (divided in Galicia into the Greek Catholic and the Roman Catholic 
churches) and its laity during the fin de siècle.  
 The Greek and Roman Catholic churches, which I understand as consisting of 
high hierarchs, clergy, and laypeople, were important players in the mass mobilization 
process and managed to influence it dramatically. The beginning of mass mobilization 
challenged the strong position of the hierarchy and clergy and stimulated them to 
produce new strategies and values in order to remain influential and important, 
especially for their laity. By laity, I mean those who were part of these institutions, more 
precisely the peasants.  
 I organize case studies around important manifestations of the mass mobilization 
process (such as the participation of the clergy and laity in elections, mass gatherings, 
demonstrations, and activities related to elections). Through these events, I explore the 
role the churches played in mass mobilization and, in particular, how belonging to a 
specific rite and tradition was used for the purposes of mass mobilization. At the same 
time, I ask how the two Catholic churches interplayed with secular or governmental 
authorities on the local and state levels. I emphasize how mass mobilization began, what 
ideas and methods were used to mobilize followers, and which political ideas intersected 
with traditional Christian ones.  
 The process of mass mobilization can be viewed from a threefold perspective: 
firstly, as the meeting point between modern politics and the social role of the Catholic 
Church; secondly, as a process of the nationalization of the Church (during the nation-
building process, the Catholic churches became more closely aligned to particular 
nationalities: in this case, Greek Catholics became Ukrainian-orientated and Roman 
Catholics Polish-orientated); and, thirdly, as a challenge for the churches to became more 
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active in the public domain in order to maintain their authority among the laity. All these 
effects resulted in significant changes in the relations between clergy and laity, as well 
as between clergy and the local administration (starostas, teachers, etc.). While the 
Habsburg Empire treated clergy as state officials, the parish priests were competing with 
secular officials for the attention of laypeople.  
 The novelty of this study lies in a comparative approach to the history of the 
Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic churches. What similarities and differences were 
there between clergy and laity who belonged to one universal Catholic Church but also 
represented two different Christian traditions, occidental (Latin) and oriental 
(Orthodox)?1 The Greek Catholic Church emerged as a result of the union between the 
Vatican and the Orthodox metropolia of Kiev-Halych in Brest in 1596. The new Church 
retained its Orthodox traditions and rituals while being under the authority of the Vatican 
and belonging to the universal Catholic Church. Thus, a comparative approach enables 
us to gain an insight into how confessionalism2 functioned within the Austrian province 
of Galicia. 
 The two different rites of Catholicism represented in Galicia makes this territory 
a unique case study. The rites simultaneously reveal which aspects of Catholicism were 
similar for almost any province of the empire and which were related to this local space 
only. Additionally, the Galician context demonstrated the flexibility of Catholic 
practices and the potential to incorporate them into the different social conditions of the 
two nationalities.3 At the same time, Galicia was part of the imperial space and was 
experiencing the same changes (social, economic, and political) as the rest of the empire4 
and Europe in general. These questions have been raised in numerous studies on Galicia 
and the Habsburg Empire,5 but not in a comparative framework. I study the two 
                                                          
1 Although there was an overarching Catholic authority in the Vatican, the existence of two separate 
clergies and laities (Roman and Greek Catholic) intensified social divisions in Galicia. 
2 I use the term ‘confessionalism’ to mean the equal rights and influence of the two Catholic churches 
(rites) in the province of Galicia and to highlight that religious rite meant not only a difference in 
performing religious practices, but also linguistic and ethnic differences that were transferred into the 
realm of state and society. Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, Monumento Ucrainae Histórica, 14 vols. (Rome, 1964), 
vol. 14, 77. 
3 Brian Porter-Szücs, Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland (New York, 2011), 15. 
4 Larry Wolff, The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture (Stanford, 2010), 
6. 
5 Israel Bartal, and Antony Polonsky, ed., Focusing  on  Galicia:  Jews,  Poles,  and Ukrainians, 1772–
1918 (Portland, 1999). Serhiy Choliy, Mobilizatsiya na peryferiyi. Viyskovyy obov'yazok yak faktor 
modernizatsiyi imperiyi Habsburhiv 1868-1914 (Kyiv, 2016). Krzysztof Fiołek and Marian Stala, ed., 
Kraków i Galicja wobec przemian cywilizacyjnych (1866–1914) (Kraków, 2011). Alison Frank, Oil 
Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia (London, 2007). Wilhelm Feldman, Stronnictwa i 
programy polityczne w Galicyi 1846-1906, 2 vols. (Kraków, 1907), vol. 2. Christopher Hann and Paul 
Magocsi, ed., Galicia: A Multicultured Land (Toronto, 2005). John-Paul Himka, Socialism in Galicia: 
Emergence of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian Radicalism, 1860-1890 (Cambridge, 1983). 
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nationalities as religious groups and thus contribute to the social, religious, and political 
history of Eastern Europe. I am convinced that studying a combination of the religious 
and social specificities of the time has great potential and will reveal plenty of 
unanswered questions.  
 With this research, I aim to contribute to the history of Catholic Church and the 
Habsburg Monarchy. Basing my argument on the works of John-Paul Himka, who 
studied the role of the Greek Catholic Church in Austrian Galicia from 1772 (the 
beginning of Habsburg rule in Galicia) until 1900, I focus on the next decade (1900-
1910), which was marked by the intensive involvement of the masses and the desire of 
the Church to influence them. On the one hand, I agree with Himka that “the Church 
played a great role in the national awakening of the Ukrainian masses and in shaping the 
national movement,”6 which is also applicable to the Polish masses and the Roman 
Catholic Church. On the other hand, the case studies I analyze connected to violence and 
tensions between the clergy and local administration are in line with Pieter Judson’s 
arguments from the book The Guardians of the Nations. In this work, Judson introduces 
two concepts essential to my work. The first is that rural violence did not necessary 
imply national commitment and was interpreted as such only by nationalists.7 By 
‘nationalists’, I mean different social groups like teachers, craftsmen, small 
businessmen, clerks, priests, peasants, etc., who supported and/or promoted the idea of 
the existence of separate nations like Ukrainians and Poles. 
                                                          
Liliana Hentosh, Vatykan i vyklyky modernosti (Lviv, 2006). Stella Hryniuk, Peasants with promise. 
Ukrainians in Southeastern Galicia 1880-1900 (Edmonton, 1991). Börries Kuzmany, “Center and 
Periphery at the Austrian-Russian Border: The Galician Border Town of Brody in the Long Nineteenth 
Century,” Austrian History Yearbook 42, (2011): 67-88. Börries Kuzmany, Brody: Eine galizische 
Grenzstadt im langen 19. Jahrhundert (Wien, 2011). Dariusz Masiak, Proba porozumenia polsko-
ukrainskiego w Galicii w latach 1888-1895 (Warszawa, 2006). Andrei Markovits, and Frank E. Sysyn, 
ed., Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia (Cambridge, 1982). Iryna 
Orlevych, ed., Natsionalna identyfikatsiya ukrayintsiv Halychyny u XIX - na pochatku XX stolittya (Lviv, 
2016). Paulus Adelsgruber, Laurie Cohen and Börries Kuzmany, Getrennt und doch verbunden: 
Grenzstädte zwischen Österreich und Russland,. 1772–1918 (Wien, 2011). Alexandr Victor Prusin, 
Nationalizing a Borderland (Alabama, 2005). Joshua Shanes, Diaspora, Nationalism, and Jewish 
Indentity in Habsburg Galicia (New York, 2012). Danuta Sosnowska, Inna Galicja (Warsaw, 2008). 
Slawomir Tokarski, Ethnic conflict and economic development: Jews in Galician agriculture 1868-1914 
(Warsaw, 2003). Oleh Zhernokleyev, Ukrayinska sotsial-demokratiya v Halychyni (1899-1918) (Kyiv, 
2000). Larry Wolff, The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture (Stanford, 
2010). Piotr Wróbel, “The Jews of Galicia under Austrian-Polish Rule, 1869–1918,” Austrian History 
Yearbook 25, (1994): 97–138. Anna Veronika Wendland, Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische 
Konservative zwischen Österreich und Russland, 1848–1915 (Wien, 2001). James Shedel, “Emperor, 
Church, and People: Religion and Dynastic Loyalty during the Golden Jubilee of Franz Joseph,”  Catholic 
Historical Review 76, (1990): 71-92. Stefan Kieniewicz, Galicja w dobie autonomicznej (1850-1914) 
(Wroclaw, 1952). Mykhailo Demkovych-Dobrians'kyi, Ukra'ins'ko-pol's'ki stosunky u XIX storichchi, 
(Munich, 1969). 
6 J. P. Himka, The Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian Society in Austrian Galicia (Cambige, 1986), I. 
7 Pieter Judson, Guardians of the nation (Cambridge, 2006), 218.  
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 Judson’s second concept is that rural violence was a widespread phenomenon in 
the Austrian Empire but such events were not as nationally homogeneous as represented 
by nationalists. Similarly, the clashes with the involvement of the Catholic Church 
discussed in the thesis demonstrate that while some of the clergy supported national 
ideas, many were only looking for the best path to follow and trying to cooperate with 
different political forces. Thus, I argue that the attention and support of the laity was at 
the core of the clergy’s priorities, while the ideas of national development were rather a 
method for engaging the laity.  
 Additionally, by discussing the phenomena of mass celebrations and rallies, I 
expand the discussion raised by Keely Stauter-Halsted, Kai Struve, Daniel Unowsky, 
and others on the politicization of the subjects of the empire through mass events. 
Stauter-Halsted emphasizes that ideas of the nation became important in Galician 
villages “at roughly the same historical moment as institutions of civic and political 
expression.”8 Similar to Stauter-Halsted, I highlight that political rights and civic space 
shaped the relations between clergy and laity, as well as those between citizens and the 
local authorities. However, I do not focus on the national aspect precisely as it was 
explicit only in the rhetoric of some newspapers: in reports from the police or starostas, 
as well as in the Church’s documentation, the main emphasis was on loyalty to the 
empire and the desire to maintain its laws and rights. 
 Drawing on Kai Struve, I organize my case studies around two transformative 
events: first, the agrarian strikes of 1902 and, second, the campaigns for election reform 
in 1906 and the elections themselves in 1908. Struve highlights that this particular period 
was decisive and resulted in numerous mass events that provoked the active involvement 
of peasants in political life.9 Some of these mass events were related to violence and 
even pogroms. Daniel Unowski emphasizes that a complex view of the riots against 
Jews, including Catholic action in them, can bring deeper insights on the nature of and 
reason for the anti-Jewish riots.10 Thus, this thesis attempts to contribute to our 
understanding of the active involvement of peasants in politics and the place of Catholic 
values and institutions in this process. 
 As I analyze numerous conflicts of the clergy with state and church authorities, I 
also explore in detail how the relations between these two institutions functioned.  I build 
                                                          
8 Judson, Guardians of the nation, 556. 
9 Judson, Guardians of the nation, 113-114. 
10 “Only by looking  at  Catholic  action, Jewish  reaction,  and  the role  of government in  preserving 
order can we  come  close  to  understanding how the riots themselves were experienced.” Robert Nemes, 
Daniel Unowsky Sites of European Antisemitism (Brandeis University Press, 2014), 20. 
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on and develop further the ideas of the American historian John W. Boyer, who claims 
that “the public authority of the dynastic state had long been closely associated with the 
institutional Church” and that the relationship between the Church and the state was 
cooperative and mutually accommodating.11 Boyer highlights the role of the clergy in 
mass mobilization as well, stating that “the clergy were often behind a variety of different 
kinds of rallies, political events, and money solicitations.”12 Upon closely investigating 
the police and local administration reports, I found that the clergy in Galicia was very 
active in organizing peasants, and even used religious services and sacraments to do this: 
such behavior brought state and church institutions into conflict. 
 In other words, I aim to demonstrate that Galicia had its particularities as a multi-
national and multi-Catholic space. However, it also manifested similar processes to those 
occurring in other provinces of the empire, like rural violence, strikes, the development 
of mass mobilization, and nationalization. The main novelty of my study is the 
comparative approach to the two confessions of the Catholic Church, which aims to 
reveal how flexible and inclusive the response of the Church was to the challenges of 
mass mobilization. 
Scenery and protagonists of the study: Galicia and Galicians 
 
Galicia was a large province on the border with the Russian Empire. It was both one of 
the largest and poorest provinces of the Habsburg Empire.13 Galicians shared various 
identities: religious (Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics, Jewish), linguistic (Polish, 
Ukrainian, Yiddish, German), ethnic (Polish, Ukrainian, Jewish), and provincial.14 
Religiously, the Galician population of around 6.3 million consisted of Greek Catholics 
(44.83% of the population), Roman Catholics (44.74%), and Jews (9.69%).15 
Linguistically, 52% of the population was Polish-speaking, 43% Ukrainian-speaking, 
and 5% German-speaking (Jews belonged either to Polish- or German-speaking 
groups).16 As each census of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy included only questions 
                                                          
11 John W. Boyer, “Political Catholicism in Austria, 1880-1960”, in Religion in Austria, ed. G. Bischof, 
A. Pelinka, H. Denz (New Brunswick, 2005), 7. 
12 Boyer, Political Catolicism, 164. 
13 J. P. Himka, Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century 
(Macmillan press, 1988), ХХІІ. 
14 “Galician identity was fundamentally provincial, and its evolution suggests the importance of the 
provincial as an ideological force overlapping with the forces of the national and the imperial.” Larry 
Wolff, The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture (Stanford, 2010), 6. 
15 Wolff, The Idea of Galicia, 7. 
16 Himka, Galician Villagers, ХХІІІ. 
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about religious and language differences, the data concerning nationalities is only 
approximate.17  
 There was a strong co-dependency between religion and language, which had its 
roots in the mutual coexistence of the nationalities of the province. Therefore, in most 
cases the Ukrainian (ethnical and linguistic)18 population was associated with Greek 
Catholicism and the Polish with Roman Catholicism. According to ecclesiastical law, it 
was not possible to change rites without permission of the Vatican.19 However, these 
changes of rite were frequent, and both clergies struggled for the attention and loyalty of 
their followers in order not to lose them to the other rite.  
 Aside from rite, other factors influenced the division between Poles and 
Ukrainians, or Ruthenians as local Ukrainians called themselves. Polish was the official 
language of the province; however, it was used by 54.6% of Galicians while Ukrainian 
was used by 42.29%. This means that Poles and Ukrainians were almost equal in terms 
of the number of inhabitants in the province. Geographically, however, the eastern part 
of the province was larger and more diverse (with 58.9% people speaking Ukrainian),20 
while Polish speakers made up the vast majority of the rather homogenous western part 
(96%).21 This division led many times to ideas (introduced by Ukrainians) to partition 
the province into Ukrainian and Polish parts, but these plans never succeeded (see map  
p. 10). 
 Another factor was the strong association between the Galician elite and the 
Polish language and culture (and also Roman Catholicism). I focus on this relationship 
between language and nationality, as the language issue contributed to the successful 
mobilization of Poles and Ruthenians alike. The language difference was also a source 
of opposition between Polish-speaking village officials and Ruthenian- (Ukrainian-) 
                                                          
17 Wlodzimierz Osadczy, “Roman Catholic-Uniate Relations and the national question in eastern Galicia 
in the 19th and early 20th centuries” in Politics and Religion in Central and Eastern Europe: Traditions 
and Transitions ed. William H. Swatos (Westport, 1994), 247. 
18 ‘Ukrainian’ was not a term used at the time: the common name was ‘Ruthenian’. However, I use 
‘Ukrainian’ here for the sake of simplicity. 
19 Osadczy, “Roman Catholic-Uniate Relations,” 247. 
20 Beata Holub, “Historical-geographical study of the nationalities in Eastern Galicia in the light of the 
population censuses in the years 1890-1910,” Annales UMCS 2: 15-40. Last visited November, 25, 2017. 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Beata_Holub/publication/265292407_Historical-
geographical_study_of_the_nationalities_in_Eastern_Galicia_in_the_light_of_the_population_censuses
_in_the_years_1890-1910/links/5429ce240cf277d58e86fed3/Historical-geographical-study-of-the-
nationalities-in-Eastern-Galicia-in-the-light-of-the-population-censuses-in-the-years-1890-
1910.pdf?origin=publication_list (last visited 30.08.2017) 
21 According to the statistics of 1900, in Galicia in general Polish was spoken by 54.6% and Ruthenian by 
42.29%, while 45.7% were Roman Catholics and 42.5% Greek Catholics.  
“Mapa językowa i wyznaniowa Galicji”, last modified November, 25, 2017, 
http://www.pbc.rzeszow.pl/dlibra/doccontent?id=4831 
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speaking Greek Catholic clergy. Some representatives of the nationalist-oriented Greek 
Catholic clergy refused to communicate in Polish and used the language issue to 
emphasize their political preferences.  
 The population structure of both churches varied as well. Galicia was mainly 
inhabited by peasants: the vast majority (78%) of the Galician population (according to 
data in 1900) worked in agriculture, while 9% worked in industry (mainly artisanal 
occupations and inn keeping) and 2% were professionals (mainly clergy and civil 
servants).22 The Greek Catholic Church (and the Ukrainian-speaking population) 
consisted of rural peasants, whereas the Roman Catholic laity was largely made up of 
the urban inhabitants of the province. This comparison shows that the Roman Catholic 
laity was much more diverse and included representatives of all social layers, while the 
Greek Catholics lacked representatives among intellectuals and the elite.  
 
Map 1. Areas inhabited by Greek Catholics and Roman Catholics.23 
 Further division between the Greek Catholics and Roman Catholics was also 
stimulated by inequality in their access to power. Galicia gained autonomy in 1861, 
which provided better opportunities for the Polish nobility, intellectuals, and urban 
                                                          
22 J.-P.Himka, “Dimensions of a Triangle: Polish-Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Austrian Galicia,” Polin: 
Studies in Polish Jewry 12 (1999): 28. 
23 Based on Beata Hołub, “Studium historyczno-geograficzne narodowości,” 15-40. 
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middle class:24 however, this deepened the conflict between the Poles and other 
nationalities, putting them into competition. The majority of the schools, the universities 
of Cracow and Lemberg, and the provincial administration all became Polish-speaking 
after 1867.25 At the turn of the century, this inequality was one of the key stimuli for 
growing nationalism.  
 Both rites played a very important role in the life of their laity. As noted by Jerzy 
Kloczowski, “the Church continued to include the vast majority of Poles, from the 
aristocracy to the poorest peasants”, and it was fused with Polish life mainly because of 
the connection between traditional culture and religious practices.26 The same was true 
for the Ruthenians (Ukrainians). The emerging secular movements challenged the 
dominant position of both churches. The threat came from national movements, 
socialism,27 the establishment of political parties by Ruthenians and Poles, and, 
subsequently, the involvement of the masses in ‘modern’ social and political life. The 
main factor that stimulated politicization was electoral reforms: thus, I take elections and 
the widening of voting rights as case studies to analyze how social, Catholic, and 
political ideas came together and were used as mobilizing tools.  
 I analyze the introduction of universal male suffrage, agitation for and spreading 
information about elections, and the preparation and holding of elections. I focus 
specifically on the elections to parliament (Reichsrat) and the local diet that took place 
between 1895 and 1908. Especially important was the period between 1906 and 1907, 
when the universal suffrage reform was prepared and implemented. As pointed out by 
the American historian Hugo Lane, the introduction of universal male suffrage changed 
the nature of political power: “if the peasantry did not have a clear idea of the nation as 
                                                          
24 The dominant elite of Galicia were big landlords and aristocrats. The urban middle class was strong 
only in Cracow and Lemberg. Thus, these cities were becoming more attractive and offered wider 
possibilities for their inhabitants: however, political messages should have been adapted to the peasant 
population as it made up the majority of the province.  
25 As Larry Wolff brilliantly summarizes on the issue of autonomy, “the emancipation of the peasantry 
from feudal obligations in 1848, followed by the full emancipation of the Jews and the constitutional 
guarantee of civic rights to all citizens in 1867 … laid the legal foundations for modern society in the 
Habsburg monarchy, including Galicia.” Wolff, The Idea of Galicia, 239. 
26 Jerzy Kloczowski, A History of Polish Christianity (Cambridge, 2000), 216-217. 
27 I use the term ‘socialism’ in the same sense as John Himka: “to denote people and groups that describe 
themselves as such and were so described by their contemporaries”. More in: J. P. Himka, Socialism in 
Galicia. The Emergence of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian Radicalism (1860-1890) (Cambridge, 
1983), 1.  
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a political community, they did have de facto political community based in their common 
socioeconomic grievances”.28 
Research questions and structure  
  
I concentrate my attention on three manifestations of mass mobilization. First, mass 
participation: how did the widening of political rights influence the secular lives of the 
Greek and Roman Catholics of Galicia? And in what ways were the new forms of 
political and social life combined with religious behavior? Second, new identities: how 
did Greek and Roman Catholics react to the emergence of various mobilizing ideas, such 
as the idea of the nation? Why did Galicians combine religious identity with other 
identities (political, provincial, and national)? Why was national identity so appealing 
for the Catholic churches? And third, secular and religious tensions: how did the 
election reforms of the Austrian state influence local communities (especially relations 
between parochial priests and laity)? How did relations between local authorities and 
parochial clergy change under the influence of mass mobilization? 
 In order to provide a complex view on these issues, I engage with various aspects 
of the process of mass mobilization throughout the thesis. In particular, I concentrate on 
the cooperation between Church and State, the interplay between the hierarchs of the 
churches, the clergy, and the laity, and relations among the clergy and laity of the same 
Church. I trace the process of mass mobilization as a social phenomenon by taking into 
account the top-down and bottom-up directions of mass mobilization and analyzing how 
the reaction of the higher authorities to mobilization influenced the local provincial 
clergy and administration (and vice versa). Comparing the two churches, I demonstrate 
how Greek Catholics and Roman Catholics, working separately from each other, faced 
similar problems and created similar approaches to deal with them.  
Main concepts and case studies 
In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Catholic Church was strongly connected to the 
state. Together they formed an influential partnership supported by the “legacy of God 
and Law”. As a result of this connection between the Church and the empire, the 
“Habsburg state was an institution legitimated in the minds of its people by a public 
                                                          
28 Hugo Lane, “Class Interest and the Shaping of a ‘Non-historical’ Nation: Reassessing the Galician 
Ruthenian Path to Ukrainian Identity” in Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in 
Honor of Roman Szporluk, ed. Z. Gitelman, L. Haida, J.-P. Himka, R. Solchanyk (Cambridge, 2000), 386. 
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moral vision”, as John W. Boyer noted.29  Boyer concludes that “the public authority of 
the dynastic state had long been closely associated with the institutional Church” and 
that the relationship between Church and State was cooperative and mutually 
accommodating.30 Due to such close interaction and cooperation between the state and 
the Church, the Catholic clergy had a similar status in the empire to that of public 
officials: they received a salary and were, as part of the local authorities, responsible to 
the central government. 
 This strong connection between Church and State is a significant factor to 
consider when researching the social role of the Catholic churches in Galicia. Both 
churches demonstrated deep loyalty and respect towards the emperor and the state. 
However, this idea of loyalty was interpreted differently depending on the 
circumstances. Clergymen never challenged the authority of the state or the emperor, but 
the authority of state officials was something very different. As the clergy performed 
some official duties, they received certain powers from the state and played an important 
role at the lower levels of the social hierarchy. For example, parish priests were 
responsible for registering and reporting demographic data. I seek to unravel how this 
alliance between the state and the Church worked on the provincial level and how it was 
challenged by electoral reforms and especially by growing nationalism. In particular, I 
explore the developing interest of politicians and intellectuals in the formation of 
national ideas and values specific to each of the nationalities of the province.  
 The Church and the state, as institutions, provided mutual support for the 
authority of the other. This was especially apparent as nationalism, which questioned the 
authority of both institutions, spread. The other side of the close relationship between 
the Church and the state was that challenging the authority of one institution meant also 
challenging the authority of the other. This cooperation between the two institutions was 
reflected in Galicia, where the high church hierarchy was very loyal to the monarchy. 
However, this loyalty also created conflicts among the clergy: between hierarchs, who 
needed to be an example of loyalty to the monarchy first of all, and the other layers of 
clergy, whose priority was to gain support from their parishes. In this way, the higher 
echelons of the Catholic institutions of Galicia looked upwards to highlight their loyalty 
and cooperation with the other authorities of the empire, whereas the lower clergy 
                                                          
29 James Shedel, “Religion, Public Morality and the Rechtsstaat in the Habsburg Dominions,” in 
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remained reliant on more localized support to retain their social positions. This 
difference took place because the mass mobilization process stimulated the lower clergy 
to fight for the attention of their laity and protect it from anti-Catholic mobilizing ideas. 
I develop this argument in detail when analyzing various trials against priests in which 
both church and state authorities were involved.  
 Another important topic for my research is the politicizing of Catholicism and 
the influence of the Christlichsoziale Partei [Christian Social Party] in Galicia. I develop 
this issue while elaborating on the activity of the Roman Catholic priest Stanislaw 
Stojalowski (1845-1911), as well as on the difficulties of establishing a political party 
with explicit Catholic ideas. Stojalowski aimed to be a follower of Karl Lueger, the 
mayor of Vienna and leader of the very popular Christian Social Party.31 The success of 
political Catholicism in Vienna was reflected in the provinces, including Galicia, where 
Stojalowski was promoting his Christian Peoples’ Party, based on the ideas of social 
Catholicism. Stojalowski used the same strategies as Lueger, like attracting the common 
people to politics by introducing anti-semitic sentiments on the basis of social 
inequality.32 Stojalowski always emphasized that he was supporter of Lueger in his 
political strategy and planned to cooperate with Lueger’s party in parliament, so I 
investigate to what extent Stojalowski managed to become a ‘Galician Lueger’ and why 
this was only partially successful.  
 Carl Schorske argues that the defeat of the liberals in the 1890s stimulated the 
development of new mass movements, such as Christian, anti-Semitic, socialistic, and 
national ones.33 According to Schorske, Lueger managed to unite the anti-liberal ideas 
of Catholicism and combine them with others that were popular within society, such as 
democracy, social reform, anti-semitism, and loyalty to the Habsburgs.34 In Galicia, 
Stanislaw Stojalowski was a passionate follower of political Catholicism. He positioned 
himself as a follower of Lueger and intended to use similar methods and ideas for 
mobilizing his followers. Simultaneously, the results of my research show why political 
Catholicism was not as popular and vital in Galicia as in Vienna. 
 My hypothesis is that the failure of political Catholicism can be explained by the 
more powerful process of nation-building that had a strong influence on the 
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transformation of Catholic identity in the region. With the rise of nationalism, the ethnic 
and religious tensions between Greek and Roman Catholics grew stronger as the 
association between rites, ethnicity, and nationality expanded. The relationship between 
Catholicism and nationalism in the region has been a subject of interest for various 
scholars working on Polish or Ukrainian history. According to the Polish historian Jerzy 
Kloczowski, the mixture of Catholicism and traditional existence brought to life a 
patriotic religion that became an important characteristic of a considerable part of the 
Polish elite.35 Brian Porter-Szücs suggests that “the strong ideological link between faith 
and fatherland emerged in full force only at the start of the twentieth century”, and even 
afterwards it needed a while to for it to become “unquestioned common sense that Poles 
were necessarily Catholic.”36 Himka emphasizes two important changes that took place 
within the Greek Catholic Church under the impact of nationalism. On the one hand, the 
Greek Catholic Church was under the influence of a national movement and in danger 
of losing some of its identity because of its increased involvement in the construction of 
what was principally a national identity. On the other, the Greek Catholic clergy were 
an important source for the formation of intelligentsia, mainly because they could marry 
and had some finances, which meant that their children received better educations.37  
Throughout the following chapters, I raise the question of the transformation of the 
clergy in the processes of mass mobilization and the nationalization of the churches. 
Additionally, I explore why social Catholicism was not very popular in Galicia while 
national ideas were. 
 The role of Catholicism in the nation-building process is essential for my research 
questions. In particular, is it important whether religious identity was reinforced by the 
strengthening of national identities or not? And how did Catholicism serve as a useful 
background for national mobilization? Both churches represented a certain nationality 
and built their own strategies for mobilizing their followers.  
 The nationalization of the churches had a deep influence on their mutual 
coexistence. Chris Hann describes how the emergence of nationalism changed the 
relatively tolerant coexistence between the two religious groups. According to him, “the 
mobilization of religion in the service of modern nationalism ruptures traditions of 
pluralism everywhere. More specifically, the old forms of coexistence and sharing seem 
to be incompatible with the new ideal, which holds that the coexisting communities 
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should be equal”.38 Hann emphasizes that the struggle for equality was reinforced by 
national movements, which considered pluralism and tolerance as the reasons for 
inequality. Thus, for example, Juraj Buzalka claims in his study that “Ukrainian 
nationalism favored the expurgation of Latin [Roman Catholic] elements from the Greek 
Catholic Church.”39 The rise of the nation-building process was therefore not some 
foreign force that challenged Catholic identity, but rather one that worked from within 
and was stimulated by the clergy and laity of both rites.  
 The widening of political rights and seeking a new role for the Church were 
mutually influential processes that should be analyzed together. Thus, I investigate the 
complex relations between the parish priest, local authorities, and laity through the prism 
of how the widening of political rights influenced these relations. In addition, I bring 
together Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic public activity and women’s rights 
activism to demonstrate how the Catholic Church was seeking a new role in sacral and 
secular space. Female activism was a new challenge for Catholicism, as it required 
rethinking the existing social hierarchy. The active involvement of clergy in political 
debates also questioned traditional authority and provoked discussion on how distant the 
Church should be from politics. While the Greek Catholic clergy had lost their leading 
roles to political activists, they had kept their position as religious leaders and thus 
managed to influence political activists and the Church as an institution.  
 The increasing importance of national ideas caused tensions between the two 
religious groups in Galicia, mainly because new identities, Polish and Ukrainian, were 
thrust upon them. The tension produced by new identities even led to displays of 
violence in the province. The violent actions and their interpretation were used to 
reinforce the political ideologies of the time (especially national and socialist ones). 
However, a closer look at the violent clashes can reveal interesting functions of the 
violence. The local national activists (mainly students, lawyers, journalists, officials, and 
educated peasants), according to Judson, believed that nations were already well-defined 
entities whose members shared eternal and easily recognizable traits. However, such an 
idea, as Judson states, was far from reality because the nation-building process was only 
one of the political projects and not the main one.40 This consideration is important for 
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my research, as the case studies I use prove that violence had backgrounds other than 
only national difference. I discuss the causes of violence in detail in Chapter five. The 
chapter contributes to challenging the way in which the historiography explains violence 
in terms of the nation-building process. 
 Judson demonstrates that rural violence was a widespread phenomenon in the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. Through these events, the national activists (who, as 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, were mainly students, local intellectuals, clergy, 
and educated peasants) “wanted to portray violence as part of a larger, coherent political 
struggle in order to win broad popular support and to mobilize that support fully.”41 
Violence proved to have the potential to advance different perceptions and explanations 
that were able to shape society. In the last chapter of this thesis, I categorize violent 
clashes according to the area in which they happened, into rural or urban. Clerical 
involvement in the clashes was further used by different political forces as arguments 
pro or contra all clergy. In the case of urban violence, the example of which is the 
assassination in 1908 of the local governor Andrej Potocki in Lemberg, the whole Greek 
Catholic community was blamed because the murderer appeared to be Greek 
Catholic/Ukrainian. The assassination of the governor was the culmination of conflicts 
between Poles and Ukrainian that became especially strong after the introduction of 
universal male suffrage and the first elections to the local diet [Galician Sejm].  
 If violent events provoked a lot of attention, the other displays of mass 
mobilization, such as gathering and celebrations (religious and patriotic),42 were already 
common activities. Mass celebrations (organized by the government or local activists) 
combined different elements that revealed something about the social make-up. Kai 
Struve demonstrates in Peasants and Patriotic Celebrations in Habsburg Galicia that 
many celebrations involved a combination of the liturgy, a patriotic sermon by the priest, 
and speeches regarding historical and political themes of the region, all accompanied by 
patriotic songs and poetry.43 In this thesis, I research further the role of the clergy in 
mass gatherings and celebration and demonstrate how such tools of mass mobilization 
were used for the politicization of the laity: I also discuss how religious practices were 
influenced by political ideas. 
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 Drawing on Struve, I investigate the behavior of the clergy and authorities in 
relation to the mass gatherings that occurred alongside electoral process. I am interested 
in how the clergy was involved in these localized mass events and what ideas they were 
spreading to their laity. Very often, depending on the participants, a mass event had the 
potential to become a realm for debate and conflict. The clergy and political activists 
managed to use mass events as a common space where various issues could be proposed 
and discussed.  
 The reforms of the electoral law were an important stimulation to mass 
participation and active involvement in politics. The electoral reforms of 1873, 1882, 
and 1896 that widened the number of electors and finally introduced universal male 
suffrage in 1907 completed the politicization of almost all the subjects of the empire. 
According to Pieter Judson, the result of these reforms was twofold. First, the changes 
led to a decrease in the political influence of the nobles.44 Second, they resulted in social 
conflicts that were rooted in crises of self-definition because of the vast increase of social 
groups that gained access to the political system and needed to define themselves 
somehow. According to Gary B. Cohen, the possibility to participate in politics for those 
who had not it before resulted in competition for the control of local government, and 
this “growing competition of the mass-based parties and interest groups for popular 
support led directly to the radicalization of political demands and rhetoric.”45  
 The introduction of universal male suffrage in 1907 was therefore a turning point 
in politicizing life in the Austro-Hungarian Empire because it allowed the resolution of 
tensions and problems through parliament and other authorities. However, it was also a 
turning point in the relations between the two churches (and nationalities) because of the 
deepening tensions between Poles and Ukrainians due to unequal access to power.  
 I have concentrated on the elections as the focal point of my research for three 
reasons. Firstly, they provoked a broad debate within Galician society. Secondly, they 
influenced and transformed the relationship between the two nationalities of the province 
and stimulated further antagonism between them. Thirdly, the governors (the head of 
imperial government in the province), namely Kazimierz Badeni and Andrzej Potocki, 
who were responsible for organizing the elections in the province, had strong support 
from and were protected by Vienna. Both Badeni and Potocki launched similarly 
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autocratic policies in the province. The elections between 1895 and 1908 were examples 
that demonstrated the approach of the two governors.  
Sources and methods 
 
For this thesis, I have selected newspapers, the documents of the Church, government 
paperwork in the office of the Vice-regency, and political brochures as the main sources. 
Such sources provide a lot of information on various mass events and social conflicts. 
As various newspapers supported different political ideas, they are valuable sources to 
trace rhetoric around religious or secular life. The analysis of newspapers with various 
ideological orientations reveals that conflicts were present not only between different 
nationalities or confessions, but also within one and the same confession. More 
importantly, conflicts within one rite were the most dangerous for this rite, so the 
hierarchs tried to minimize them through public speeches or pastoral letters. The press 
spread and even criticized these official declarations of church hierarchs. Thus, the press 
was a pool of the various interpretations of the events and ideas of the time and served 
simultaneously as a tool for unification or separation. Newspapers shaped discussions 
on the most exemplary issues in society and interacted with each other to respond to any 
conflicting or intersecting points in the discourses.  
 Official documents both from the Church and local and central authorities also 
provide key primary sources. Such documents represent official institutions’ versions of 
events during the elections and reveal how the relations between the two churches and 
local authorities [Galician Vice-regency] functioned. By ‘official documents’, I mean 
documents that were sent to the Vice-regency, church authorities, and local officials: 
however, this does not necessarily mean that the documents represented the official 
positions of the authorities or that they were widely available. Some of the documents 
concerning trials or strikes were strictly confidential. With these sources, I trace the 
position of the churches and local government towards the elections or violent events 
connected with them.  
 In pastoral letters (which were published and thus widely known), the hierarchs 
of the churches emphasized certain values and behavioral strategies that the clergy and 
laity should follow. In addition, documents like reports or responses by the Church’s 
government to the requests of state officials reveal the difference between the desired 
behavior promoted by the church hierarchy and the actual behavior of the clergy and 
laity. Court files, testimonies, and complaints from clergy or officials that involved the 
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Vice-regency are also an extremely informative sources to reconstruct interactions 
between secular and sacral authorities. 
 Working with the aforementioned types of sources provides us with a 
combination of official and media materials that allows us to reveal how the influence 
of mass mobilization surfaced on a public level and in the closed environment of state 
and church administrators, and how different ideas were constructed and discussed on 
these levels. This approach also allowed me to highlight the individual contributions of 
the most influential actors (mainly state officials and parish clergy) to mass mobilization. 
By focusing on both secular and religious sources, I unveil attitudes to the rising tension 
between the different identities in Galician society, how state officials and the clergy 
contributed to mass participation events and acts of political violence, and how the press 
pushed its readers to take an active position and even sometimes encouraged radical 
responses. 
 The creators of the above mentioned sources were the representatives of various 
social groups. The church hierarchy and local authorities included mainly aristocrats, 
while officials and clergy throughout Galicia were close in their lifestyle to intellectuals 
and the middle class (teachers, lawyers, journalists). Unfortunately, there were not many 
representatives of the peasants (maybe just a few authors of the articles) among those 
who worked in the local administration or newspapers, but this this was a specificity of 
the time, when peasants were only starting to participate in the public sphere. Thus, the 
contribution and response of the peasants to mass mobilization can be traced only 
through sources (such as reports of police and starostas, court files) created by other 
social groups: as such, these sources present a view on the peasantry from the outside. 
Additionally, there are no private sources involved in the thesis (as I have not found 
any), which prevents us from tracing how important mass mobilization was in the private 
sphere or everyday life. Private sources could have great potential for further research 
on mass mobilization in Galicia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
 In essence, the suggested combination of sources makes it possible to trace 
different aspects of the mass mobilization process from top to bottom (i.e., from the 
representatives of the religious and secular authorities to participants from broader 
religious and secular groups) and from bottom to top (from the press and its readers to 
the representatives of power). 
 In terms of methodology, I use critical analysis of the sources as well as social 
history and microhistory. This allows for an in-depth analysis of the representation and 
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role allocation of social actors, providing us with the analytical tools needed to 
investigate which social actors were put into the foreground and which were “de-
emphasized”. I am particularly interested in the social position of the peasants and how 
it changed under the influence of mass mobilization. Mass mobilization provoked a 
struggle for power and influence between clergy and local officials that also had an effect 
on the lives of the laity. In terms of social history, I focus on social changes like the 
transformation of relationships inside village communities and religious groups (e.g., the 
relationship between priests and laity and between different Catholics), the importance 
of economic position in terms of unequal access to power and the promotion of certain 
political ideas, and the social motivation of peasants to engage into politics.  
Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis begins with a general overview of the role of the clergy in the social domain 
and their first experiences of mass events, such as the agricultural strikes in 1902 that 
had involved plenty of Ruthenian peasants in the eastern part of the province. The 
example of the strikes demonstrates what potential the clergy had as mobilizers and how 
the church authorities reacted to mass events that threatened the social order. After the 
strikes, the clergy became active supporters of the movement devoted to widening 
electoral rights in 1905-06. Based on this example of mass movements aimed at 
supporting electoral reform, I unveil the general role of the clergy in mobilizing their 
laity and preparing them to practice the new opportunities for public participation 
(according to the new electoral law of universal male suffrage).  
 Chapter two turns its attention to the actual participation of the clergy in elections 
after universal male suffrage became reality. I analyze pastoral letters and newspaper 
discussions on how the clergy should participate in elections and involve their laity. A 
significant part of Chapter two is devoted to the role of women in political debates. As 
more political and social rights were available to men, the role of women also became 
more important for the churches. Both Catholic churches and women’s rights activists 
were actively engaged in discussing and shaping the new role of women in society. 
 Chapter three looks at the example of the priest Stanislaw Stojalowski, who was 
the most active Roman Catholic clergyman in the mobilization of the masses. Taking his 
example as a case study, we unveil the influence of mass mobilization on the relations 
between the government and the church hierarchy, on the one hand, and the relations 
among clergy and between clergy and laity, on the other. The case of Stojalowski 
demonstrates which ideas and tools served best to mobilize the faithful and how the 
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hierarchs of the Roman Catholic Church and state officials reacted to the popularity and 
successes of Stojalowski and cooperated to control the activity of the politically involved 
clergy. This chapter delves into relations at the top level of the society (i.e., interactions 
between state and church authorities, the involvement of the Ministry of Justice and the 
Vatican), while the next chapter is about similar processes at the local level (the tensions 
between local officials and clergy in village communities). 
 Chapter four concentrates on Greek Catholic priests and the problems they had 
with local secular and ecclesiastical authorities because of active engagement in the mass 
mobilization process. Through the analysis of cases linked to the misuse of clerical 
positions, the chapter reveals how local secular (i.e., starostas and village mayors) and 
religious (parochial priests and the Consistory) representatives of power exercised their 
influence on the laity in Galicia and how these two powers competed with each other in 
order to keep control and maintain their effectiveness. 
 The fifth and final chapter is about the violent clashes and conflicts connected 
with the elections. This section discusses what role the clergy of both rites played in the 
conflicts and what effect violent events had on both the laity and national activists. The 
fifth chapter also unveils a shift in the interpretation of local conflicts from social 
tensions (mainly between landowners and peasantry) to national ones (between Poles 
and Ukrainians), and discusses the culmination of such tensions with close reference to 
the assassination of the local governor. 
 All of the case studies discussed in this research are related to the election process 
and public activity and reveal different aspects of mass mobilization. In some cases, the 
focus is more on the personalities of the priests and their motivation to engage in mass 
movements. In others, attention is shifted towards mass events and their interpretation 
and importance for mobilization. It would be beneficial to reconstruct more stories of 
the peasants regarding the importance of mass participation; however, there are no 
reliable detailed sources for such a purpose. This is the reason why I dedicate a lot of 
space to analyzing the relations and balance of power inside village communities.  
 Our knowledge about village communities can be deduced from sources that 
reconstruct relations between starosta or other officials and the clergy, such as reports to 
the governor and court processes against priests. The reconstruction of issues in village 
communities provides significant insight into the participation of peasants in mass 
mobilization, demonstrating how important the support of the peasants was for the parish 
priests and how they managed to mobilize their laity. I analyze these questions in detail 
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in Chapter three, which is based on documents related to court trials against priests and 
reveals the competition for power at village level. 
 In analyzing religious and state authority, this thesis reveals a complex pattern of 
struggles and competitions for power, control, and influence in Galicia at the start of the 
twentieth century. It is through understanding the unique environment of mass 
mobilization amongst the laity, workers and peasants, that the conflict between the Greek 
and Roman Catholics, as well as with the secular authorities, becomes apparent. 
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Chapter 1. The beginning of mass mobilization: between 
agricultural strikes and the struggle for electoral reforms 
 
Introduction  
 
The first decade of the twentieth century was an exceptionally intense time for mass 
mobilization. The massive agricultural strikes of 1902 and preparation for electoral 
reform in 1907 were the key events that stimulated the growth of peasant involvement 
in the political domain. Under the influence of mass politics, the Roman Catholic and 
Greek Catholic churches became nationalized and strongly connected to certain national 
projects (Polish, Ukrainian, or Russophile). Simultaneously, the clergy and laity started 
to be more and more actively involved in political life and develop intersections between 
Catholic ideas and political goals in Galicia.  
During strikes and public gatherings, Galician society (elites, local officials, and 
the clergy) became acquainted with the power of the masses. For the authorities, it was 
a time to experience power; for political parties, a time to test their ideology; and for 
landowners, a time to deal with the demands of peasants requiring improved salaries. 
This was also a time for the local Catholic churches (mainly Greek Catholic, as the 
strikes mostly happened in Eastern Galicia) to test the extent of their influence and to 
mediate relations between the laity and local officials. The most essential aim of both 
churches was to retain their control and influence over the laity and prevent the 
popularization of socialist ideas. The main strategy for the clergy to keep their influence 
over the laity lay in active participation in the lives of the laity, including their political 
education.    
The case studies in this chapter are vivid examples of how the demands on the 
clergy to be more involved in politics combined with ideas of being better Christians. 
The duties of the good Christian intersected with the duties of the good citizen, and in 
this way new strategies of social behavior emerged. The aim of the chapter is to seek 
answers to the following questions: how were the clergy and laity influenced by growing 
politicization? Why were the churches interested in lay participation in politics? Which 
tools and methods did the clergy use to mobilize the laity in the struggle around the 
electoral reforms? These questions unveil the issues addressed in the introduction: the 
nationalization of religious life and the transformation of the Catholic Church under the 
influence of mass mobilization.  
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Pillars of local Catholicism: the role of parish priests in their communities 
 
Parish priests were the main agents of the Church for communicating with leading 
parishioners. They knew the parishioners best and had authority as representatives of 
God. The strong position of the parish priest had its positive and negative sides. On the 
one hand, when parish priests decided to be more publicly involved and lead their 
parishes into active public and political participation, they held a better position than 
other activists because of their existing influence. The priests simply already had the 
established networks and tools required to lead and influence. On the other hand, the 
priest’s intense involvement in politics often resulted in the worsening of relations with 
the local administration and could also cause conflicts with the laity (particularly 
regarding different political views).  
It is important to keep in mind that priests had certain obligations towards 
government authorities, and this created a space of necessary interaction with the local 
government, schools, etc. In addition, congregations were dependent on their priests, as 
the priest was needed to perform the sacraments that took place in the life of every 
Christian, such as baptisms, weddings, and funerals. The importance of sacraments in 
the life of every peasant provided the priest with an opportunity to exploit his position 
for personal benefit, and in some cases to spread his convictions. 
The vision of the Church’s hierarchy of the behavior of the parish clergy was 
summarized in the document called Tabel Svojstv [Table of Virtues]. The Table of 
Virtues was simply a blank form with several fields to fill in, and its function was to 
provide information about a priest in case he moved from from one place of work to 
another. The Table was filled in for each priest and served as a personal dossier that 
evaluated a priest’s various qualifications. A closer look at the Table reveals which 
qualities were considered to be essential for priests.  
The characteristics assessed can be grouped into four categories (though the 
Table itself did not arrange the questions in any particular order): personal qualities and 
loyalty, ecclesiastical duties, secular duties, and school duties. The focus on these 
specific categories means that the role of the priest was set out within various spheres: 
the sacral and secular domains for duties and opportunities were thus clearly defined. 
The first category of data included: loyalty to the emperor, information about the trust 
and respect of the priest in the parish, the wisdom and prudence of his behavior, and 
23 
 
what weaknesses and insufficiences he possessed.46 Thus, these categories generally 
defined how well a priest fitted into the social hierarchy, as well as what kind of issues 
(weaknesses) he might have. 
With regard to ecclesiastical duties, the Church hierarchy inquired about 
preaching and holding services, taking care of the sick, participation in clerical meetings, 
the support of temperance brotherhoods, and donations to the foundation for supporting 
widows and orphans. This category reveals an emphasis on the social work of priests in 
their communities. The services that the priests performed were their greatest 
opportunity to get to know and influence their parishioners as well as to manipulate them 
and collect money. 
Priests’ secular and school obligations were the fields where they interacted with 
local authorities, in particular with starostas and teachers. The maintaining of parochial 
records in an orderly manner and the proper organization of the parish register and other 
government documents were among the secular obligations of the priest. In some cases, 
priests used their secular obligations to block the work of local officials, for example by 
not providing records about births and deaths in their parishes.  
The final category, related to the sphere of education, addressed questions such 
as: does the priest contribute to good order in the school? Does he have a good 
relationship with the teachers? Does he teach religion at the school?47 The relations 
between the local teacher and the priest were very important, as both were educated and 
motivated to make a difference in the village. However, they were not necessarily allies: 
in some cases, teachers were modern and skeptical of religion, while in others teachers 
and clergy had conflicting visions of political issues. This might even divide the 
community between those who trusted the teacher and those who trusted the priest.  
Unfortunately, the Table of Virtues did not provide any details regarding the 
priest’s skills in financial management or his political activity. This information is 
crucial for understanding the various cases of priests abusing their positions, as most 
reports by the secular authorities on priestly abuses addressed either financial or political 
misbehavior. 
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From the financial perspective, priests were responsible for the parish and the 
church lands that served as their source of income. Good management of this land could 
enrich a priest, but if it was managed badly priests could be tempted to raise the rates 
they charged for performing various sacraments to offset their losses. Additionally, 
priests’ political engagement became increasingly important as their parishioners’ 
political engagement grew. From the perspective of local authorities, politically engaged 
priests were a threat to peace within the community; from the Church’s point of view, 
priests needed to compromise between their pastoral duties and their involvement in 
mass mobilization. 
In most cases (unless there was a significant reason such as health conditions), 
priests were expected to teach religion at school;48 this was the arena in which they could 
interact with and influence pupils. As was stated above, schools were places where 
priests could make alliances with other teachers or, conversely, develop mutual hostility. 
In many cases, teachers held views that were too secular for the priests to stomach; in 
addition, teachers, as secularized intellectuals with a modern worldview, often saw 
priests as overly traditional and conservative. In short, the relationships between local 
priests and teachers varied greatly. The quality of such relationships mattered a great 
deal for communities because they could be a source of reconciliation or confrontation.  
An example of the arguments presented in this chapter is the case of Teodor 
Cegelskyj, Greek Catholic parish priest of the village of Strusov. It demonstrates how 
the secular duties of the priest and his political activity led to the involvement of secular 
and religious authorities in his own life and that of the village. The issue was addressed 
by the school inspector. He wrote a report which informed the Galician administration 
that Cegelskyj was using school pupils to organize and agitate people to take part in a 
political meeting.49 The involvement of pupils in such an activity was a problem, as it 
raised the issue of the abuse of priestly duties. After receiving the school inspector’s 
report, the Galician administration formally informed the Metropolitan’s Consistory (a 
high-level church institution) that Cegelskyj was believed to be asking his pupils during 
religious education classes to spread an invitation to a Ruthenian/Ukrainian political 
gathering.50 As priests were under the authority of religious institutions, it was now the 
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responsibility of the Metropolitan’s Consistory to investigate what had really happened 
and to prevent future recurrences. The Vice-regency suggested prohibiting all priests 
from distracting pupils from their studies.  
The Consistory stated in their response to the Vice-regency that Cegelskyj was 
not involved in encouraging pupils to participate in or organize any gatherings; rather, 
the pupils seemed to be acting on their own initiative. The Consistory’s investigation 
proved that the Ruthenian political gathering was only for a small group of people: none 
of the pupils had been present. The only possible guilt that could be attributed to the 
priest was that he had not monitored the pupils’ presence during his lessons, but a 
mistake of this sort was totally unrelated to politics or distracting the pupils from their 
studies.51 As a result of this careful and clearly structured answer from the Consistory, 
Cegelskyj was exonerated of any blame.  
Thus, the Consistory, as an institution responsible for the proper behavior of 
priests, had the duty to re-assure the Vice-regency that priests were performing their 
work properly and were not causing any political problems. In addition, the case reveals 
that the representatives of communities, including priests, were tied together and 
observed one another’s actions (like a teacher reporting a priest), especially in the field 
of political activity and mass mobilization. As discussed with regards to the Table of 
Virtues, priests had plenty of domains where their duties intersected with the duties of 
teachers and officials: thus, the position of the priest was multisided and allowed him to 
have influence on different spheres of public and religious life (i.e., social work, 
education, providing data on the population). In the next section of the chapter, I address 
the potential the priest’s position had during the agricultural strikes of 1902, as the strikes 
were mass events that involved many villages and almost all their representatives. The 
example of the strikes provides more insights on the relations between different members 
of communities and demonstrates how the priests were able to contribute to mass 
mobilization in their parishes. 
Shaking the pillars: the agricultural strikes of 1902 as the first active involvement 
of the Greek Catholic clergy in mass mobilization  
 
Emerging out of a growing number of smaller strike actions, the agricultural strikes of 
1902 were the first mass events with active peasant participation. Strikes throughout 
Europe were becoming a form of social manifestation, resistance, and demands for more 
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rights.52 The agricultural strike of 1902 and the preparation for electoral reforms were a 
rehearsal and approbation of social activity for both clergy and laity. This strike was 
mainly addressed against landowners and demanded from them an increase in wage for 
peasants as well as allowing mobility for the villagers. and an allowance for peasant 
mobility. The strike was one of the first manifestations of mass mobilization in Eastern 
Galicia. It thus provides a good insight into the dynamics of mass mobilization as they 
developed from these early stages to the wider involvement of clergy and peasantry 
during the first election to use universal male suffrage (1907).  
The agricultural strike was an example of coordinated action between peasants 
and their leaders, who very often were either local agitators or priests (sometimes one 
and the same person). The Greek and Roman Catholic clergy were challenged by the 
choice of whether to take an active or passive role during the strike, while the hierarchs 
were very worried about preserving peace and order among the laity. Thus, the strike 
was an opportunity, brought about by mass mobilization, to rethink the interactions 
between the clergy and laity in the public sphere. 
The main reason for the strike of 1902 was the unsatisfactory salaries of peasant 
workers. They demanded increased salaries, as it was not possible to survive with the 
existing ones. The peasants threatened the landlords for whom they were working that 
they would not take part in collecting the harvest as the wage was too low.53 
Additionally, the peasants noted that they would prefer to travel to Prussia for seasonal 
work, as the salaries there were much higher. From their side, the property owners 
refused to raise salaries, arguing that they did not have enough money. The landlords 
threatened the peasants that they would invite workers from other parts of the province 
or even the empire, so the peasants would thus lose their only source of income for at 
least one season.54 However, encouraged by information in the press, the peasants did 
not believe such threats, knowing that migrants would be much more expensive for the 
landlords than increasing salaries.  Furthermore, it would take too long to actually bring 
them to the fields: the harvest would not be completed in time. As the peasants and 
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landlords were quite codependent, they both had the means to pressure each other in 
disagreements over pay. 
Poverty and the disadvantaged position of the peasants were discussed in the 
press and official documentation as the main causes of the strike. At most risk were those 
in regions where the peasants did not have enough land in their possession and needed 
to work for a landowner in order to earn some of the harvest for themselves. The starosta 
from Kolomyja, for example, was not worried about the strike because at his Bezirk 
[starostwo] peasants earned enough. He wrote to the Vice-regency that the strike would 
not be successful as the peasants were quite wealthy and worked for themselves, not the 
landowners.55 Thus, the reason for the strike was initially economic: however, in the 
process of the strike other dimensions became visible, especially the difficulty in 
organizing the peasants to strike. 
The main problem with the strike was to convince the majority of peasants to 
take part (not go to work), since, just as with workers breaking the picket line, this would 
inevitably weaken the strike. If all potential workers refused to work, then the pressure 
on the landowners would improve the chances of receiving higher salaries. Without the 
help of agitators, it would clearly be problematic to organize an effective strike.  
The national democrats and socialists from the Ruthenian side supported and 
promoted the idea of strike action. Special brochures with precise descriptions on how 
to organize it were even spread in the villages. The brochure56 advised that it was very 
important to prepare correctly before establishing strikes: it was particularly vital to elect 
a strike committee that would organize others, select the most effective time to strike, 
and then negotiate with landowners about salaries. The most important factor during the 
strike itself was to behave calmly and to be united. One of the agitators characterized it 
thus: “it should be as quiet in the village as in church.”57 If there were any open tension, 
then this would be a reason for the starosta to use the military, an unnecessary turn for 
those on strike. So, the idea of united group pressure was probated by strikes. In various 
villages, the strikes led to better salaries for peasant work.  
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Besides the peasants and agitators who organized the strike together, the clergy 
and local authorities were important actors that influenced the positive or negative 
outcome of the strike. In terms of the strike itself, the parish priests often were selected 
as negotiators between the landowners and the peasants. One of the best examples of 
clerical involvement is the case of the Greek Catholic priest Bohachevsky, who was also 
a deputy in parliament. Bohachevsky, together with the starosta, had to agree on the 
salaries for peasants: however, the negotiations did not go smoothly, as the starosta and 
the priest could not come to an agreement between themselves. The starosta suggested 
that the peasants agree on the landlord’s proposition of an increased wage lower than the 
one the peasants required. He argued that nobody would give them a higher price. The 
priest supported the peasants in continuing the strike, and because of this the starosta 
accused the priest of blowing up the negotiations. The priest claimed that he was chosen 
by the governor to reach an agreement with the landlords and that the starosta was 
blocking him from doing so. In addition to this, priest Bohachevsky intended to collect 
factual information about the strike in order to discuss the issue in parliament and 
provide statistical data to clarify the reasons for the strike.58  
 So, both negotiators, the starosta and the priest, had other motives for 
participating in the negotiations besides reaching an agreement for the peasants. For the 
starosta, it was important to end the strike and resume normal relations between the 
peasants and the landowners, while for the priest it was interesting to research the nature 
of the issue. Bohachevsky travelled to other villages to negotiate and collect data. There, 
other local starostas also expressed suspicions about him, as he was negotiating the 
prices only until April 1903. One starosta wrote to the Vice-regency that Bohachevsky 
was probably planning a new strike in 1903 with demands for higher salaries.59 
Therefore, the starostas suspected this priest of agitation and having a bad influence on 
social order.  
Taking into account the possible danger of priests’ communication with peasants, 
some starostas convinced the Vice-regency to send gendarmes to services in Greek 
Catholic churches, especially during religious holidays,60 in order to keep an eye on what 
priests communicated to the laity. In addition, the gendarmes had to report their 
observations to the Vice-regency and organize regular watches during the Easter 
holidays. Thus, the holidays, with crowds of participants and the active role of priests, 
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were seen as potential preparation for future strikes. The local authorities were clearly 
concerned by the nature of holidays, which brought together and united large numbers 
of participants and presented opportunities for spreading dissent or fomenting it into 
public disturbance. Thus, the strike created the circumstances for a clash between the 
authority of the starosta and the priest; the future widening of the electoral laws only 
intensified this. 
As the strikes were mostly organized by Ruthenian activists and clergy against a 
background of social injustice towards peasants, the question about the role of Roman 
Catholics in these events appears very natural. Even though the eastern part of Galicia 
had a majority of Greek Catholic Ruthenians, the villages had mixed Polish-Jewish-
Ruthenian populations. Everything regarding the social position of Ruthenian peasants 
held true for Roman Catholic Poles. However, this was not true for Jews, as they 
normally did not work in agriculture. Therefore, the idea of uniting against injustice and 
the low payments offered by property owners was as hot for the Polish peasants as it was 
for the Ruthenians. However, it was the Ruthenian priests and activists who inspired the 
strike, and they posed the question: “What to do with Roman Catholic peasants?”61 The 
answer to this question was not easy, as some of the agitators appealed only to oppressed 
Ruthenians and named Poles as a cause of suffering. Other agitators encouraged 
engagement with the Roman Catholic peasantry in order to inspire them to strike as well: 
after all, they “had the same problems and all peasants are united by the same interests.”62  
The local lawyer Lonhyn Tsehel’s’kyy’s brochure Straykovi prava abo chy vil’no 
straykuvaty? [“The right to strike, or is striking allowed?”], published in Lemberg in 
1903, elaborated on this idea, arguing that both types of peasant (Roman and Greek 
Catholic) “were neighbors, blood relatives, having one language and one tradition and 
thus should be united”.63 However, the problem was that there were interested parties 
(the Roman Catholic clergy and Polish agitators) who wanted to convince Roman 
Catholics that they were different from Ruthenians.64 At this point in mass mobilization 
(the initial stage), there were still a lot of bridges that united the two rites, especially 
among those belonging to same social stratum (peasantry). In addition, mutual and long-
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lasting coexistence had created plenty of similarities between the Greek and Roman 
Catholics (Poles and Ruthenians, respectively). With the further nationalization and 
politicization of the Ruthenian and Poles, these similarities were undermined while 
differences (rite, origin, etc.) were emphasized. This is very visible in the preparation for 
the election of 1907, which I discuss in chapters four and five. 
The Roman Catholic clergy was also seen as breaking the unity between the 
Roman and Greek Catholic peasantry by, for example, supporting and promoting the 
idea to ignore strikes among Roman Catholic peasantry, since this peasantry had to 
support Roman Catholic property owners.65 However, this hypothesis regarding the role 
of the Roman Catholic clergy was expressed by Ruthenians, so it is unlikely to have been 
true. The important idea behind this statement was that Roman Catholics were 
considered potential supporters of Ruthenian ideas: there was still no clear way to 
distinguish between Ruthenians and Poles besides rite. 
The hierarchy of the Church could not ignore the strike and felt the need to 
express their opinion about it. The Roman Catholic Archbishop Jozef Bilczewsky stated: 
“The peasants had a right to fight for their rights in a calm and just way”66 however he 
emphasized that it is important for the peasants to ask for a realistic wage, not one that 
is too high. The Ukrainian oriented newspaper Dilo, while discussing instructions of the 
Roman Catholic archbishop, wrote immediately that the Roman Catholic clergy was 
against strikes and instead of supporting peasants, the priests were scaring them, 
claiming that those who strike would go to hell.67 Certainly, Dilo is not an adequate 
source if we take into account its ideological preferences. However, what is important is 
that the newspaper emphasized the negative attitude of the Roman Catholic clergy 
towards strikes, thus contributing to worsening the relations with the Roman Catholic 
clergy and discouraging the laity from possible participation in the strikes. This concern 
highlighted that the position of the local clergy, as well as the interpretation of this 
position in the press, was a very important condition for the successful outcome of the 
strike. 
The position of Greek Catholic Archbishop Andrej Sheptytsky was similar to 
that of the Roman Catholic bishop. Sheptytsky emphasized in his appeal about strikes 
that “parish priests had to remind peasants to act calmly, legally, and to avoid any kind 
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of violence.”68 However, the archbishop also provided precise instructions for the clergy, 
asking them to report to him about the strikes and to remember that the parish clergy 
could do a lot regarding the matter of strikes, as they lived close to the people and could 
be a mediator between the peasants and property owners.69 Thus, the Greek Catholic 
archbishop defined clearly what the role of the clergy should be during strikes. 
Publishing the appeal of the archbishop, the Ukrainian-oriented clerical newspaper 
Ruslan stated that there were no doubts that priests would listen to the words of the 
archbishop and act accordingly. So, actively engaged priests were seen as a good tool in 
the success of strikes, since they could calm the peasants and help them to get better 
wages. 
As was already discussed, local authorities, mainly the starostas, saw a 
mobilizing potential in priests and thus kept an eye on them. The starosta of the town of 
Rohatyn was extremely worried that the clergy would be inspired by radical politicians 
and help them to organize strikes. The starosta explained his fear: “the priest in each 
parish could prepare the ground for the strike without any additional efforts and 
gatherings.”70 For the starosta, the most serious problem was that it would be very hard 
for him to predict the strike, as the priest could organize everything silently and without 
drawing unnecessary attention. Thus, the starosta was powerless to prevent the strike 
from happening. Under such circumstances, local officials were more suspicious about 
the parish clergy and transmitted the message to local government that the clergy were 
the main, or at least very important, organizers of the strike. 
Earlier, the same starosta claimed that his district was very calm, mainly because 
the clergy were against strikes. The starosta argued that “the priests wanted the peasants 
to be submissive and obedient to clergy”.71 This, in his opinion, was the reason why 
strikes had not occurred in the district: “In the case of the clergy’s neutral attitude to the 
strikes, the strike would spread.”72 As is evident from the paragraph above, the priests 
had actually changed their attitude and become supportive of the strikes. In his turn, the 
starosta became more attentive to their behavior, as for him the opinion of the priest was 
decisive. Thus, the clergy were becoming important public leaders in their communities 
and were treated as such by starostas. Later on, this experience would motivate priests 
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to become the active promoters of electoral reforms and to mobilize peasants to support 
them. 
There were examples of priests who were not successful organizers of strikes. 
For example, the starosta from Borshchov reported that the priest of the village of 
Dzvinyachka, Dmytro Kurdydyk, had criticized his laity during the sermon, claiming 
that the laity “were sitting like fools and not taking part in strikes.”73 He advised the 
peasants to take those who were striking as an example, as such people were caring about 
themselves and their children.74 Such a speech during a religious service was reason 
enough for gendarmes to detain some peasants and question them as witnesses. 
However, the peasants told them that they had not understood the speech or were 
standing too far from the altar to hear it properly. Apparently, the laymen did not want 
to testify against their own priest. The local starosta was not so worried about the priest’s 
speech, explaining that the priest gave it after the harvest and thus it was too late to 
strike.75 Peasants could succeed if they struck before or during the harvest because the 
property owners had a limited window of time. Afterwards, they could hire peasants 
from other regions and the strike would not be fruitful. The example of the priest 
Kurdydyk shows that some priests were even using religious services to mobilize 
peasants and to criticize their laity for being passive. Additionally, the laity, even after 
being criticized, aimed to protect their priest from possible accusations/court trials, most 
likely out of respect for or fear of the priest. 
Little is known about the political orientation of the clergy who were actively 
involved in the strike. Two types of priestly political behavior were most evident 
according to the observation of starostas. Thus, it is possible to assume that at least two 
political parties were engaged in the strikes. One priest-activist, Stephan Onyshkevych, 
was characterized by a starosta as one of the leaders of the Ruthenian Radical Party.76 
This priest, besides agitating for a strike, also supported the idea that bishops and 
archbishops should be elected, not appointed, in the Greek Catholic Church. In this way, 
the Church sought to become more independent from the preferences of local or state 
power. Most likely, the idea that the priest belonged to the Radical Party was just 
assumption of the starosta, as this party was criticized by Church hierarchs77 and the 
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priest could have been persecuted for such a political preference. Nevertheless, the 
Radical Party was an active organizer of the strikes.78 
In contrast, the Russophile Party and the priests involved in it were spreading 
ideas about the negative side of the strikes and trying to prevent them from happening. 
The main argument that Russophiles used against strikes was that the landowners were 
the only source of income for peasants; by striking or damaging landlords’ property, the 
peasants would only become poorer.79 Thus, the engagement or support of certain 
political parties created mutually exclusive ideas among the clergy and contributed to 
their division into hostile camps.  
The clergy therefore held considerable influence and sway over the laity. They 
were able to influence mobilization in terms of strikes, depending upon the level of 
political engagement or motivation of an individual priest. The examples detailed above 
clearly show the potential of priests as political organizers. They also show that while 
priests were not universally political active, some were willing and able to work on their 
own initiative, independent of their religious superiors. In terms of society overall, it is 
also evident from the strikes of 1902 that the peasants were becoming increasingly aware 
and courageous about exercising the power to withhold labour as a form of protest or 
political influence. In addition, the desire of the starostas to always retain quiet public 
order put them at odds with the more politically engaged priests. Whilst both the Church 
and the secular authorities had an interest in maintaining public order, it is clear that the 
religious paternalism felt by priests towards their laity shaped their relationship to 
mobilizing peasants. For priests who saw their role as being more political, supporting 
their laity in political mobilization would undoubtedly create tension with the local 
starostas. With the growing politicization created by universal male suffrage in 1907, the 
role of the Catholic clergy and tensions with starostas were only to increase. 
Building new pillars: electoral reforms and the role of the Catholic clergy 
 
In 1906, the Austrian monarchy was widely discussing the idea of universal male 
suffrage to elect deputies to imperial parliament and the utility of such a reform 
throughout the empire. The provinces saw great potential in such a reform, as it would 
bring more local representatives to the imperial parliament. Galicia was no exception. 
During strikes, numerous peasants had learned to move their fight with the property 
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owners into the public sphere: electoral reform seemed to be the next step for gaining 
better living conditions. Kai Struve and Keely Stauter-Halsted emphasize that the 
peasants had learned how to be active in this public and political spheres,80 and this 
brought them skills and the desire to fight for their own rights, such as the right to vote. 
John Boyer highlighted that for many contemporaries the reform of 1907 seemed like 
“the equivalent of giving the Habsburg Empire a new constitution.”81 Boyer claims that 
certain groups, such as “the Czechs, the workers, and the petite bourgeoisie, and from 
an ideological perspective, both the Social Democrats and the Catholics”,82 were great 
supporters of the electoral reforms and saw huge potential in them. In the 1950s, Willian 
Jenks analyzed in detail the antecedents and mechanisms of the reform.83 Pieter Judson 
focuses on the results of the reforms of 1897 and 1907, emphasizing that the reforms 
themselves “repeatedly challenged existing political movements either to absorb and 
mobilize new classes of voters into their ranks or to risk obsolescence.”84 In summary, 
the reform was welcomed warmly throughout the empire as it offered new possibilities 
for different social and national groups. 
In Galicia, the clergy of both rites were also trying their best to mobilize the 
peasants to support the planned reforms. After the experience that parochial clergy had 
gained during the strikes of 1902, they were more aware of the power within the 
mobilized masses. Thus, in 1906-1907, when the acceptance of the new electoral law 
was on the table, the clergy already had respect for mass power and an idea of how to 
organize peasants in support of this reform. The parish priests knew that they could play 
an important role in mobilizing their laity. The chance to practice this role was provided 
by the preparation and discussion of a new electoral law that would provide any man 
over 25 in all the crown lands of the empire with the possibility to vote. This was a huge 
new opportunity for the peasants, who until then had no real influence on the political 
powers. The change was even greater for the so-called Ruthenian ‘minority’ (actually, 
their population was the same size as the ‘majority’ but held the legal status of a 
‘minority’). The political reform was more significant for Ruthenians as they could 
redress the balance of ‘ethnic power’ by electing more representatives to parliament and 
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challenge the Polish-centric representation of Galician interests. Thus, for the Greek 
Catholic clergy it was even more important to engage the laity and push them into 
actively supporting electoral reforms and further elections: in doing so, they could really 
change the existing order of things. 
In most cases (based on the reports of starostas and responses from the Vice-
regency), the main activity of the priests was to organize or participate in the gatherings 
that supported electoral reforms and use their position in the community to encourage 
the laity to do the same. Below, I analyze the typical motivation and scenario of such 
gatherings, the role of the priest and laity, and the political ideas they spread. Such an 
analysis unveils how mass mobilization began in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, why the 
clergy were important activists in it, and what ideas served best to mobilize the peasantry 
into the political domain. Certainly, not all the representatives of the parish clergy were 
involved in the mass mobilization of the laity. However, based on official reports about 
gatherings from starostas, the priests were very active participants in most of the 
meetings in 1906-07. 
The main motivation for the clergy was to encourage the laity’s participation in 
elections, and thus elect deputies with strong Christian values and Catholic support. For 
the laity, the most important motivation was the possibility to improve their status and 
position within society. The gatherings themselves were an opportunity to discuss 
various ideas related to electoral reforms, as well as issues that were not directly related 
but were considered extremely important. One such issue was the inequality of access to 
power for Ruthenians and Poles, as well as the economic disadvantages of the peasantry 
in comparison to property owners (the latter was a continuation of the issue that caused 
the strikes in 1902).85 Certainly, the priest and laity were not the only participants in the 
gatherings: there were also local officials and, in some cases, gendarmes who observed 
and upheld public order. In many cases, representatives of the political parties 
participated at the gatherings, as they were preparing the ground for the future election. 
All these participants brought their own perspectives and motivations on the importance 
of the reforms and the opportunities they brought. 
Speaking about the Ruthenian gatherings, one of the starostas characterized them 
in the following way: “the agitators are the youth and professors from the gymnasium 
… students and priests that put on themselves the role of participants and organizers of 
the movement. In general, the idea of agitation is to enlighten Ruthenian peasants and 
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encourage them to be patriotic, but they (the agitators) are also stimulating hatred 
towards Poles and landowners.”86 Thus, the starosta briefly characterized the audience 
and motivations of those organizing the gatherings. He explained further his struggle 
with this movement: “it is hard to trace the movement, as it is developing in reading 
houses, during closed meetings or gatherings of the clergy.”87 In such circumstances, the 
details of the movement were not accessible to the starosta, and he could not identify 
what level of hatred between nationalities and social groups would emerge.  
Some parish clergy were not politically engaged. On the one hand, the clergy lost 
their importance in communities to political agitators. As John-Paul Himka summarized, 
“priests taught peasants the importance of political action, but this necessarily implied 
their own displacement from the center of the political stage.”88 Very often, the political 
activists took the leading role in mobilizing peasants. The starosta of the town of 
Nadvirna stated that political agitators mobilized peasants in the town and made them 
aggressive towards the clergy and nobility.89 On the other hand, there could be other 
explanations for why some clergy avoided politics (not only fear of agitators). In a few 
cases, the parish priest had not realized the importance of mass mobilization and the 
need to be actively involved in it, whilst others considered public activity as optional or 
as a distraction from their core priestly duties. Very often, the clergy saw their role as 
mediators or keepers of public order. In such a situation, the parish priests were not 
leaders but still participated in public activity to calm the peasants when things became 
tense. 
The actions of the Greek Catholic hierarchy were especially motivating for the 
behavior of priests. The bishops preached how crucial it was for the clergy to organize 
the peasants to support electoral reforms and how much potential the clergy held given 
that they were the ones closest to the peasants. The role of the clergy in the public sphere 
was motivated not only by instructions from the bishops but also by the possibility to 
improve the social and economic position of the laity. I emphasize economic 
improvement as an element of agitation in the next chapter when discussing cases about 
the political preferences and conflicts that the clergy experienced.  
The Catholic clergy and Jews in light of future mass suffrage 
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The other motivation for clergy to become active mobilizers was to prevent peasants 
from possible troubles, such as imprisonment and clashes with Jews: the gathered 
crowds might become uncontrolled and aggressive. Very often when raising the issue of 
societal inequality, one of the reasons given for such inequality was the position of Jews, 
who rented various things (but mainly the right to sell vodka) from the nobility and then 
sold them to peasants.90 Thus, the Jews were seen as speculators who did not work hard 
but extracted money from the industrious peasants. For the parish priest, it was extremely 
important to calm any agitations against the Jews, mainly because the threat to public 
peace would result in the imprisonment of peasants and a long prohibition on gatherings. 
As mentioned previously, the priests were influenced by a paternalistic view of the laity 
and their rights, and so were reluctant to see actions that would allow starostas to cancel 
the right to assemble. Furthermore, if gatherings were prohibited the potential for the 
Church to get their message to the flock and influence political change would be 
seriously damaged. However, some priests found a way to deliver their message in such 
circumstances, as is visible in other chapters of the thesis: they managed to use sermons 
during the religious service as a tool to agitate the laity. 
The attitude to Jews, which was announced at various gatherings, had two sides. 
On the one side, various gatherings, while requiring election reforms for Ruthenians, 
also mentioned the importance of electoral reforms for Jews, in particular the 
opportunity to have their own representatives in parliament. At first glance, such 
declarations seem like evidence of tolerance; however, this was not the sole factor. 
Ruthenians were concerned that if Jews did not have their own representatives, they 
would try to be elected as Ruthenian representatives. In addition, Jews were considered 
as possible allies against Poles. This was actually a practice during the 1907 
parliamentary elections, when the Ruthenians and Jews allied and supported each other’s 
candidates.91 If Ruthenian representatives were not available to vote for in some places, 
then they voted for the Jewish candidate, and vice versa: this was tactical vote swapping.  
The other side was the presence of agitation against Jews based on clearly anti-
semitic ideas. Such agitation was not dominant, but it was present: at least two priests 
were active representatives of it. The starosta of the town of Rudky (50 km from 
Lemberg) complained to the Vice-regency that the local priest Stefan Onyshkevych was 
writing articles with an anti-semitic message for the newspaper Dilo: the starosta noted 
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that because nobody knew about his writings, it was easy and secure for him to continue 
doing so.92 The neighboring priest Julian Humieckyj (from the village of Horozhava 
Velyka), who encouraged people to boycott Jewish business and goods, was definitely 
an ally of Onyshkevych.93 Thus, there were two mutually exclusive ideas: to fight with 
the Jews (by supporting Jewish candidates in the absence of a Ruthenian one) or against 
the Jews (boycott them and their businesses). Both were present in the gatherings and 
developed further in the press. 
Relations between Poles and Ruthenians  
Also at the core of most gatherings were the relations between Poles and Ruthenians. 
During various gatherings, the main subject of attention besides electoral reform itself 
was social inequality and injustice. In many cases, the reason for social inequality was 
seen in the advanced position of some other nationality. Poles, like Jews, were blamed 
for causing the poverty and suffering of the Ruthenian peasants. Some activists 
distinguished between the Polish nobility, which actually possessed most of the 
resources in Galicia, and Polish peasants, who were just as unprivileged as Ruthenians.94 
However, some activists generalized and built an argument against the Polish nation as 
the cause of all social problems. Such generalization and polarization between 
nationalities is extremely visible in the violent clashes that I analyze in the last chapter 
of the thesis. 
Upcoming election reforms and the woman question 
The widening of women’s rights was also among the questions raised at the gatherings. 
However, this issue was not as popular as discussing relations between nationalities or 
social injustice. The reasons for this are quite evident: the women’s rights movement 
was still growing and the question of emancipation was more typical for the urban sphere 
than the rural one. Even so, a couple of gatherings spoke specifically about women’s 
rights. At a gathering in Vrozhniava, the priest Andrij Pelenskyj agitated for political 
equality for women, arguing that women had duties equally as complicated as men’s and 
thus needed to have equal rights.95 Pelenskyj repeated the same arguments at other 
gatherings. 
The participation of women was mentioned in a number of other gatherings. In 
most cases, women were part of the gathering and thus participated in all actions related 
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to it. At the gathering in Gorlice in 1906, the female activist Kazimiera Bujwidowa 
spoke. She argued that women should have the right to vote as they worked even harder 
than men: at home and at work.96 A number of gatherings led by priests also supported 
women’s suffrage using similar arguments. This was a very important sign for women, 
as in the majority of cases they were very religious and would not have become involved 
without the blessing of the clergy. Thus the support of local clergy encouraged women 
to be politically active within the constraints of the time. Further in the thesis, I refer to 
other ideas and examples of women’s roles in politics and the struggle for electoral 
rights. 
In conclusion, the role of the parochial clergy was very important in organizing 
and leading various gatherings. The parochial priests knew their laity and had authority 
among them, making them able to transmit the message most appealing to the lay people. 
Most of all, the priests worked on keeping the peace in their villages: this was essential 
in order to avoid prohibitions against gatherings or the involvement of gendarmes and 
the military, which would totally stop any public participation for a while. Whilst the 
clergy were separated between the Roman or Greek Catholic rites and generally along 
national lines, there was a clear understanding that national or ethnic motivations for 
uniting could lead to unwanted disorder. Thus we see the clergy operating flexibly within 
their own lay communities as mediators or, more directly, as political agitators. 
The common scenario and the message of the gatherings 
The gatherings served two main purposes: to inform peasants about electoral laws and 
to help them recognize the possible benefits of universal male suffrage; and to gather 
signatures in support of the electoral law. Thus, the core activity of the gatherings was 
to adopt some resolution, sign it, and send it as a telegram to the Minister of the Interior. 
The main goal of the organizers was to emphasize that the peasants were ready for 
political change and to fight for this change. In various rallies, the idea was brought up 
that the peasants would organize a massive strike if they were defeated.97 This threat was 
a direct result of the strikes discussed in the previous section. These events revealed to 
peasants that strikes were a powerful tool for influencing society and that they actually 
had something to use against social injustice. 
The gatherings devoted to the support of electoral reform needed to receive 
approval from the local authorities (starostas) to be legal. Normally, if all the paper work 
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(this included announcing the program and topics of the gathering) was organized 
properly, the starostas allowed gatherings.98 Typically, the gatherings took place on 
Sunday in some large hut in the village or at the priest’s home. Very often, it was the 
priest who took care of the organization, place, and agenda of the gatherings. In a 
majority of the rallies, a representative of the Vice-regency was present and observed if 
the gathering was properly organized and followed the topics announced to the 
starosta.99 Frequently, the gathering took place just after the religious service, and most 
of the laity present at the service, including women and children, moved to the place of 
the rally. This meant that there was a wide and varied audience at the gatherings: a priest 
was also very often at the core of the organization. 
When a priest was the leader of a gathering, he started it with a prayer and then 
moved on to a short lecture about what the electoral law meant and how it would 
contribute to improving the lives of the laity. The lecture itself could be prepared by a 
priest or be read from the very popular brochure Proch z kuryyamy! Proch z 
panovaniyem paniv [Away with the curias! Away with the dominance of the nobility], 
written by Lonhyn Tsehel’s’kyy.100 At some gatherings, only the priest spoke. Even 
when the priests encouraged discussion or suggested giving the stage to other presenters 
after his speech, villagers preferred to remain passive. Most likely, they were not 
confident and knowledgeable enough to express their thoughts at this stage of mass 
mobilization. As will be visible in other chapters of the thesis, this passivity changed 
with time (especially during the election in 1907) and the laity became much more active 
in voicing their needs. Thus, the public work of priests bore results. 
There were also gatherings that involved more presenters then just a priest. In 
most cases, these were gatherings in larger villages or small towns with participants from 
neighboring villages. The priests of these villages encouraged their laity to participate 
and attended the rally together with them to serve as an example.101 The most dynamic 
were gatherings in which political activists took part along with the priests. In these 
cases, the same message about the importance of electoral reform was expressed from 
both secular and sacral representatives. In addition, such gatherings were also an 
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example of dialogue between active priests and agitators.102 This dialogue might have 
been mutually supportive or mutually antagonistic. However, intense confrontation was 
not possible because of the presence of the representative of the Vice-regency, who could 
cancel the gathering at any moment if he considered it a threat to public order. None of 
the presenters wanted this to happen, so they tried not to cause deep confrontation.  
At the end of the gatherings, the participants normally signed or voted to support 
some resolution on the issue of electoral reforms. Typically, they appealed to the 
Minister of the Interior to grant universal male suffrage, more representatives for their 
nationality, and the right for women to vote (in some cases).103 Occasionally, there was 
a threat in the appeal that if the requests were not fulfilled, then the peasants would 
organize a large strike.104 Some brochures (for example, Away with the curias! Away 
with the dominance of the nobility) read at the gatherings stated that “the imperial 
government agreed to introduce the electoral reforms because of the fear that the 
Austrian monarchy would fall apart.”105 According to the brochure, citizens should 
pressure the government to implement the reforms. 
After the gatherings, the appeal was telegrammed to Vienna. So, the aim of the 
gatherings to give participants the feeling that important action had been accomplished 
was partially achieved. This feeling became even stronger after the introduction of 
universal suffrage, as it was seen as a victory to those who supported electoral reforms 
in the gatherings. The victory also proved that it was possible to require more equitable 
laws from the government.106 Thus, after the agricultural strikes, the electoral reform 
was seen as the next win by common citizens and inspiration for the future fight for a 
more just society. 
The last, but by no means least, element of the gatherings was the ending. At the 
end of many gatherings, its participants sang songs and organized a march through the 
streets while singing. The repertoire of songs depended on the atmosphere and political 
context of the gatherings. If the atmosphere was neutral, they sang religious songs about 
God and his love for his people, but if the gatherings had a patriotic component, the 
songs were devoted to a certain nationality or even against other nationalities in the cases 
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of more radical gatherings (for example, the Ruthenian song “It is not a time to serve 
Poles”).107 Thus, the participants, even when passive during the gatherings themselves, 
had a chance to take an active part in spreading ideas in a more informal and relaxing 
way, in particular by composing and performing songs with certain messages. 
Even though Galician villages normally consisted of more than one nationality 
and the widening of the electoral system was beneficial for every nationality, gatherings 
in support of the electoral reforms were organized separately. One of the reasons for this 
separation was the leadership role of the priest. As the priests were organizers and 
encouragers of the gatherings, they had access only to their own laity, which mainly 
consisted of one nationality. This worked to exclude other nationalities from 
participation (especially the Jews, who had a totally different religious leader). The other 
reason was a slightly different interpretation of the electoral reforms by the activists. The 
Ruthenian activists, including clergy, highlighted that an increased number of deputies 
would be a fairer and more desirable solution for the problems of Ruthenians. However, 
Polish activists, also including clergy, emphasized that the number of Ruthenian deputies 
should remain low: otherwise, the Ruthenians could challenge Polish dominance in the 
province.108 Certainly, these two ideas could not work well together at the same 
gatherings: they were mutually exclusive and contributed to tensions between the 
nationalities. 
Nobody was interested in having gatherings that had representatives from 
different nationalities. For local officials, this was a threat to public order; for the priest, 
a threat to his authority and influence over the laity; and for national and other activists, 
an awkward situation that required the defense and explanation of their views. Only a 
few gatherings were multinational. One of them took place in 1906 in the village of 
Rodatychi, where Ruthenian and Polish parish priests led the gathering. The gathering 
itself did not express strong political ideas and was characterized as calm. However, the 
Roman Catholic priest was not a good speaker: he had not prepared properly and spoke 
about the threat of socialism rather than electoral reforms, so he was asked to stop. The 
gathering ended and the majority of its participants walked to the Ruthenian gathering 
in a neighboring village.109 In this case, the mutual gathering was not very effective or 
interesting for its participants, as one of the priests was more active than the other.  
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The other example of a mutual gathering was the Polish-organized gathering in 
the village of Lanky. At this gathering, the Ruthenian peasants wanted to present in 
Ruthenian, but the leader of the rally, the Roman Catholic priest Lozinsky, objected to 
the use of Ruthenian, saying: “At a Polish gathering, the Polish language should be 
used.”110 This statement provoked quarrels between the Ruthenian and Polish 
participants. Thus, the local officials and gendarmes present announced the cancellation 
of the meeting. The starosta wrote in his report that this was a Ruthenian plan to sabotage 
the Polish gathering and thus only have Ruthenian gatherings in the region.111  
In conclusion, this closer look at the gatherings reveals precisely how the parish 
priests acted and motivated the laity to take part in mass mobilization. The most 
important observation is that religious practices were integrated into the public sphere, 
demonstrating how the Church and its representatives were incorporating Catholic and 
political actions into mutually complementary social behavior. Gatherings centred 
around the priest of a particular rite therefore took on a degree of ‘ethnic’ exclusivity. 
For priests of different rites, nationality and political mobilization were becoming 
intertwined. 
The component of nationalism in the gatherings 
The political and social ideas expressed during the gatherings were the basis on which 
the main motivation for mass participation was constructed. As I already discussed, the 
core of this motivation was social injustice and the poor economic position of the 
peasants. This focus was used by all nationalities and so was not national at its core. 
However, due to disproportionate representation in parliament as well as the increased 
activity of national activists, nation-building processes were more and more associated 
with mass mobilization and even equated with it.  
A poster advertising a Ruthenian gathering is a great example of the political-
religious reinforcement discussed above. Firstly, the poster made a point about the 
disparity between the number of deputies that peasants and nobles had in parliament. 
Then it stated that a new electoral law would challenge this inequality for the good of 
the peasants and that the peasants totally deserved this change as they were more 
hardworking and useful for the state than the nobility. The poster summarized the main 
motivation in the following words: “At this gathering should be everybody who values 
our faith, who appreciates our native language, who wants good for himself, his children, 
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and grandchildren, who values his holy land, and who wants to be his own host/master 
on his Ruthenian land”.112 This quotation is an excellent example of the intersection of 
sacral and secular values (and, respectively, of the sacral and secular spheres), as well as 
of a certain logic of establishing equivalence between the religious and the national (faith 
as equal to native language, the good, and holy land). This was a common strategy for 
integrating pre-established sacral values into new political values (native land, culture, 
faith, etc.). Within the next few years, this connection between Catholic and national 
values would develop further: in the following chapters, it will be demonstrated how the 
Church actually incorporated the equivalance between love of God and love of the 
Motherland. 
The Roman Catholic Church was following the same process of rapprochement 
between patriotic (and, in some interpretations, nationalistic) values and religious ones. 
At the gathering in Brzezia (in 1906), the representative of the People’s Party, Franciszek 
Bardel, emphasized that equality in the election law was required to fulfil the Christian 
principle of the equality of people before God and the law. The other speaker at this 
gathering, Kaetan Kalas, emphasized the importance of solidarity between working 
people, nobility and clergy: “People should unite for the love of Motherland and respect 
of religion.”113 This example reveals how political party (in this case Stronnictwo 
ludowe [People’s Party]) was using alliance with the Roman Catholic Church for 
promotion of their own ideology. 
A similar message was pronounced by the politically active clergy of the Roman 
Catholic Church. For example, the priest and deputy Zyhulinsky stated that electoral 
reform was a requirement of the times and that the Catholic Church had always been 
very good at adapting itself to such needs. Thus, the electoral reform would only 
reinforce the social role of the Church, which meant the clergy should openly support 
this reform.114 A similar idea was expressed by the priest Stojalowski, who emphasized 
the importance of Christian love and unity under the motto of “God and Motherland”, as 
well as relying on Evangelical and patriotic values.115 Thus, through the mutually 
supporting mottos coming from clergy and political activists, the Roman and Greek 
churches were, step by step, becoming part of political life by adopting elements of the 
nationalist movement. 
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Conclusions 
 
Within Galician communities, the clergy held a position of influence. Through this 
influence came the opportunity to motivate and coordinate peasant involvement in mass 
mobilization. The extent of a priest’s involvement depended largely on an individual 
priest’s goals and perceived responsibilities. What is evident is that many priests, in line 
with the Table of Virtues, perceived it as their duty and responsibility to take a fatherly 
view of the peasants, which increasingly included becoming involved in politicisation.  
One of the the first opportunities for priests to explore their potential role in 
exercising influence on the laity was as mediators for strikes. In some cases, priests took 
an active role in assisting with the mobilisation of peasants for strike action. In other 
cases, they acted solely as mediators between disgruntled strikers and landowners or 
local officials. In both these instances, the involvement of priests created tension with 
the local starostas, who wanted to retain public order. The strikes of 1902 thus show the 
emerging signs of an increasingly political role for priests and the potential areas of 
tension that would later increase between individual priests, starostas, the Church 
hierarchy, and the secular authorities.  
The 1906 political movement subsequently presented the opportunity for priests 
to have a more official role as mediators or even leaders and become more widely 
involved in community life. The Catholic Church recognised the need to take on this 
role but also that it had to more closely guide the involvement of its priests. The foci of 
the Church emerge more clearly – countering socialist threats; cementing their ‘religious 
role’ alongside the political duty to further the well-being of their ‘flock’; and 
demonstrating the importace of Catholic values and institutions in public life.  It is 
through the active involvement of the clergy in 1906 (organising gatherings, preaching, 
and publishing news articles and brochures) that we see how the Church was trying to 
maneuver during a time of great upheaval. 
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Chapter 2. The Catholic hierarchy on the role of clergy and 
women in the process of mass mobilization 
 
The two important aspects that served as guidelines for the clergy’s involvement in the 
mass mobilization process were the vision of the Church’s hierarchs on clerical political 
participation and the perception of women’s role in the social and political fields. I 
combined these two issues into one chapter as they have a number of similarities and 
were directed to groups whose traditional role was in question. Both topics had the 
potential to very strongly question the existing societal order and even threaten the 
domination of the Catholic Church. Clergymen and women were developing their own 
strategies on how to respond to and act in the new circumstances of mass mobilization. 
For the Church, it was also important to examine and evaluate the social and political 
involvement of the clergy and women and support them if such activity was not contrary 
to Catholic doctrine or the hierarchy.  
In this chapter, I analyze the activism of the parochial clergy as well as the 
Catholic women’s movement inspired by the activism of the clergy. This is why I 
suggest discussing the activity of clergy and women together, as it was strongly 
interconnected. In the case of the Roman Catholic Church and its highly urbanized laity, 
clerical and women activists focused their work on the socialization and education of 
workers and servants. The Greek Catholic Church had a different approach, as the 
majority of its parochial clergy were married and so had wives and daughters involved 
in helping them take care of the laity. Greek Catholic women related to the clergy were 
often the only educated women in the village and set an example to peasant women.116 
Despite the difference in rite, both sets of clerical and women activists had a similar task: 
to work closely with the laity and promote Catholic-based views among it. 
For both clerical and women activists, universal male suffrage brought new, 
unexplored opportunities: through pastoral letters, sermons, and the press, Catholic 
hierarchs and intellectuals sought to clarify those opportunities and address them in a 
proper Catholic manner. Both clerical and women activists had much in common as 
social groups: they were educated, restricted by their social position (because of their 
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church or family duties and hierarchy), and excluded from the peasants while seeking to 
work with them.  
Clergy and elections 
 
The Roman Catholic and the Greek Catholic churches had similar visions of their roles 
among the laity and society in general. The two churches, as institutions, faced the 
challenges of mass mobilization and nationalism and responded to them by integrating 
and linking Catholic values to the demands that emerged in society at the time (i.e., 
democratization, nationalization, and the politicization of individuals). The aim was to 
influence mass movements within society in such a way that they did not threaten the 
authority of the Church or of Christianity. The Galician elections provide telling 
examples of how the Catholic churches implemented their goals.  
A Greek Catholic priest summarized the mission of the clergy as follows: “we 
[the clergy] need to push ourselves through doors and windows to places where the fate 
of Ruthenian/Ukrainian peasants is decided.”117 A Roman Catholic bishop reframed a 
similar idea a bit differently: “you [the clergy] have a duty to go hand in hand with the 
people.”118 Such statements brilliantly reveal the essence of the approach taken by the 
clergy and the Catholic Church, with their main idea being to participate actively in the 
life of the laity. Further in the chapter, I analyze in detail how this idea was realised and 
what opportunities and problems such activity raised for the clergy. 
The Vatican was also very much concerned about the implementation of 
universal male suffrage in the Austrian parliamentary elections. In Vienna, the Vatican 
nuncio Granito Pignatelli di Belmonte Gennaro reported in detail how the Habsburg 
Empire adopted and then implemented the suffrage reform. In his report, the nuncio 
indicated that “the elections demonstrated the strength of Catholicism” and that “a 
majority in parliament would act on behalf of the Church.”119 In the same report, he 
underlined the importance of young and active bishops who could guarantee Catholic 
mobilization and the further integration of Catholic values into politics.120  
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The Vatican was carefully observing the development of mass mobilization and 
requested its nuncios to report about the results of the elections. The observation of the 
nuncio confirmed that the active position of the Catholic clergy was bringing about a 
positive outcome and thus strengthening the position of the Church in the realm of 
politics (i.e., preventing the adoption of a divorce law).121 Additionally, it is clear from 
the report that the nuncio saw great potential in the younger clergy, who understood the 
challenges of the time and acted upon them. As the Vatican was encouraging the 
participation of bishops in mass mobilization, the bishops were sending the same 
message to the parish clergy and the parish clergy to the laity. The example of the 
Galician churches provided in this chapter demonstrates how this message about the 
active involvement of the clergy actually travelled from the Vatican to the laity and how 
it worked in a specific multi-rite space. 
The attitude of the Church hierarchies towards elections 
The hierarchy of the Catholic churches and their clergy viewed electoral reforms as a 
positive change so long as they corresponded to Christian values. The main concern of 
the church hierarchs throughout the Habsburg Empire was ensuring the election of 
deputies who were loyal and faithful Christians in order to preserve the unity of Church 
and State. Thus, the attitude of the high-ranking hierarchy was very similar throughout 
the Catholic world, but at the lower level, where the clergy were in close contact with 
the laity, the situation was much more complicated. The laity became more and more 
politicized. Political movements were internally fragmented and very often pursued 
mutually exclusive or conflicting programs. On the one hand, the clergy certainly needed 
to promote Christian ideas and follow the instructions of the hierarchy, but, on the other, 
they needed to remain influential among the laity and, in addition, had their own outlooks 
on political life. This complexity of views intersected in local villages, with all the issues 
of different forces and institutions coming together and frequently resulting in violent 
clashes. 
The Roman Catholic hierarchy of Galicia shared these values whilst emphasizing 
the importance of the Catholic Church taking an active role within society. The 
Armenian Archbishop Teodorowicz,122 whose appeals were cited widely in the Roman 
Catholic press and used as a basis for explaining the role of the Church and the clergy in 
elections, argued that democracy had its origins in Christianity and only Christian 
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democracy could unite all layers of society. Teodorowicz emphasized that the duty of 
local parishes and their clergy was to be active in social and political work. He also 
underlined that “elections are not only a civic duty for everyone but also a moral and 
ethical one.”123 This meant that participation in an election was very important for every 
male Christian: it also demonstrates the combination of sacral and secular duties and the 
unity of Church and State. 
The rationale behind the aforementioned strategy was that deputies would 
potentially be able to influence the laws of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, including 
those laws that dealt with religious and family life. The fear of the Catholic Church at 
that time was the socialists’ proposal for parliament to adopt laws creating a secular 
school system and permitting divorce.124 These laws, in the long run, could have led to 
the total separation of Church and State (similar to the secularization that took place in 
France).125 The Church felt a moral obligation to preserve the existing social balance and 
saw elections as an opportunity to secure its power. 
The bishops of the Greek Catholic Church had a very similar view of the 
elections. In a 1907 pastoral letter, the three main hierarchs of the Greek Catholic Church 
emphasized the importance of the Christian faith in all parts of life, including politics. 
The importance of Christianity in politics was legitimized by their claims that the clergy 
were also the leading force in protecting Ruthenians126 as a national group. Faith was 
crucial, according to the letter, because atheism and other dangerous ideas that 
repudiated religion, the Church, or the clergy were spreading. Thus, the Greek Catholics 
aimed to maintain the faithful’s loyalty to the Church and Christian values and to 
preserve a close bond between the people and the clergy. Only electing deputies who 
were good Christians and patriots could ensure this.127 The link between rite and 
nationality was strong in the eyes of the Greek Catholic hierarchy.  
                                                          
123 Józef Teodorowicz, “Wobec zblizajacych sie wyborow w Galicji” [In view of the upcoming elections 
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124 The Greek Catholic newspaper Osnova wrote on the matter that “the enemies of the Church (most 
likely socialists) want to achieve the approval of the divorce law. At the time, only separation was 
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The other difference in attitude towards the elections between the Greek and 
Roman Catholic hierarchies concerned the engagement of high-ranking church officials 
in the election process. For the Greek Catholics, their bishops were one of the tiers that 
connected them with the emperor and the local authorities because the secular 
intelligentsia was not yet numerous or influential enough within parliament and the local 
diet.128 One example of this close bond between the political and religious spheres was 
the leading role the Greek Catholic hierarchy played in a delegation to the emperor in 
1906, which emphasized to Greek Catholics the importance of implementing universal 
suffrage and electoral reform.129 It appears that the rationale behind the delegation was 
the conviction that elections would give Greek Catholics more chances to fight for their 
rights and benefits on the local and imperial levels. Participation in politics would 
provide a means to educate and train people to better organize their social and religious 
lives and duties. Last but not least, the hierarchy argued, Greek Catholics would be a 
strong opponent in the face of the socialist challenge. 
The churches and local [Sejm] elections 
The issue of electoral reform at the local level persisted and remained unresolved until 
the end of the empire, despite the efforts to implement it.130 Even though this project was 
not successful, it is important to analyze the clergies’ vision for this reform, mainly 
because it was different from that of the political parties. For political parties, especially 
those who represented Ruthenians, universal suffrage could guarantee that Ruthenians 
would gain greater influence in the governing process. For the Polish parties, such a 
reform meant greater competition with Ruthenian political forces, challenging their hold 
on leading positions in the province. 
The Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic clergies supported the idea of applying 
universal suffrage to the elections for the Galician Diet. From 1907, elections to the 
Parliament were conducted on the basis of universal male suffrage: elections to the 
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Galician Diet in 1908, however, were held according to a curial system that favored large 
landowners, while the working class and peasantry had very limited representation. In 
this way, the domination of the nobility among the local authorities remained untouched 
despite the changes brought by the new electoral law.131 Local power structures endured, 
and this provoked two sets of conflicts within the local public sphere.  
The first set of conflicts concerned the inequality between nationalities and social 
classes in access to power; the second arose because of a slowing in the democratization 
process at the local level, where it was most important for Galician citizens. Since 
Galicia maintained autonomy in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, participation at the local 
level of politics was more essential than at the imperial one, because doing so gave the 
opportunity to manipulate the implementation of imperial laws within the province as 
well as provide immediate control over the locals.  
The ideal way of electing representatives for the Roman Catholic and Greek 
Catholic clergies was the idea of community representation.132 The suggested suffrage 
system would provide each community (national, religious, social, and professional) 
with representation in the diet. For example, teachers of both nationalities would have a 
representative who could speak and act on behalf of their interests. Jews would not need 
to join Polish or Ukrainian socialists or radicals in order to be elected; and nationalists 
of different nationalities would not need to use nationalist arguments about injustices to 
gain support among electors.133 The number of representatives from each group would 
depend on the size of the group. As each group would have own its representatives, the 
conflicts between different nationalities, classes, and religious groups would be limited 
or even disappear over time.134  
The Catholic Churches considered this plan as just and democratic and believed 
that it would minimize the threats brought by mass mobilization. The goal of this vision 
was to manage and control the masses in order to hamper their autonomous democratic 
agency and prevent the possible domination of socialists and radical nationalists in the 
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local diet. Thus, the process of mass mobilization would not challenge the established 
social hierarchy and would remain under control.  
Public activity of the clergy and Catholic parties in Galicia 
 
In the Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic churches, the role of the clergy in the public 
sphere, especially during the election campaigns, was understood very similarly.135 The 
clergy’s first task was to observe local political parties and their activities in order to see 
whether their programs corresponded to Christian values and, consequently, to 
counteract the growing popularity of parties and candidates whose ideas were 
incompatible with Catholic values. They considered the biggest danger to be the 
socialists and other parties that denied the importance of religiosity or suggested 
increased secularization. For example, the success of socialist-leaning parties was not 
only attributed to a lack of understanding among voters as to what socialism represented 
but also to the limited social activity of the clergy in places where socialists had received 
support. Thus, the clergy of both rites needed to participate actively in all public events 
(particularly those that dealt with politics). 
The clergy were expected to educate their parishioners about the ideological 
differences between various political parties and to improve the quality of life in their 
parishes. The strategy behind clerical efforts was to organize cooperative efforts, charity, 
or a mutual aid society. In this way, the clergy would demonstrate what an important 
role they played in local life and gain a level of trust that no political party could 
challenge. Overall, this strategy was rather idealistic and merely a recommendation; in 
practice it played out very differently. In the cases analyzed below, we see more clearly 
the practical side of the clergy’s role during elections. Briefly speaking, in some cases 
priests became more involved in politics than in religion, while in others they were 
simply not active at all. However, returning to the rhetoric employed by the churches 
regarding the clergy’s public activity, no clergymen resisted it or disagreed with the 
aspiration for increased political activity.  
Both the Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic clergies considered the possibility 
of supporting and participating in a Catholic party. In the case of the Roman Catholic 
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Church, such a party actually existed and was called Centrum [Center] (following the 
example of an extant German party),136 but this party was not very popular and did not 
receive any positions in local or imperial institutions. The Roman Catholic priest Michal 
Sidor, in his article W sprawie udzialu duchowienstwa w zyciu politycznem i spolecznem 
[On the participation of the clergy in political and social life] (published in 1908), 
pointed out that one of the reasons for the party’s poor performance was that some priests 
counted on being elected without being politically active, relying only on their respected 
position as priests.137 In addition, Centrum did not have an attractive political program138 
and, as a result, the support needed to make a difference in politics. 
In the case of the Greek Catholic clergy, the idea of a representative party was 
never realized, as the national activists claimed that it was a dangerous and useless idea. 
National activists viewed a potential Catholic party as a threat that could divide society 
between national and religious identities and result in an inability to elect national 
representatives. A nationally-oriented priest emphasized that “the clergy must not move 
away from the secular intelligentsia and isolate themselves in their own parties and 
organizations”.139 He went on to explain why this unity was so significant: “together 
with the secular intelligentsia we need to enlighten the nation, and by being present 
everywhere [in all public activities] we [the clergy] can destroy anti-clerical propaganda 
and tie our nation to ourselves [the clergy] and through us to the Church”.140 Thus the 
clergy were seen as possible leaders in almost any party, not only in a Catholic one. 
The nationally-oriented newspaper Dilo emphasized the necessity of public work 
by the clergy, arguing that such work should take precedence over that of insulating 
themselves in parties or organizations because the clergy would divide the voters if they 
supported their own party.141 Apparently, national activists knew how useful the support 
of the clergy was for the nation-building process and the mobilization of the masses. The 
clergy adopted the same approach: they realized that their only chance to gain support 
from the laity and to control the mass mobilization process would be with the support of 
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secular activists.142 Therefore, they were mutually reliant on each other and on sticking 
to their own strengths.  
What the Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic clergies had in common was the 
need to cooperate with influential secular leaders and parties (that did not conflict with 
the Church).143 In supporting secular leaders ‘friendly’ to the Church, the clergy could 
gain influence and improve their political skills. It was no longer enough simply to be a 
member of the clergy to be elected or to participate in politics: now an understanding of 
the political and social spheres was needed. The Ukrainophile Dilo argued: “a priest can 
even be the leader of a political party, not because he is a priest but because he is a good 
politician”.144 Priests could no longer count on the support of the laity just by virtue of 
their role; gaining that support required intensive work fulfilling the needs and demands 
of the laity. Thus, priests’ public activity was a bridge for the clergy to participate in 
politics and gain the necessary skills to become influential politicians in the future. This 
was also a way for the clergy of both rites to control the presence of Catholic ideas in 
the process of mass mobilization. 
The churches did not officially support any political party (in order not to divide 
or lose support from the laity), but active participation in civic meetings and expressing 
opinions during political meetings was encouraged in both rites. The main difference 
between the Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic clergies lay in the intensity of their 
engagement in the political arena. As the Greek Catholic – and therefore Ruthenian – 
laity occupied less privileged positions and their political activity was less developed, 
the Greek Catholic clergy were more active in the mobilization of their flock. Roman 
Catholics had better access to administrative positions and political life, so their 
engagement was more moderate. The other difference was the absence of a single 
national identity among Greek Catholics (some were Russophile, some Ukrainophile), 
which further developed into conflicts inside the clergy, as well as between clergy and 
laity. 
A brief overview of the parties is useful to understand the political alliances that 
were possible for the clergy of both rites. Polish political life consisted of five main 
parties: Democrats, Populists, Social Democrats, Conservatives, and Catholics 
(Centrum).145 The Populist Party was the most influential and successful. This party 
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promoted the Church and Catholic values, so the Roman Catholic clergy recommended 
supporting it so long as voters made sure its candidates were proper Christians. The 
Conservatives were considered reliable as well, as this party consisted mainly of the 
gentry, which had always favored the Church. The Social Democrats, along with any 
type of socialism, were dangerous for the Church, because of their idea of a secular state, 
anticlerical views, and promotion of divorce. The clergy were supposed to condemn this 
kind of political ideology; even reading socialist literature and press was considered a 
sin.  
The Church’s attitude toward the National Democratic Party was neutral, as its 
program contained nothing contrary to the Catholic Church. However, this party was 
still viewed with suspicion because of its liberal ideology and active Jewish participants. 
In addition, some National Democrat representatives wanted to subordinate religion to 
national needs and to confiscate the Church’s property.146 Priests were permitted to 
belong to the National Democratic Party in order to influence and change its ideology 
from within to one more favorable to the churches. In the conclusion to his overview of 
political parties, the Roman Catholic priest Michal Sidor emphasized: “the clergy should 
actively participate in public life, because the clergy should set the example of a good 
citizen. And they [the clergy] need to remember the different political views of their laity 
so as not to participate in agitation but keep their distance”.147 Therefore, the clergy 
worked on developing their own precise position to political parties and engaged the 
laity to support this same position.  
The Ruthenian political movement consisted of Russophiles, Radicals, 
Socialists, and National Democrats. Though a few sympathized with the Radicals, the 
majority of the clergy considered the Socialists and Radicals a threat to religious and 
Christian values for the same reasons as the Roman Catholics. The Socialists’ values 
were seen as opposite to the existing social order and religion; the Radicals were anti-
clerical and saw religion only as a tool for national mobilization. As an antidote to the 
dangerous ideology of the Socialists and Radicals, the clerical newspaper Nyva [Field] 
suggested that “priests have to become Christian socialists, and, as it is more significant 
to gain the support of the village, to become Christian radicals.”148 In this way, the clergy 
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could pose an alternative to the Socialists and Radicals: “if a priest is mobilizing the 
peasants, then the radicals and socialists will not have anything to offer.”149 
In the Greek Catholic Church, there were two political forces in line with 
Catholic doctrine and thus officially supported by clergy: the Russophiles (pro-Russian) 
and National Democrats (pro-Ukrainian). The Russophiles’ political party was based on 
the idea that Ruthenians were part of the Russian nation and language (their newspapers 
were issued in Russian even though Ruthenians of the region spoke Ukrainian). The 
Russophiles’ ideology provoked intense debates with the National Democrats and their 
press (who viewed Ruthenians as Ukrainians). This disagreement over Ruthenian 
identity demonstrated that the Ruthenian movement was polarized and caught up in a 
struggle over self-identification. This process of self-identification manifested itself in 
intensive rhetoric and conflicts in the Ruthenian part of the province (Eastern Galicia). 
Such confrontation was most visible in newspapers, as the Ukrainophile newspapers 
Dilo, Ruslan, and others frequently polemicized and criticized the Russophilic 
Galychanin (and vice versa). The elected Ruthenian deputies, who belonged to either the 
Russophiles or the National Democrats and thus brought their confrontation to 
parliament, deepened this tension. These conflicting identities prompted disagreement 
within the Greek Catholic clergy as a group and affected the relationships between the 
clergy and laity, as in some cases the clergy and laity supported different parties. Political 
preferences shaped the clergy from within and resulted in tense relations with those 
representatives of the laity who shared different preferences. 
The politically active Greek Catholic clergy took part in both conflicting parties, 
Russophile and National Democrat (some clergy were also involved in the Radical 
Party). This political division among the clergy was problematic for them as a group, as 
it resulted in hostility within the clergy and culminated in the public attacks of priests 
against each other.150 For example, the Russophile newspaper Galychanin, issued in 
Lviv, constantly attacked one of the Greek Catholic bishops, Bishop Khomyshyn. In 
March 1907, the newspaper claimed that Bishop Khomyshyn was giving preference to 
Ukrainian-oriented priests and openly discriminating against those who supported the 
Russophiles.151 Galychanin described Khomyshyn in the following way: “the bishop has 
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no tact, no pastoral skill, and no wisdom. We are not going to list all the facts that prove 
this because they are already well known from the newspapers or from private 
stories”.152 The Ukrainophile Dilo defended the bishop, writing that he was innocent.153 
Thus both newspapers, focusing on the personality of Bishop Khomyshyn, used him to 
promote their own political ideas. So, the church hierarchy, as well as their political 
preferences, was now also a target for attention and analysis in the newspapers.  
In conclusion, the hierarchy of both churches saw the clergy as a tool to ensure 
that candidates were good Christians, but they preferred for the clergy not to represent 
any particular ideology themselves. However, it was not easy to implement a neutral 
strategy, especially in places where a priest and the laity had different political views 
and preferences. The hierarchy preferred not to be involved in this type of conflict, 
insisting only on legal and Christian methods of politicking. Furthermore, local 
governments used the conflict between Ukrainian- and Russian-oriented parties as a way 
to reduce the number of Ruthenians in the local diet. Additionally, priests used their 
power to support particular parties or candidates. Thus, the politicization of both clergy 
and laity changed the role of the clergy in their parishes, as it brought politics to this 
relationship. How exactly the change happened is discussed in the last chapter of the 
thesis, which explores incidents of violence during the elections.  
The Catholic churches and the mass mobilization of women 
 
Even though women at the time had limited rights, they were important actors in church 
and public life. Women took care of the priest and the church buildings, participated in 
organizing services and religious celebrations, and either discouraged or encouraged 
their husbands and sons to be politically active. Certainly, mass mobilization affected 
the position of women in society and in the Catholic Church. However, this process was 
quite slow as the role of women was limited to family life. 
The family lives of Greek and Roman Catholics were different. The Greek 
Catholic Church allowed priests to marry, thereby giving rise to a whole group of women 
– priestly wives and daughters - who were Church insiders. The American-Ukrainian 
historian Marta Bohachevska-Chomiak has emphasized that in the case of the Greek 
Catholic Church, the priests’ daughters and wives were the first to acknowledge the 
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importance of an active role for women in society; they were the ones who started to 
promote women’s organizations and press.154 Later women’s rights activists focused 
only on the secular role of their movement, but ideas introduced by secular 
organizations, such as kindergartens, were infrequently adopted later by the Church. 
In the interplay between the Catholic churches and women’s activism, there were 
no explicit conflicts or discussions. The general impression gleaned from the press 
(religiously-oriented and that of women’s rights activists) is that both sides tried to avoid 
possible confrontation or active debate. One of the reasonable explanations for such 
tactics was the desire of both sides to avoid conflicting ideas that would divide 
supporters. This strategy was productive for both women and clergy, as it provided them 
with enough space to develop their positions on similar questions without conflict over 
audiences. A good example of how this process worked was the discussion of women’s 
social activity by the clergy and female activists.   
The clergy of both local churches emphasized that women’s main role was caring 
for their families, but social activism was not banned or forbidden. Thus, moderate 
activists claimed that their programs were aimed at those women who successfully 
managed their family duties and still had extra time to spend on activities outside the 
home. Therefore, the Church’s position only came into conflict with radical, mostly 
socialist female activists who called the entire social hierarchy into question, thereby 
contradicting the Church’s views. However, even those radical activists did not enter 
into discussion with the church hierarchy: on the one hand, they were not looking for 
compromise, but, on the other, they were not very popular and thus were not considered 
dangerous. 
The main realm of intersection between the churches and women’s rights 
activists was family life and social work. On the first matter, the clergies of the two local 
churches both supported the idea of men having the leading role in family life.155 On the 
second matter, women’s rights activism within society was inspired by the churches in 
the sphere of charity and care, not in the political domain.156 As the legal framework of 
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the Austro-Hungarian Empire prohibited the political activity of women157 and the 
churches were close allies of the state, they could not preach against existing laws.  
Among one of the first demands of the women’s movement was access to 
education and participation in public life, for example through elections. As Zofia Chyra-
Rolicz has emphasized, the main aim for women was to achieve the opportunity to 
function in society on their own.158 For both Polish and Ruthenian movements, the most 
important straggle revolved around access to education. Katherine David notes the same 
fact about Czech women, who were observing the progress of the education question in 
other nations and planned to be even more successful.159 The Ukrainian activist 
Kobrynska emphasized that as soon as Czech women sent a petition to the Reichsrat in 
1890 to request access to high education, the Ruthenians had followed this example. 
Viennese women also sent a similar petition.160 Thus, the women of Austro-Hungarian 
Empire were inspiring each other to raise women’s issues at the state level.  
The concerns about increasing educational and social possibilities for women 
were true for the Russian Empire as well. Malgorzata Fidelis emphasized the dilemma 
of Polish women in the Russian Empire: “women were concerned with both creating 
opportunities for women outside the home and strengthening their role in the family. The 
double commitment made their feminist messages seem contradictory and difficult to 
interpret.”161 The researcher of Ukrainian activism Bohachevska-Chomiak highlights 
that educated middle-class women “saw themselves as functioning within a European 
context and looked toward concepts developed in Western Europe”. However, the 
problem was that these activists “did not share the Western European middle-class ideal 
of mothering and domesticity.”162 A similar situation was true for Polish and Czech 
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women as well, whose surroundings promoted first and above all the ideal of the “faithful 
wife, greatest mother, educated tutor, [and] good housekeeper.”163 
The beginning of women’s mobilization was certainly a challenge to society’s 
existing values and hierarchy and thus provoked a variety of reactions, ranging from 
mockery to attempts at control. Among those forces with a vested interest in the woman 
question were national activists and the clergy.164 For nationalists, women were an 
important conduit for strengthening nationalistic ideas and raising future patriots.165 For 
the clergy, women were responsible for supporting parishes and priests with their active 
participation in services and clerical households, as well as for promoting spirituality in 
their families. Neither Polish nor Ruthenian nationalists nor the clergy were fans of 
women’s liberation, as it could easily result in an unknown outcome and a revolution in 
family life.  
The popular ideas of nationalism and national liberation influenced women’s 
activism as well. National activists were also interested in mobilizing women. It is clear 
from the writings of women inspired by national ideas that they saw the liberation of 
women as one of the elements in the liberation of the nation.166 However, male 
nationalists saw this process in an alternative way: first came the liberation of the nation, 
then of women. In fact, no influential political party (except the Socialists) was willing 
to support women’s issues per se; women’s rights activists faced the same problem with 
the press, which was under the control of political – and thus male – authorities. Simply 
speaking, the male world was more worried about the actually-occurring mobilization 
of men around national issues than the mere possibility of mobilizing women.  
In the framework of the whole of Eastern Europe, the women’s movement 
considered national identification to be most important issue, while women’s rights were 
at best second place. In her study on Czech women, Katherine David has emphasized 
that “women’s rights activists drew strength from their identification with the Czech 
national movement and viewed their Czechness as, in many respects, advantageous to 
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their struggle as women.”167 A similar argument is raised by Sylvia Paletschek and 
Bianka Petrow-Ennker, who emphasize that “the lack of full national sovereignty meant 
that Czech and Polish feminists were ambivalent about the Austrian and German 
women's movements.”168 Thus, the women’s movement was under the influence of and 
codependent on the national one.  
The conception of the role of women in the Catholic press produced by both 
churches was very similar, emphasizing the family sphere above all: “women are called 
to quiet, non-exhausting work within the family and devotion to their immediate 
environment”.169 The article Powołania kobiet [Women’s vocation], published by the 
Roman Catholic newspaper Niewiasta [Woman] in 1908, elaborated that public work 
was not forbidden and that women could participate in such work if the opportunity 
presented itself. Analyzing the public sphere, the article continued that women could not 
be the equals of men: it was not their prescribed lot in life, as women’s duty was to care 
for the home and family.170 
According to the Catholic press, in the family sphere the priorities of women 
could be identified as follows: the woman’s relationship with her husband, parenting, 
and running the household. In relationships with their husbands, women were called 
upon to be helpful and obedient wives.171 The Greek Catholic newspaper Nyva 
emphasized that in Christianity “men and women share equal human nature and dignity”, 
thus “subordination to men is not a sign of inferiority, it is only hierarchical 
pragmatism.”172 The author claimed that it was actually Christ who stated that women 
are equal in God’s eyes, and recognition of such was real emancipation (in the opinion 
of the Church).173 Similar arguments were used in the press for women throughout the 
empire: Galicia was no exception. However, the novelty for Galicia was the existence of 
a discussion on women’s roles and the recognition of its public presence in society.  
The Roman Catholic newspaper Niewiasta, published by Stanislaw Stojalowski 
especially to promote a conception of the role of women in line with Catholic views, 
very frequently published articles written by women. However, none of these articles 
focused on real problems or practical advice for women. Thus, the aim for the Catholic 
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press was to again justify existing hierarchical relations between men and women and 
highlight that women should not challenge this hierarchy when increasing their 
participation in social activities. 
The other frequent topic in the Catholic press was patriotism, which could be 
expressed in patriotic parenting and support for national businesses. The emphasis on 
patriotic parenting was a result of the influence of nationalistic ideas and fears of 
assimilation. For Catholic women of Polish or Ruthenian ethnicity, there was always a 
risk that their children would assimilate into the more prestigious imperial culture (in the 
Polish case, Russian or German174; in the Ruthenian case, Polish or Russian). Niewiasta 
devoted a great deal of space to patriotic poetry, stories, and discussions on the 
importance of patriotic mothers: “mothers who are educating the fighters of the future, 
do not forget to impart the holy faith and love for all that is ours.”175  
In such terms, faith was considered a necessary part of Polish identity and 
‘mothers’ an important tool for promoting Polishness along with Roman Catholicism. 
The final focus was the idea of woman as the head of a household. Here the rhetoric held 
that a woman should be a wise housewife who, on the one hand, knows how to maintain 
the house and how to cook well and, on the other, supports national production and trade 
by using locally-sourced goods for household needs.176 Certainly, the focus on the 
household was not new: however, the idea of promoting national identity was rather new 
and present in most of the nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Thus, 
Catholicism and national activism created a mutually beneficial combination. 
The view of the household as the most important domain for women was not 
only typical for the Austro-Hungarian Empire: it was also the case for the Russian 
Empire. Historian Malgorzata Fidelis uses the words of the Polish activist Maria 
Konopnicka “our homes will be fortresses” to emphasize that the household was seen as 
a “state unto itself, a bastion of resistance against political and cultural domination.”177 
Since women already had power and influence in the household domain, they could use 
it to spread their influence into the public one and strengthen the position of their 
nationality within the empire. Such a focus on the household was very convenient for 
the Catholic churches and national activists, as under these conditions the traditional role 
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of women would not be challenged: at the same time, new responsibilities could be 
placed on women, such as support for national ideas or the protection of Catholic values. 
Speaking about women’s equality, the Greek Catholic newspaper Nyva (1912) 
repeatedly stressed that women’s natural occupation was care for their households and 
families. As such, the education of women needed to be properly geared towards the 
skills needed for these tasks: “By nature, due to their spiritual and physical strengths, 
women must only be complementary to men.”178 However, the author admitted that 
women’s demands for rights such as equal salaries and access to education were just and 
thus deserved to be fulfilled.179  
The Greek Catholic Church made an effort to raise female spirituality and 
cooperation by organizing women-only retreats. A four-day spiritual retreat took place 
in Ternopol and Lviv, where women could get away from the home and focus on their 
spiritual needs. However, such an event was not seen as positive by all: some men were 
against it, as there was nobody to feed them or do other work at home.180 Thus, it is 
possible to see one more challenge that the women’s movement was facing, namely the 
economic one: households were totally dependent on women, so men’s welfare could be 
put at risk. For this reason, the spiritual retreats for women did not become a popular 
practice. Thus, women could not postpone their duties at home even for the cause of 
religion.  
Coming back to the comparison with Czech women, the important difference 
with Galician ones was the role of Catholicism. Even though the majority of Czech 
women, just as with Galician women, were Catholic, Catholicism was not seen as a tool 
of mobilization, but rather vice versa: Catholicism was associated with Habsburg 
dominance.181 The Protestant past and the Hussite movement was a source of inspiration 
as “feminists often recalled the role of Hussite women who defended their faith in battle 
alongside men”.182 Thus, in the Galician case Catholicism was a positive inspiration for 
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the women of both nationalities while in the Czech one it was negative and less used for 
mass mobilization. 
As demonstrated by this short analysis of the portrayal of women in the Catholic 
press, both Greek and Roman Catholics had a mutually reinforcing concept of the role 
of women within the family. Their relationships with their husbands were seen from a 
very traditional perspective and granted women only a passive role. In contrast, in 
relation to their children and household duties women were seen as active and very 
useful for the needs of society, as they exerted influence over their children’s upbringing 
and education and over household consumption. In these last two aspects, the national-
building process had already made its influence felt, treating women as active 
participants. Catholicism left a clear space for women’s activism, as it did not condemn 
it as anti-Catholic. This realm was a perfect opportunity for progressive clergy and laity 
to approve of women’s activity, provided it did not challenge Christian hierarchical 
family values or the social roles of men and women.  
The role of Greek Catholic women 
As already mentioned, the Greek Catholic Church differed from the Roman Catholic one 
by virtue of a particular group of women among its faithful: the so-called ‘clerical 
women’. These women were the wives or daughters of priests, as Greek Catholic clergy 
could marry. The Greek Catholic press, above all Nyva, certainly realized the importance 
of these women for the Church as an institution and for the communities in which their 
husbands served as priests. In several articles, Nyva discussed the behavior of ‘clerical 
women’ and suggested some actions for them to accomplish. The author of these articles 
emphasized that Galician women were actually not particularly aware of women’s 
issues, making it essential to provide such awareness from the Catholic perspective.183 
This mission could be accomplished through improved religious education. In the 
opinion of the author, religious and theological education for girls would be useful from 
three perspectives. First, it would make them better wives for the Greek Catholic clergy; 
second, they could then serve as examples for and leaders among other women; and 
third, they could aid in spreading Christian ideas.184 These were the main tasks suggested 
for members of priests’ families. 
An important concern of the Greek Catholic Church was to provide an alternative 
to the increasingly left-wing (socialist) mobilization of women, with the additional goal 
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of making use of women’s zeal for the benefit of the Church.185 As mentioned above, 
women were supposed to inspire their priest-husbands to better perform their duties and 
to understand the difficulties associated with this job. As an example of the sort of 
behavior these wives should avoid, the author cited a wife who yelled at her husband 
when he was late for dinner because of his social work.186 The second important duty 
for ‘clerical women’ was to be actively involved in parish life, mainly by maintaining 
the church building and organizing religious social events and the parish choir. Thirdly, 
and most significantly, ‘clerical women’ were exhorted to develop closer ties with the 
laity, especially with regards to educating other women and encouraging them to be 
active participants in religious life.187 This was an essential task: if the priests’ wives did 
not serve as an example, Galician women would instead look to the female radical 
intelligentsia for leadership, meaning they certainly would not embrace Catholicism as 
a means of mobilization. Thus, ‘clerical women’ were seen as guardians of lay women 
against anti-Catholic ideas and behavior. Good guardianship entailed working together 
with their husbands to facilitate the political and social mobilization of their 
communities. 
Last but not least, ‘clerical women’ were expected to continue supporting the 
clergy as a social group. Over time, the Greek Catholic clergy evolved into a separate 
class that enjoyed certain benefits: a better financial position than that of the peasants, a 
salary from the government as public servants, access to education, and partial 
exemption from field work (peasants donated their labor instead). To maintain these 
benefits, it was essential to close the group’s ranks to a certain degree: peasants could 
occasionally become part of it and the daughters of priests were allowed to marry 
laymen, but it was not the preferred practice. Thus, one of the problems raised in Nyva’s 
articles was the problem of priests’ daughters preferring to marry laymen rather than 
priests and becoming more and more involved in secular activities. The fear was that 
fewer women would be involved in helping to spread the Catholic view of society and 
politics. This fear was exacerbated by the decreasing number of monks and nuns. 
Women were also expected to encourage their children to enter religious orders, thereby 
keeping the monasteries full.188  
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In conclusion, the Greek Catholic Church saw ‘clerical women’ as essential, 
useful citizens for the prosperity of the Church. The clergy of the Greek Catholic Church 
recognized the importance of women for social and political participation and counted 
on women’s cooperation in managing such activity in the villages. The parish priests 
needed the support of their wives and daughters, as through them it was easier to reach 
the female population of the villages and their husbands. In the fourth chapter of the 
thesis, I explore how women were engaged observers during the election process and 
encouraged their husbands to participate actively in voting (in this case, the possibility 
for men to vote was not seen as an individual right but a right of the family that the man 
was representing). However, the Galician Catholic press had little interest in women’s 
issues like gaining more political and social rights or widening the list of professions 
available for to women.189   
Roman Catholic women and the Church 
In comparison to the Greek Catholic Church, Roman Catholics did not have clerical 
women: however, the Roman Catholic Church had a higher number of working women. 
This was a quite specific group of women, who had to work because of their economic 
position. They worked in various plants and enterprises, in the postal service, or as 
maids. On the one hand, this group was more accessible than the peasantry. However, 
they were disconnected from their familiar communities and surroundings because of 
the need to move to the towns for work. On the other hand, this group was quite 
underprivileged (as only girls from poor families had to work) and needed real support. 
Working women were a subject of interest for women’s rights activists, 
socialists, and the churches.190 This combination of interests is essential for my thesis as 
it demonstrates how Catholic and national ideas intersected and why. For the Church, it 
was essential to win these women over, preventing them from becoming fascinated by 
immoral or ‘dangerous’ ideas such as socialism. For women’s rights activists, working 
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women were proof that women’s work mattered and that such work was useful for 
society. It is also worth mentioning that one of the aims of the Roman Catholic Church 
was to avoid the assimilation of Polish-speaking Jewish women into Polish women by 
emphasizing the importance of religion.191 
As both Catholic churches were willing to support women’s activism, especially 
when helping those in need, they encouraged organizations (most of all Catholic 
organizations) to help working women address their spiritual and material problems. The 
main concern for the churches was the possibility of working women “losing their 
virtue” and becoming prostitutes due to the difficulty of working life and the lack of 
oversight from family members.192 Fruitful insights into the development of church ideas 
about working women can be gleaned from looking at an initiative organized by 
Czytelnia Katolicka [Catholic Reading Room] in Lemberg in 1898. An awareness of 
poor working conditions for women sparked the idea of conducting a survey among 
Lemberg’s working women in order to better understand their living and working 
conditions.193 The survey asked questions about free time, organizational memberships, 
and reading preferences. This information was considered important for future 
mobilization, as it provided insights on the ways of life and priorities of working women 
and gave ideas about how to approach them.  
Most likely, the interest in working women was the result of the highly popular 
encyclical Rerum Novarum. One of the main ideas was the Christian role in improving 
the position of workers.194 The Galician women activists were also aiming to have their 
say on protecting those girls becoming workers in the towns. Thus, representatives of 
the nobility, probably Professor Tadeusz Pilat and Countess Helena Stadnicka, organized 
a survey to explore the lives of working women. 
For this survey, 61 women from 18 occupations were questioned (among whom 
5 were employers). The interviews were conducted by a male member of the 
intelligentsia and an unnamed countess. The survey confirmed popular conceptions of 
very poor working and living conditions among women workers. Major findings 
included their lack of time (due to working days of over 12 hours), low interest in any 
social, cultural, and public life, discrimination by employers, and the inability to support 
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themselves with the money they earned.195 Most working women came from families 
that were employed and did not engage in intellectual or cultural pursuits; their only 
entertainment was reading religious or crime literature. 
The results of the survey demonstrated that despite the mainly peasant 
population, there was a group of working women that had needs and problems. For the 
political activists, it was also important to mobilize these women: all means possible 
were used for this task. The goal of Czytelnia Katolicka in conducting the survey was to 
observe the position of working Catholic women from the perspective of involving them 
in national activism; that is why there was such a great interest in organizational 
memberships and reading preferences. Such an approach illustrates well that behind the 
emphasis on religious difference stood the idea of national belonging: their emphasis on 
Christian women workers immediately excluded Jewish and, in most cases, Ukrainian 
women (Greek Catholics did not refer to themselves as Catholics in order to highlight 
the differences with Roman Catholics).  
This case demonstrates that Catholicism as a mobilization tool was important for 
women’s rights activists. They used religious identity to exclude other nationalities from 
the Polish nation-building process. For Catholic women, the most important uniting 
features were religion and nationality rather than social group. 
Universal male suffrage and women 
 
The position of women was legally very restricted in Galicia, just as it was throughout 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Before the introduction of universal male suffrage, the 
electoral law stated that all citizens above a certain level of financial means had the right 
to vote. These laws allowed women to have a vote as well if they fulfilled this criterion, 
but the vote had to be cast by a male proxy on the woman’s behalf. The electoral law of 
1907 gave all men the right to vote, regardless of their income, but it simultaneously 
removed the right to vote from those few women who had previously had it, albeit in an 
indirect fashion.196  
This development was very troubling to wealthy, educated women who earlier 
had the right to vote and suddenly lost it: after all, uneducated male peasants who were 
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not paying taxes had now acquired this right.197 Educated women recognized this 
problem and saw becoming active citizens as the only possibility for change. Various 
women’s organizations emerged to promote awareness of women’s limitations within 
society and to construct a suitable approach to overcome them. The main ways they 
identified to change the position of women in society were promoting access to 
education, debating the role of women in the family and society, and demanding the right 
to vote. 
Women’s mobilization was highly influenced by universal male suffrage. On the 
one hand, the broadening of civil rights for men inspired women to voice their own 
claims to the right to vote. On the other, the majority of political forces were not 
interested in women’s issues. The authors of the recent volume The Struggle for Female 
Suffrage in Europe: Voting to Become Citizens, published in 2012, discuss different 
aspects of why women did not receive the right to vote. Scholar Birgitta Bader-Zaar 
emphasizes that politics was seen as a male sphere in which women should not be 
involved.198 Malgorzata Fuszara argues that the problem of women’s voting was not 
connected to social traditionalism but to fear on the part of the privileged (male) 
gender.199 Blanca Rodriguez-Ruiz and Ruth Rubio-Marin further develop this thought, 
highlighting that women’s issues were seen as a distraction from the central issue of 
constructing the concept of citizenship and could pose a threat to family unity in cases 
of different political preferences.200 Only the Austrian Social Democrats included a 
demand for women’s suffrage in their program.201 In reality, as women could not vote, 
there was no need to address their issues in political programs, especially as this might 
not be acceptable to more conservative male voters, thereby alienating them.  
The Catholic Church did not issue any official statement in opposition to 
women’s suffrage, but there was a strong tradition of the male public role and the idea 
of women’s devotion to the family, which relegated women to the private sphere under 
the supervision of men.202 In the Galician Catholic press, the issue of women’s suffrage 
did not obtain significant attention. This issue was essential for neither of the Catholic 
churches, so there were no clear statements about it. The Greek Catholic Nyva 
highlighted that Christian doctrine presented no obstacle to women voting and the 
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Catholic Church did not yet have a stated position on the matter, so individual Christians 
could come to their own conclusions.203 However, the author in Nyva saw a problem in 
the fact that voting necessitated participation in public life on an equal footing with men, 
and this could be dangerous for the family. On the one hand, according to the article, 
women could neglect their household duties in favor of social activism, while, on the 
other, they could come into conflict with their husbands over differing political views.204 
Thus, in their struggle for universal suffrage the two main arguments activists 
made in favor of women’s participation in elections were, first, the necessity of equality 
and universal rights regardless of gender and, second, the conviction that women’s life 
experiences could contribute to a higher ethical level in public life.205 These arguments 
were intended to counter men’s belief in the danger of women in politics. The same was 
true not just for Galicia but for the Habsburg Empire and other European states.206 
The process of mass mobilization was not only oriented towards the active 
engagement of men in politics: it also had a strong influence on women’s activism. The 
Catholic churches did not forbid or criticize women’s social activity so long as it was 
not political or contradictory to social hierarchy. Moreover, the political and clerical 
activists recognized the importance and usefulness of women for spreading or supporting 
certain ideas. In the case of the Greek Catholic Church, there was a significant reliance 
on the help of ‘clerical women’, who would help priests to educate and activate 
peasantry. In the case of Roman Catholics, the Church was fighting for working women 
in order not to lose them to other political or national forces. Women activists themselves 
were building their own vision of the role of women not only in society, but also in 
politics. However, those voices were few and not available to the majority of the 
peasants, as women activists came from urban areas. In the villages, women took part in 
the public domain as a support for men and saw their husbands as representatives and 
actors for the good of the whole family. A village was a community of family units, not 
a community of individualistic positions like the city.  
Conclusions 
 
The clergy and Catholic women activists developed similar strategies and responses to 
the mass engagement of Galician society. The main aim of the Catholic Church for both 
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groups was to promote Catholic values and ideas through the mobilization process and 
to be attentive to all anti-Catholic messages.  
The Vatican and the high hierarchy of the churches encouraged clergy to be 
politically active, participate in gatherings and rallies, provide explanations about the 
differences between political powers, and be good leaders in their parishes in general. 
However, with the growing politicization of society, the clergy were not the only source 
of information for the laity; additionally, the clergy had their own political preferences 
and often worked to promote them. Thus the main difficulty for clergy was to establish 
new and quality contacts with the laity. 
The similar need for new relations was true for women activists, who aimed to 
educate and unite women to increase women’s rights. Women activists, as well as the 
clergy, supported the widening of political rights and combined them with the demand 
for more social rights. Both clergy and women activists most often supported national 
visions, considering the widening of national rights to be the most crucial issue.  
The Greek and Roman Catholic churches were active supporters of universal 
male suffrage, and also discussed its possible implementation. One of the most popular 
ideas was to have community representation where each community could elect its own 
representatives to the diet. Similarly, the clergy of both rites had an interest in creating 
their own Catholic party that would be an example of proper Catholics in politics. 
However, neither group managed this successfully, as they were not numerous and 
homogenous enough to actually become an effective political power. Thus, the main 
strategy for the clergy was to participate in promoting existing political parties that 
supported the Catholic Church. Examples of how this worked will be provided in the 
following chapters of the thesis. 
In regard to women, the Greek and Roman Catholic churches acted very 
similarly. Both hierarchies understood that women held a unique role in the community 
and, in particular, church life. As keepers of the home,207 they were the foundation of 
family life, but also the most active in volunteering support and assistance – be it 
cleaning and maintaining the church or assisting priests with household chores. 
Certainly, such an approach was common to all Catholic churches: however, the Galician 
particularity lay in the difference in rite.  
                                                          
207 As the newspaper Niewiasta polska stated, the main task of a woman was to bring God into the home: 
however, men tended to turn the house into a tavern, which is why women had to work to make the 
inhabitants of the house religious. Niewiasta polska 5, (1904). 
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The Greek Catholic Church, with women as wives and daughters of priests, had 
a more direct understanding of women’s roles and grievances. The Greek Catholic clergy 
saw clerical women as an example of public activities for other women and as 
ambassadors of education in the parishes. In contrast, the Roman Catholic Church had 
more working women to worry about, as these women migrated far from their families 
and thus had no support. The Roman Catholic activists created various charity 
organizations to help working women in these new surroundings.  
Throughout Europe, the Catholic Church was most concerned with defining the 
role of women in promoting their own message and educating those who would soon 
hold the right to vote – namely, the men. Thus, the church hierarchies worked on 
developing an intellectual process of consolidating the role of women in support of the 
clergy’s role within the community. And they did this without going so far as to join or 
promote any struggles for universal suffrage. For the Church, retaining the established 
social hierarchy within which they were already strong was logical if they were to utilise 
their existing influences upon an increasingly politicized laity. There was no need to 
push for voting rights for women if they had not yet secured their own political identity 
within the scope of universal male suffrage.  
There was consequently a desire from the Church to promote itself as aware of 
and sympathetic to women’s rights and to maintain social unity within the framework of 
the Church’s influence. Therefore, the clergy generally refused to criticize women’s 
social activity so long as it did not encroach upon the established social hierarchy. 
Through this, we see that the priority of the clergy was to maintain their own levels of 
lay support and to avoid social confrontations with their own community. Finding ways 
to promote their support for women’s social roles was important for the Church to 
maintain order and undermine the potential political growth of socialist activism. The 
interests of the Church were about appeasing women’s concerns whilst preparing a 
political defence against any emerging adversaries that might seek to weaken its 
influence. 
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Chapter 3. Roman Catholics and social Catholicism: Father 
Stojalowski and his agitation  
 
Introduction 
 
The arrival of universal male suffrage thrust peasants and workers into the sphere of 
political significance. Inevitably, suffrage unleashed the hitherto unrealized potential for 
mass mobilization. The local administration, political organizations, and religious 
institutions vied for ways to retain their existing power and competed to extend their 
influence within the new dynamics of political elections. This vying for power led to 
conflict within society and between social and religious groups as complex, almost 
chaotic, clamors to legitimize existing or establish new authority ensued.  
The extension of universal male suffrage across the peasantry created something 
of a ‘political vacuum’. The peasantry suddenly held a significant stake in elections, 
locally and nationally, and yet the existing authorities had previously operated without 
having to appeal for their support at the ballot box. For political activists, local officials, 
and nobles, this factor was obvious, and they sought to mobilize the mass support of 
those who had previously been disenfranchised to retain their position of privilege. For 
others, the mass mobilization of the previously disenfranchised was an opportunity to 
challenge and override the existing establishment in politics.208 In particular, the 
potential of the peasantry as a means for securing political authority led to the emergence 
of a targeted approach to appeal to and unite mass support. This chapter explores how 
the local Galician clergy of the Roman Catholic Church attempted to mobilize the 
potential power within the peasantry, as well as how social Catholicism manifested in 
Galicia.  
The most politically active and successful representative of the Roman Catholic 
clergy was the priest Stanislaw Stojalowski. The mobilizing ideas he used are a great 
example of how the interconnection between politics and religion functioned, as well as 
an example of the nationalization of religious life. The political struggles of Stojalowski 
and the way in which the church and local authorities approached and dealt with him 
                                                          
208 As Daniel Unowsky brilliantly highlighted, “eventually, the balance of power shifts away from the 
central government, which is no longer able to exert control over the provinces.” Unowsky, Pomp and 
politics, 4.  
Stojalowski, as well as the cases of Greek Catholic priests, demonstrated how this shift actually happened 
in Galicia and how the changing balance of power influenced relations between the clergy and officials of 
the province. 
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give us a deep insight into the tremendous importance of the peasantry and workers for 
political activists in Galicia and demonstrate the relations and co-dependence of all 
layers of society. This approach also reveals how the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
functioned at the bottom level and what loyalty and civic rights meant to citizens.  
In his book The Habsburg Empire, Pieter Judson analyzes the mechanisms of the 
empire at the top level and emphasizes how the building of a liberal empire led to new 
possibilities for mass involvement, even though the property owner remained the core 
of the society and thus “limited the degree to which  all  citizens could participate in  
public life.”209 The case of Stojalowski demonstrates how a political activist and priest 
extended the limits of public participation and what reaction this provoked from the 
Church and the state. 
The personality and actions of Stojalowski have already been the subject of 
analysis in a number of works: however, there are still new sources and questions to ask. 
Both Daniel Unowsky and Keely Stauter-Halsted have pointed out how successful 
Stojalowski was in mobilizing peasants and what influences this mobilization had on the 
balance between different social layers within the province. Unowsky emphasizes that, 
thanks to activists such as Stojalowski, Potoczek, and others, the peasants “were no 
longer content to seek fulfillment of their interests through the mediation of the 
conservative elites” and were becoming a political force themselves.210 In her book The 
Nation in the Village, Stauter-Halsted elaborates on how peasant circles and 
organizations functioned and how fundamental Stojalowski's role was in this process. 
Andrzej Kudlaszyk explores the evolution of the idea of the peasants’ political role from 
Stojalowski’s mottos “peasants should elect only peasants” to parliament and the Diet 
and “not to choose a nobleman and not to believe him”211 to the idea “with Polish 
nobility, Polish people”.212 
                                                          
209 Jusdon, The Habsburg empire, 167.  
In another section, Judson highlights: “As the needs and desires of citizens changed, so did the functions 
and meanings of the state. From schooling to military service to welfare benefits to postal services, the 
responsibilities of the state increased, and some of these responsibilities became understood as 
entitlements by their clients.” Judson, The Habsburg empire, 254. 
210 Unowsky, Pomp and Politics, 105-106. 
211 Andrzej Kudłaszyk, Katolicka myśl społeczno-polityczna w Galicji na przełomie XIX i XX wieku 
(Wrocław, 1980), 92. 
212 Andrzej Kudlaszyk, Ksiądz Stanisław Stojałowski: studium historyczno-prawne (Wrocław, 1998), 278.  
In this context, it is worth mentioning that Stojalowski’s strategy was not simply to bring peasants to 
parliament, as while summarizing the results of the 1907 elections he stated that all elected peasant from 
the ludowiści and socyaliści [socialist and folk party] “ do not speak German, do not have education and 
do not have sincere and fundamental Christian beliefs.” Kudlaszyk, Ksiądz Stanisław Stojałowski, 305.  
In 1907, Stojalowski, speaking about his own party, shared the following election results: “only 6 deputies 
[were elected], but from them 4 were priests ... With God’s help we will elect from 6 to 8 deputies, from 
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In the framework of the existing analysis on the subject, I focus on the Catholic 
side of Stojalowski’s ideas and behavior, as this was his way to doubt the existing 
conservative behavior of the clergy and lay people and consequently call them to actively 
participate in the political and public domains. I aim to contribute to the understanding 
of how Stojalowski used the increase in political rights to influence the secular life of 
Roman Catholics. Why did Stojalowski combine religious identity with other identities 
(political, provincial, and national)? How did the success of Stojalowski change the 
relations between local authorities and the parochial clergy?  
Stojalowski, due to his mobilization strategy, was the most famous and 
politically active Roman Catholic priest in Galicia. He focused his mobilizing activities 
on workers and peasants. His main objectives were to combine patriotic and Catholic 
ideas and to encourage the lower layers of society to be more active in political life. The 
analysis of Stojalowski’s political aims and methods of mobilization reveals that 
Stojalowski challenged the social hierarchy and looked to capitalize on the mobilization 
of lower classes to create change. Such views and strategies for mobilization created 
conflict between the Church and their congregation as the concept of the closer social 
and political involvement of the clergy was something new. 
Stojalowski had built his career from a parish priest to a deputy in parliament and 
the Galician Diet [Sejm], which serves as an example of the possibilities that the Austrian 
Empire was offering at the beginning of the twentieth century. From the late nineteenth 
century until his death in 1911, Stojalowski was under the constant scrutiny of the 
Church, local government, newspapers, and politicians because of his intensive agitation 
and political activity. As a result of the close interest in Stojalowski, the clergy and high 
hierarchy developed strong opinions on the mobilization of the peasants and the role of 
the Catholic Church within this process. In chapters three and four, I discuss the 
examples of other priests (mainly Greek Catholic) who were politically active and, 
together with Stojalowski, brought the Church into modern politics and modern politics 
into the Catholic Church. 
The personality and political image of Stojalowski 
 
                                                          
whom half will be peasants and the other half people able to [do] different parliamentary work.” Thus it 
is evident that the participation of peasants in the election did not necessarily imply the need to elect 
peasants, especially because the peasant representatives were not educated and suited for politics. 
However without peasants’ support, it was not possible to elect priests or middle-class deputies, as the 
nobility preferred to elect conservative noblemen instead. Kudlaszyk, Ksiądz Stanisław Stojałowski, 321. 
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Stojalowski was born into a family of small Polish landowners in the village of Znesenia, 
near Lemberg. He joined a Jesuit monastery and studied philosophy and theology in 
Krakow. In 1873, he went to Belgium and became acquainted with the Jesuit Adolf 
Daens, who had founded the local Christian People’s Party.213 Certainly, this experience, 
as well as his fascination with Lueger and Pope Leo XIII’s ideas, shaped Stojalowski’s 
worldview. Later on, he started to implement these ideas into action in Galicia, bringing 
political Catholicism into the province. 
Even though Stojalowski grew up among Ruthenian-speaking villagers (only 
during his stay in the seminary in Krakow did he meet Polish peasants), he was inspired 
to work with Polish peasantry and left the monastery to become a parish priest in the 
village of Kulikow, near Lemberg (1881-1896). Being a priest offered him the 
opportunity to use his clerical network as well as his flock as the foundation for the start 
of political career.214 Stojalowski’s criticisms of the church hierarchy resulted in the loss 
of the parish and suspension from the Church. However, he did not agree with the 
suspension and proved to the Vatican that he did not deserve it. After losing his parish, 
Stojalowski focused on politics even more intensively: he founded the Stronnictwo 
Chrześcijańsko-Ludowe [Christian People’s Party], which received six seats in 
parliament during the elections in 1897. Stojalowski himself was also elected to the 
Galician Sejm between 1898 and 1911. 
Stojalowski was often called a “demagogue in a cassock”: however, he 
personally declared that this was a positive characterisation as he was protecting the 
common people. Baudouin de Courtenay argued that Stojalowski’s image of himself as 
a chaplain and protector of the poor was his main strength and a key to success.215 The 
court trials and constant persecution from the local authorities also influenced the 
popularity of Stojalowski, as he appeared to be just as much a victim of the local 
administration and nobility as the peasants.216 
Kudlaszyk, describing the political views of Stojalowski, emphasized that he was 
a follower of Leo XIII and Lueger. Stojalowski always highlighted in his newspapers 
that Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum and ideas on Christian democracy were his main values. 
In terms of his political background, Stojalowski wanted to collaborate in parliament 
with Lueger’s Christian Social Party.217 Kudrszyk pointed out that Stojalowski was also 
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considered a follower of Lueger’s testament.218 Thus, Stojalowski managed to combine 
ideas about the Church’s modernization from Leo XIII and the political ideology of the 
Christian Social Party as a means of mobilizing the peasantry and workers. 
In the activism of the early twentieth century, the Church was confronting a new 
breed of determined, flexible, and intelligent activism. Stojalowski’s successes in 
mobilization came not just from effective tools like the use of the press and mass 
assemblies, but also from his personality and flexible political behaviour, such as 
creating cooperation with different political parties or referencing the blessings of the 
Pope (discussed later in the chapter). The use of religion as a tool for uniting and 
mobilizing the peasantry was also combined with appeals to national identity by 
Stojalowski, showing that both religion and nationalism held strong potential for 
mobilization.  Indeed, what could be achieved in terms of popular support by the 
charismatic personality of an activist who appealed to people through religion and 
national identity is evident in the example of the peasants’ public backing for 
Stojalowski. In 1895, thousands of peasants, including women, signed a Memorandum 
to the Imperial Government (mainly to the Minister of Justice). 
The Galician Lueger: Stojalowski’s mobilization strategy 
 
The ideas defined and spread by Stojalowski were significant for three reasons. Firstly, 
he introduced social Catholicism to Galicia, following the ideas of Pope Leo XIII and 
adapting them to the needs of the province. Secondly, his ideas, such as the focus on the 
importance of love for the Motherland and involving peasants in politics, were absorbed 
and modified by other political forces (mainly nationalists like Narodowa Demokracja 
[National Democracy]). Finally, and most importantly, Stojalowski set an example for 
other priests by uniting Catholic and political values. The combination of good pastor 
and politician was essential not only for Stojalowski but also for other clergy involved 
in politics. In the subsequent chapters of this thesis, I demonstrate the similarity of the 
ideas and strategies used by other Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic priests to 
Stojalowski’s.  
Stojalowski himself, in his newspaper Wieniec-Pszczolka, specified in 1908 the 
six main aims that he and his followers had been working on for over three decades. The 
first was “to awaken peasants from sleep and ignorance, and push them to cooperate on 
public matters”, while the second was to overcome poverty and misery and teach the 
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peasants how to improve their economic position on their own.219 The third aim was to 
construct “national strength” and to emphasize that the best way to realize this aim was 
to use the fourth aim of “adherence to the principles of Christ’s teaching, so-called 
Christian ethics”.220 In general, this strategy was to bring peasants into politics through 
Christian and national values. 
Stojalowski stated in 1908 in Wieniec-Pszczolka that the Christian Peoples’ Party 
(organized by Stojalowski) had managed to realize those principles and transformed the 
“dark and beast-like mass of the population” into a politically and economically active 
one.221  Stojalowski organized different initiatives to improve the lives of working 
people.222 The political program of his party declared that it would always focus on the 
needs of working people: “the spread of education, awakening of national spirit, 
finishing poverty by raising farm and entrepreneurial sense, participation in political life 
by understanding the meaning and significance of elections”.223 Thus, Stojalowski 
emphasized that he had spent  thirty years productively: he had mobilized the peasants 
and brought about an important change to their lives. 
With the help of newspapers, local clergy, and active peasants, Stojalowski 
created the organizations Kólka rolnicze [Agricultural Circles] and Towarzystwo oswiaty 
narodowej [National Education Society].224 In the beginning, Kólka rolnicze was a 
network of peasant organizations that focused only on enlightening and helping the 
peasants, but, in time, political parties started influencing the peasants and they began to 
work toward their own ideals, excluding Stojalowski's influence.225 For example, 
Stojalowski was not elected as a chief of Kólka rolnicze because the participants decided 
to involve local officials in the organization in order to influence the government.226 
However, this did not discourage Stojalowski from organizing peasants, and he actively 
organized election committees in order to promote himself and his political party.  
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The ideas and aims of political and social mobilization expressed and practiced 
by Stojalowski were a significant part of the mass mobilization process in Galicia, as 
they were effective and unifying. Stojalowski and, later, other political and clerical 
activists strongly emphasized three unifying ideas appealing to peasants: social injustice, 
Catholic values, and love for the Motherland (further developed into national devotion). 
Tim Buchen compares Stojalowski’s approach with that of Jewish activist Joseph Bloch 
and demonstrates that religions and patriotic ideas functioned well in each national 
group.227 Buchen suggested that the biographies of activists like Stojalowski should be 
analyzed in the context of the history of empire and the history of religious groups as an 
intersection “between religion and Habsburg public life, or politics on the one hand and 
the empire and its religious community on the other.”228 
Stojlowski carefully observed the development of social Catholicism in Europe 
and tried to apply it in Galicia. The most essential example for Stojalowski and other 
representatives of political Catholicism was Leo XIII and his ideas of social work. 
Stojalowski always emphasized that he was a follower of Leo XIII.229 Also, Stojalowski 
paid a lot of attention to the development of Catholic movements outside Austria, 
especially in Germany:230 he focused on anti-episcopal movements.231 This is shown 
well in the last case of the chapter, which analyses the conflict between Stojalowski and 
the bishops. 
Lueger and his political behavior were the main inspiration for Stojalowski. 
Stojalowski was constantly monitoring the progress of Lueger and used similar methods 
in Galicia.  Boyer has emphasized that Lueger’s “‘new’ political language was really 
quite traditional in terms of its popular rhetoric and religion”, which resulted in priests 
being “elected to seats  in  the  Lower  Austrian  Landtag  in 1890  because  ‘the  people  
again  trusts  its clergy’.”232 The same approach used by Stojalowski worked in Galicia. 
Thus Stojalowski was building a strong connection between social Catholicism in 
Vienna, Germany, the Vatican, and the province of Galicia. 
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Stojalowski wrote public appeals to both his patrons Leo XIII and Lueger at 
different stages of his career to ask for their support. He brought the pope’s attention to 
his conflict with Galician bishops. In the Fractionis Christiano-Socialis in Polonia 
Austriaca, Stojalowski presented his political aims to Leo XIII and asked the pope to 
support his action. While the ideas themselves were about gaining more social justice 
and increasing the level of knowledge among peasants, the pope had no objection to 
them.233 Through out his career, Stojalowski very often refered to the importance of Leo 
XIII’s support and the duty of the clergy to follow Rerum Novarum. 
Stojalowski reached out to Lueger mostly for help in the political domain. In an 
open letter in 1897, Stojalowski asked Lueger to help him in the struggle with the 
‘nobilities party’ widely present in government.234 In this case, Stojalowski most likely 
wanted to demonstrate that because of his similarity to Lueger and the latter’s help, he 
was able to make the same change in Galicia as Lueger did in Vienna: he was also trying 
to scare conservative elites with this kind of change.  
Stojalowski and Lueger represented social Catholicism and were active 
mobilizers. In 1897, Lueger confirmed that Stojalowski’s program was compatible with 
the doctrines of the Church235 and thus recognized its social Catholic background. The 
Polish historian Andzej Kudlaszyk has further emphasized that Stojalowski’s aim to 
improve the moral, social, and political position of the working people was similar to 
that of all social Catholic parties in Europe, regardless of the administrative borders.236 
The American historian John Boyer has focused on other manifestations of social 
Catholic movements, such as the active political behaviour of clergy, also typical for 
Stojalowski. Boyer highlights that “police reports from 1895-96 indicate, for example, 
that the clergy were often behind a variety of different kinds of rallies, political events, 
and money solicitations.”237 Under such conditions, it is possible to analyze Stojalowski 
and his agitation in the framework of the ideas and actions of social Catholicism typical 
at the time. The closer look at the example of Galicia provides a micro-historical insight 
into how social Catholicism functioned in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
Stojalowski ‘spreading the word’ 
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Stojalowski was particularly proud of his newspaper Wieniec-Pszczolka (The 
Wreath and the Bee)238 and the role it played in making his political ideas visible. He 
noted that his newspapers were the first and, for a while, the only ones in the province 
that printed a practical political-social program “speaking and writing for the people in 
an understandable way: [and] as to mature people and citizens rather than to children”.239 
Certainly, other political forces used newspapers to spread their ideas as well. I examine 
Stojalowski’s newspaper as an example of how important the press was for mass 
mobilization, what ideas were most effective, and how it was possible to continue 
publishing despite censorship and prohibition. 
 The newspapers issued by Stojalowski, along with various meetings, were one 
of the most effective tools for mass mobilization. One of the distinguishing features was 
the almost 40-year duration of his publishing activities. Taking into account that 
Stojalowski was jailed, had financial troubles, and organized numerous meetings and 
other activities, the long lives and regularity of his newspapers was impressive. At the 
beginning of his editing career, he stated that there were no political aims in his 
newspapers, just compassion for the peasants.240 Furthermore, he characterized Wieniec-
Pszczolka as the first and only newspaper in Galicia with political ideas for working 
people.241 Besides the novelty in approaching this demographic, the newspapers were a 
great tool for communicating and discussing ideas. He wrote that all his important 
mobilizing activities were inspired through the newspapers: “pilgrimages, peasant 
organizations (Kółka rolnicze), shops, buying agricultural machines, etc.”.242  
The two main elements of Stojalowski’s political rhetoric throughout all the 
issues of the newspapers were the importance of Christian values in politics and the 
increasing political involvement of the people (mainly peasants and workers). In 1906 
in one of the articles in Wieniec-Pszczolka,243 Stojalowski declared: “in the work and 
struggle that we have undertaken for so many years, Christian truth and justice was for 
us, above all, the victory of socio-political work, which was first indicated in the Gospel 
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of Christ, and in recent times newly recalled in the memorable encyclicals of Leo 
XIII”.244 Thus, Stojalowski emphasized the leading role of Catholic values, and 
especially the continuity of Leo XIII’s vision, on the modernizing of religious life and 
the social mission of the Catholic Church. The following might sound very typical for a 
Catholic priest; however, the link to Leo XIII’s encyclicals and the conception of the 
general role of the Catholic Church in society was not common for all socially active 
priests, who rather focused on local problems and support for local bishops. While 
Stojalowski did not have the support of the local church hierarchy, he tried to emphasize 
the global, instead of the local, character of his movement. Stojalowski always stated 
that his newspapers adhered to all the requirements of censorship and followed all state 
and religious laws. However, as he very often criticized local authorities and even clergy, 
his newspapers were censored and sometimes prohibited. Stojalowski organized printing 
in Hungary and even planned to move it to Vienna245 in order to protect the newspapers 
from the Galician authorities. The decision to move printing from Galicia proved to be 
very useful, as the Galician government had difficulties to controlling newspapers issued 
far away from Galicia: in times of conflict and persecution, Stojalowski thus managed 
to keep publishing regularly. Galician starostas [Bezirkhauptmänner]246 constantly 
reported how hard it was to expropriate the newspapers when there was something 
inappropriate against local authorities and how helpless they felt.247 The plan to move 
the publication to Vienna was very expensive.248 So, the newspapers moved to Silesia, 
staying there until the death of Stojalowski. After Stojalowski was elected to parliament 
and the Sejm, he and his press were no longer persecuted. However, it was not only 
elections that worked to protect Stojalowski. His followers also learned how to defend 
themselves and their pastor. 
When it was not possible to forbid printing, the next move for the starostas was 
to determine who Stojalowski’s audience was and ask the Vice-regency to approve of 
confiscating newspapers directly from subscribers. With their reports about his audience, 
we find out who Stojalowski's supporters were. In various villages, they were the 
professional and educated peasants: foresters, local mayors and a few other officials, 
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reading houses, and teachers and other school officials.249 In 1895, thousands of 
peasants, including women, signed a Memorandum to the Imperial Government 
requesting an end to the persecution of Stojalowski and his followers .250 By 
‘persecution’, they meant the confiscation of brochures and press and the banning of 
meetings. The issuing of such a memorandum demonstrates firstly the extensive support 
Stojalowski had mobilized and secondly how concerned local figures in the Galician 
authorities were by a mobilized peasantry.  
The authors of the Memorandum expressed their discontent, as the Imperial 
authorities had ignored the previous memorandum with 5,000 signatures. The 
memorandum stated that not only had Stojalowski experienced injustice, but the people 
had also suffered due to a lack of civil rights, such as electing representatives, reading 
newspapers, or organizing gatherings.251 The statement concerning the lack of civil 
rights is very fascinating, as it highlights some basic understanding of what civil rights 
are and why they matter. Certainly, this does not mean that all who signed the 
memorandum had clear understanding of it; however, they all definitely trusted 
Stojalowski over the local administration. 
The memorandum was signed and sent to Vienna to explain what was taking 
place in Galicia and to ask for justice. Such an act reveals several important levels of 
Stojalowski's success. Firstly, his followers were well organized and informed on whom 
to reach in the empire’s hierarchy to require justice when it was not present at the local 
level. Secondly, that these peasants found it important to support their leader even 
though doing so might mean they too had to face persecution means that political 
awareness was gaining more and more value. Thirdly, as secular and religious authorities 
did not support Stojalowski, his followers used the Memorandum to question the 
accuracy of those institutions on this particular matter. Such an attitude can be seen as a 
prime example of critical thinking among Stojalowski’s followers about the conduct of 
social institutions. 
This relatively short document (with more than 250 pages of signatures) 
demonstrated that even before being elected as a deputy, Stojalowski had managed to 
activate several thousand peasants and unite them around the idea of the Polish nation. 
The supporters had clearly stated in the Memorandum that they represented the whole 
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Polish nation. Later in the chapter, I discuss the particularities of Stojalowski’s idea of 
Polishness. 
Even though the Memorandum seemed ineffective with regards to achieving its 
main goal, it was a significant mobilizing tool. It engaged people in reading and signing 
it. It demonstrated the actual presence of support for Stojalowski and the courage of the 
signatories in making their identities known to the authorities. The Memorandum was 
also a way of pressuring the local authorities to change their attitude towards the 
peasantry and guarantee such basic rights as reading newspapers and organizing 
gatherings.  
In conclusion, the idea and strategy of issuing the newspapers was very effective 
for Stojalowski’s political career. The newspapers summarized and constantly 
emphasized the political strategy of Stojalowski and his followers in the article Nowy 
trzydziesty trzeci rok [New 33rd year] of Wieniec-Pszczolka in 1907: “We demanded 
political freedom for the people and allowing them to participate in local government, to 
learn their civic duties, and to get used to rational, cooperative work for the good of the 
country and the whole nation”.252 From this statement, it is easy to see that Stojalowski 
reserved for himself the role of political enlightener and contributor to the construction 
of the nation. These and similar ideas were constantly repeated in his newspapers. In 
some articles, his aims and strategies were clarified in more detail.  
The means of communicating and spreading any ideas which were not directly 
controllable posed a significant challenge to the Church, who held their authority by 
remaining a focal point for social cohesion in the villages. Activists such as Stojalowski 
sought to inflame the peasantry and challenge the existing hierarchical system. Thus 
through the means of communication and the intent to mobilize dissent, a perceivable 
threat was established towards the existing authorities.   
Along with newspapers, the publication of brochures was a very effective tool to 
spread certain political ideas and to construct an effective political image. One of 
Stojalowski’s brochures Bogiem a Prawda [God and Truth] was published in 1894. The 
brochure’s content was so controversial that Stojalowski was put on trial for disturbing 
public peace and order following its publication. Stojalowski, however, managed to use 
trials and persecutions to increase his popularity and gain sympathy among peasants and 
workers. The brochures were very often a successful alternative to newspapers, because 
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all newspapers, by law, were censored. Brochures were harder to trace and easier to 
spread from hand to hand.  
In the brochure Bogiem a Prawda, Stojalowski described the conflict between 
himself, the bishops and the local authorities. He explained that the local powers 
persecuted and jailed him and, consequently, his followers because they could not do 
anything else to stop the growing movement of people: this was why the Galician 
bishops were involved. Stojalowski encouraged ‘the people’ to analyze the motives of 
the authorities because the latter intended to manipulate the former for their own benefit. 
Of particular interest to the Church, one of the important ideas of the brochure was 
critical thinking about secular and religious authorities, as well as fighting against any 
injustice.  
Even though the majority of bishops were against Stojalowksi at this moment, 
Archbishop Wierzchleyski tried to approach him calmly. He organized a meeting with 
Stojalowski and said: “My dear, I had a meeting with Count Alfred Potocki and he was 
complaining that you are storming people and asked me to forbid you the rallies, because 
you [Stojalowski] are acting on the territories that still remember 1846”.253 This 
reference to 1846 highlighted what a threat the nobility still saw in the peasant masses 
and thus why it was so important for landlords to keep the peasants calm and under 
control. Furthermore, Wierzchleyski continued that while he was defending Stojalowski 
before the court, he was really asking the priest to be careful with the authorities.254 
However, Stojalowski did not take the bishop’s advice and criticized openly the 
behavior of the Galician governor Kazimierz Badeni and his relatives. He stated that 
Badeni’s family occupied the positions of power in Galicia255 and used them for their 
own benefit rather than “representing the justice of the Emperor”. In addition, the 
governor was using all his power to minimize Stojalowski’s activation of ‘the people’, 
mainly by persecuting his newspapers. One of Stojalowski’s intentions was to criticize 
and destroy the strong position of the nobility within Galicia and to create public 
accountability for officials so they did not misuse their power. Stojalowski was not 
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attacking the governor’s position but the governor as a person, since he was abusing this 
position and acting against the laws of the Austrian monarchy. This idea was often 
present in his newspapers, speeches, and brochures. The supremacy of the law for all 
classes of society was a core element of mass mobilization, and in Stojalowski’s hands 
it was an effective idea, especially since such equality seemed to be possible in the 
empire. 
At the end of the brochure, Stojalowski presented a strategy to contest the unjust 
behaviour of Governor Badeni and of the post authorities (who stopped delaying the 
newspapers) in parliament.256 It is noteworthy that Stojalowski always presented his 
supporters a strategy for action and assured them of the possibility of gaining justice. 
This was one of his most effective approaches to engaging his audience and influencing 
his enemies. In most cases, the way to fight against local injustice was to appeal to higher 
authorities. In contrast to local authorities, the imperial ones were seen as fair and 
reliable. Pieter Judson has emphasized that the building of liberal empire led to new 
possibilities for mass involvement, even though the property owner remain at the core 
of society and this “limited the degree to which all citizens could participate in public 
life.”257  
Unfortunately, there is no evidence of how the peasants viewed this brochure: it 
is easy, however, to reconstruct the reaction of local officials. As soon as the brochure 
started to spread, starostas from different districts reported its controversial content. As 
the brochure was not spread through the post but from hand to hand, it was hard to trace 
and confiscate. For example, in 1894 the starosta of Dobromyl258 pointed out that the 
brochure’s target audience in his town were the servants of property owners.259 Thus, he 
was afraid of possible conflicts between landowners and their servants. Local officials 
and the Vice-regency considered the criticism of the governor as a threatening idea that 
could encourage active resistance to the existing social order. 
In the run-up to the parliamentary elections in 1896, Stojalowski, taking into 
account the success of the brochure Bogiem a Prawda, distributed a new brochure, 
Modlitwa chlopa [Prayer of the Peasant]. The Prayer was written as an allusion to 
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official prayers. The prayer glorified God but also described the peasants’ miserable 
position in Galicia:260 
Moneylender Jews, unkind lords are pushing the last piece of bread from 
the peasant’s hands… And even pastors are in pair with wolves, because 
they, like Jewish golden gods, they [pastors] are cursing us, even though 
poor folks are worshipping at your [God’s] altars. 
This verse highlights that peasants worked to sustain other social classes, but they are 
‘despised’ and ‘averted’ in society. In such a way, Stojalowski aimed to emphasize the 
peasants’ importance and showed an understanding of their problems, which was always 
the core of his agitation. He positioned himself as the friend and protector of peasants, 
the one who helped them to realize their unjust place in the social structure and to 
improve it.261 Since they were not many other ‘protectors of peasants’, Stojalowski 
gained more and more popularity. 
 The brochure contained strong accusations against the Jews and nobility for the 
unfair treatment of peasants, as well as a lack of priests who supported the peasants’ 
interests. Stojalowski implied that unlike himself the majority of the clergy was not very 
interested in improving the peasantary’s position262 because of the instructions coming 
from higher hierarchy: such an approach would never lead the clergy to success in 
mobilization. 
Throughout his whole career, Stojalowski stated that the behavior of the nobility 
and the positions of local officials were the reasons for backwardness in Galicia. 
Stojalowski’s anti-Semitic ideas deserve attention as a separate topic. It is important to 
emphasize that Stojalowski saw Jews as an economic problem. In his opinion, the 
peasants were economically ruined by Jews, who advanced loans that were impossible 
to cover and sold vodka for a high price. The priests were also mentioned because during 
Stojalowski’s conflicts with the Church authorities, the majority of Roman Catholic 
priests obeyed the orders of the Galician bishops to excommunicate Stojalowski’s 
supporters from the Church. Stojalowski regarded the demands to excommunicate him 
as a betrayal by the bishops and priests, who were willing to cooperate with the nobility 
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for their own good instead of joining Stojalowski’s activities to protect peasants from 
unjust treatment.  
Naturally, local officials viewed such a brochure, criticizing as it did the nobility 
and clergy, as dangerous, as at its core the brochure touched on the whole structure of 
society. The starosta of Wadowice, who was among the first to read this brochure, 
insisted on prohibiting it, as it could threaten the public peace and cause hatred between 
social classes.263 Furthermore, plenty of copies were found and confiscated. This fact 
showed that Stojalowski’s agitation walked a fine line and was the main cause for his 
persecution and the prohibition of his materials. Such straight-forward criticism of the 
social structure prevented the possibility to create alliances and limited Stojalowski’s 
influence, as his actions and ideas were considered illegal in many cases: respect for the 
law was one of the core values for many in the Habsburg Empire. 
The other noteworthy thing is that while the Prayer intentionally appeals to 
people’s emotions, there are no clear calls for action. This was one of the methods to 
approach and inspire the masses Thus, we can observe how Stojalowski was making his 
agitation efforts simple and easy to understand and as a result succeeded with them. 
Stojalowski’s methodology was just one of many that agitators of the time used: 
however, he was the most successful and well-known representative of the clergy who 
managed to turn religious ideas into mass mobilization methods. 
Mass assembly as a mobilization tool 
Bringing people together in mass assemblies is one of the main tools for achieving or 
spreading the ideas of any political force, especially when the majority is illiterate. In 
Galicia, Stojalowski was among the first to effectively utilize mass gatherings as  a 
mobilization tool. Stojalowski’s example gives us new insights into how mass rallies 
influenced the relations between the clergy and their laity and as a result led to the 
politization and nationalization of the subjects of the empire.  
Stojalowski himself used rallies for different purposes, such as to create personal 
contacts with his audience, gain new supporters, spread his ideas, and convince his 
audience that they were not at fault for their unfortunate social position. Stojalowski’s 
gatherings took place in urban and village spaces, so I analyze closely one rally in a city 
and a few in villages in order to demonstrate how and why they were organized and the 
perceptions of participants and local authorities. Such perceptions could be more 
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important than the rally itself, as they reveal what fears, opportunities, and functions 
were behind the idea of the mobilization of masses. 
In various cases, Stojalowski organized gatherings simultaneously with patriotic 
occasions or celebrations devoted to important events from Polish history. In this way, 
he connected the peasant movement (mainly led by him) with other Polish national 
movements (mainly lead by conservatives). When organizing a rally, Stojalowski very 
often selected Krakow or Lemberg, the largest and most important cities of the province, 
in order to make the event and its participants visible to the local authorities and the 
press.  
In the summer of 1890, Stojalowski planned a peasant rally in Krakow with a 
patriotic celebration devoted to the reburial of Adam Mickewiecz. Stojalowski 
encouraged the peasants to demonstrate their presence and importance in society by 
participating in the event. One police official reported that Stojalowski contacted 
Krakow’s priests asking for their help in organizing the peasants.264 Thus, he was using 
his own clerical network to organize a gathering and to secure its participants from police 
attacks.265 Stojalowski’s newspaper Przszolka (no. 136, 13.07.1890) described in detail 
how the peasants managed to participate in Mickewiecz’s reburial, enhancing the 
ceremonial experience and thus deflating initial fears that the presence of peasants would 
be detrimental.266 According to Stojalowski, the participation of the peasants had 
reached its main goal in proving that the peasants were not “an ignorant mass” and were 
civilized enough not to ruin any public event. Stojalowski was proud that, besides his 
arrest, all went well, and he emphasized that persecution against him only highlighted 
the desire of the peasants to resist.267 For Stojalowski, this was a sign that the peasants 
could now organize themselves. 
Stojalowski was inspired by this success and thus kept planning new mass rallies, 
despite the threat of arrest. One of his main plans was a massive Catholic gathering (in 
Krakow or Lemberg) with the aim of demonstrating how Catholic and political ideas 
could combine and mobilize the masses. The first plans for the gathering appeared in the 
summer of 1893, but it took around a year to make precise plans. The aim of the 
gathering was to establish a Catholic organization that would have participants all over 
Galicia. However, there was a delay in approving the organizational regulations. On 
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November 1894, Stojalowski arrived in Krakow to find suitable place for the gathering 
and sent invitations and announcements to the newspapers.268 
The Vice-regency and local officials devoted a lot of attention to changing 
Stojalowski’s plans. The police director in Krakow reported to the Vice-regency that it 
would be a great time to arrest Stojalowski and forbid him from settling in any Crown 
land. Apparently, the Vice-regency agreed to the former suggestion but not the latter. 
The arrest took place on 15 November, three days before the planned gathering. The 
police director knew that the event could take place without Stojalowski, so he banned 
the gathering itself, announcing to the participants that their political opponents might 
physically attack them. The peasants accepted the information calmly; they took part in 
a religious service (mass) and left Krakow.269 
The behavior of the peasants reveals that they had learned how to organize 
themselves without Stojalowski. Certainly, the arrest of Stojalowski ruined the rally as 
such, but there were no threat to public order because of the peasants’ presence in 
Krakow. So, the biggest fear of the city’s authorities that a peasant mob would run out 
of control had not come to pass. As Stojalowski had devoted a lot of space in his 
newspapers to promoting calm actions at mass rallies, his activity was also the reason 
why the peasants behaved in an organized manner.  At this point, the local administration 
had also proven to be effective, having managed to control Stojalowski and prevent 
rallies by arresting their leader. Thus, this case is an illustration of how both sides, 
agitators and the local authorities, were adapting to the strategies of the other and used 
their power to achieve the desired results.  
For Stojalowski, it was very problematic to arrange a successful gathering in the 
cities: however, it was much easier and more fruitful in the villages. The peasant 
communities were small and thus served as tight networks where the priest could easily 
spread messages among peasants. Simultaneously, it was harder for local authorities to 
control gatherings in the villages. The villages were also a source of comfort for the 
peasants. The gatherings in different villages of Galicia were a regular part of 
Stojalowski’s agitation. He organized these gatherings with different purposes: to 
arrange local organizations for the peasants (Kolka rolnicze), to agitate for specific 
candidates before elections, to consult with peasants about their problems, and to set an 
example. In the later stages of his career, the peasants of Galicia and Silesia organized 
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such gatherings themselves and sent reports about them to Wieniec-Pszczolka. The 
editors of the newspaper published these reports and in this way encouraged other 
villagers to arrange their own gatherings.  
Certainly, Stojalowski was not the only agitator who used such meetings to 
promote his ideas, but he was one of the first to demonstrate how effective they were 
and to emphasize the importance of personal contact with the peasants. In addition, he 
managed to encourage the peasants to build their own clubs and networks, teaching them 
to be self-sufficient. This was very innovative for the time. For the Catholic Church, 
Stojalowki’s success270 was a sign that peasants were responsive and attentive to ideas 
coming from the priest. 
Stojalowski was constantly in touch with his audience and worked on increasing 
it. After being banished from Galicia, Stojalowski worked hard to establish connections 
not only with peasants but with workers as well. One of the reasons for this strategy was 
the mobility of this group and his desire to win workers over from socialism. He met 
with his supporters in informal atmospheres, drank alcohol, and embraced them.271 In 
some cases, despite conflicts with the Church’s hierarchy, he visited parish priests, 
invited them to his party, and agitated among the peasants to vote for them.272 However, 
the conflict with bishops ruined his clerical network and made him an unwanted person 
in many villages. 
One of the strengths of Stojalowski’s strategy was that he tried to avoid open 
conflicts with local authorities or the clergy; if they disagreed, he simply looked for a 
new location and partner. Some starostas used Stojalowski for their own benefit. For 
example, the starosta of Gorlice reported to the Vice-regency that he would permit 
Stojalowski to organize a gathering because it would split peasant support between 
Stojalowski and the other candidate (Stapinski) in the parliamentary elections.273 This 
starosta did not specify why it was important for him to split the preferences of the 
villagers, but one can assume that he was counting on it to prevent the election of both 
candidates. 
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The example of Stojalowski shows that, for the clergy, the mobilisation of the 
peasantry was easier in rural areas, although mass assemblies in urban areas could have 
a more significant impact. It also reveals that an organiser of gatherings had to take care, 
particularly at first, when garnering the trust of the peasantry and preventing too much 
friction with the local authorities. Stojalowski was a leader that knew his laity well and 
understood their needs: thus he was successful in combining Christian values and 
practices with the political ideas of the time, using both religion and national identity to 
mobilize peasants. Additionaly, Stojalowski managed to spread social Catholic ideas in 
the province and emphasized constantly the request of Pope Leo XIII to improve the 
position of the peasants. Last but not least, Stojalowski, with his printing strategy 
(spreading newspapers and avoiding censorship) and mass rallies, became an example 
for other priest engaged in mass mobilizations.  
Stojalowski forging and inflaming connections using national identity 
 
Nationalism was becoming a strong political idea and an important mobilizing tool by 
the turn of the century. Religious, linguistic, and economic differences reinforced 
mutually divided communities in Galicia and other provinces. The aforementioned 
differences were fruitful stimuli for emerging ideas of belonging to particular 
nationalities and the importance of national self-governance. In Galicia, national ideas 
were mainly based on the difference in rites (Greek and Roman Catholic) and language 
(Ruthenian and Polish) and were a nurturing ground for the growing separation and 
construction of diverse nations. During the process of enfranchising the peasants, 
appealing to certain national ideas was a very effective agitation method and a powerful 
way to increase the chances of being elected.  
Stojalowski and other representatives of the clergy realized the mobilizing 
potential of nationalism and incorporated it into their political activity. The incorporation 
of national ideas by Stojalowski and other representatives of the clergy influenced their 
churches and laity and hastened the nation-building process. I demonstrate below, using 
the example of Stojalowski, how the intersection between national and religious ideas 
worked; later, I analyze similar processes among the Greek Catholic clergy. Certainly, 
both the Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic clergies were closely observing and 
considering each other’s behavior, especially because they shared the same territory and 
space of influence. 
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Stojalowski’s approach to the different nationalities of the province can be 
reconstructed from his speeches, publications, and public gatherings. A great summary 
of his ideas is gathered in his parliamentary speech of 1898. This speech was the 
culmination of Stojalowski’s struggle to be elected to the imperial parliament and served 
as a declaration of his political ideas and plans at the imperial level. Additionally, 
Stojalowski’s actual behavior with the two other major nationalities in the province 
(Ruthenians and Jews) reveals how he implemented his ideas. This focus on the relation 
between nationalities is a vivid demonstration of how nation-building process occurred, 
how the national groups were shaped, and how they constructed exclusive ideologies 
against a background of ritual difference. 
Stojalowski’s speech was not only pronounced in parliament but was also 
published in his newspapers and as a separate brochure. This was a moment of triumph 
for Stojalowski as he finally, after the conflicts with the Galician government and church 
authorities, managed to be elected to parliament and had a chance to make a difference 
there. He stated that parliament is “the place of justice and lawmaking, the only place in 
Austria where a free word can be said.”274 This claim about parliament’s importance and 
justice was an essential element of his rhetoric. Parliament was seen as a place of 
freedom and change, where new thoughts and laws were created. The key element in 
mobilizing the masses was to emphasize that it was possible to manage injustices and 
improve one’s position in society through elected bodies (parliament and the diet).  
Historian John Boyer views the changing role of parliament from a different 
perspective. Boyer states that “until 1897 the Reichsrat served as a means for the 
representatives of the social elites of the nationalities to reconcile their differences and 
establish difficult, but workable, compromises.” However, with the development of mass 
politics and the presence of deputies like Stojalowski, “the parliament thereby lost its 
role as an integrating force in imperial politics and became, instead, a forum for the 
expression of national and social discontent.”275 Stojalowski definitely planned to 
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express discontent, as focusing on social discontent was effective in seeking 
improvements for Polish peasants. 
Stojalowski talked in the speech about his and his party’s unique political 
strategy. He stated that the Christian People’s Party would only support Christian social 
reforms and that it would not join the collection of Polish deputies in parliament known 
as Kolo Polskie [Polish circle]. Kolo Polskie was known for its conservative views. Even 
though Stojalowski had similar national views to them, he planned to join Lueger’s 
party, as it was more Catholic. As the speech shows, Stojalowski did not ally himself 
with any Polish politicians in parliament and choose his own way, possibly counting on 
the support of Lueger’s party because of their shared ideas about the importance of 
Christian social reforms.  
John Boyer points out that clergy throughout the Austro-Hungarian Empie was 
involved actively in politics: thus, Galicia was part of the wider picture of 
interconnections between the clergy and mass mobilization. It was easy to influence 
followers in conservative regions like Galicia or Tirol, while in other parts of Lower 
Austria this was no longer the case.276 The clergy sought to regain influence through 
politics or combining religion and politics together: thus, “many priests  ran  for  public  
office  and the  vast majority  of the Viennese  and  Lower  Austrian clergy  served  as  
adept  agitators  in the  political realm.”277 In such terms, Stojalowski was not an 
exception but rather a confirmation of the general rule that the Catholic Church was 
becoming an important political player at all levels (from the laity to the high hierarchs). 
Harald Binder, in his book Galizien in Wien, emphasizes Stojalowski’s ability to 
contribute to setting up a ‘solid Catholic foundation’ in parliament with Galician 
representation. Binder associates this success with two factors: firstly, the wide 
popularity of Catholic movements thanks to Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum and, secondly, 
to “the charisma of the people’s tribune Karl Lueger.”278 Thus with direct and indirect 
help from Lueger, Stojalowski managed to establish his presence in parliament sessions. 
It is notable that Stojalowski did not suggest any actual solutions to specific political 
problems, which was very typical for his political campaign. However, he emphasized 
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that, as always, he was a defender of the Polish people, justice, and truth.279 Those 
abstract ideas were very comfortable to use, as they were more compatible with moral 
issues than politics. As a result, Stojalowski became very popular in Galicia and through 
his activism taught peasants how to organize themselves to achieve different political 
aims. 
Rerum Novarum was an important milestone for Catholic action in other 
provinces. Marija Vulesica shows that Rerum Novarum and “the parties set up with an 
explicitly Christian program like the Christian Social Party in Austria and the Catholic 
People’s Party in Hungary”280 were the main factors that stimulated the importance of 
political Catholicism in Croatia-Slavonia.281  
Vulesica states that although political Catholicism was not a well-organized 
movement, it managed to elect its candidates to one third of all available seats (29 of 
88).282 One of the reasons for such success was strong anti-semitic agitation, as was the 
case for Stojalowski. Anti-semitic ideas appeared to be fruitful in mobilizing Christians 
and were widely used by political Catholicism throughout the empire. The Catholic press 
in Croatia, similar to Stajolowski, used anti-semitism to increase their popularity.283 
However, there was no real cooperation between the Catholic movements. The Croatian 
Catholic newspaper Katolicski List did not discuss Stojalowski, only briefly mentioning 
him in 1898 to call him “a ‘darling of the people’ who is going to protect the people and 
the faith.”284 Thus the movements in Galicia and Croatia-Slavonia, while both inspired 
by Rerum Novarum and Lueger and using a similar anti-semitic agenda, were developing 
in parallel but rather independently.  
The parliament speech provided an overview of Stojalowski’s ideas, mainly on 
the importance of parliament as a tool to realize his plans. However, it also emphasized 
that Stojalowski had not developed suitable alliances among the Poles and was leaning 
on cooperation with Lueger’s party. This alliance had the potential to become a new 
level of political engagement for Stojalowski’s Christian People’s Party, but this did not 
occur, as apparently Lueger’s party was not that interested in constantly supporting such 
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a controversial figure.285 Equally, Stojalowski was turning more and more towards 
nationalism. 
Stojalowski’s attitude to other nationalities 
 
The idea of nationalism in the multinational space of Galicia was always connected to 
relations between the nationalities of the province. All three nationalities (Poles, 
Ruthenians, and Jews) shared the same territory, administration, economic conditions, 
and political rights: however, it was difficult for them to unite and act together against 
social injustice or the arbitrariness of the nobility and local administration. Thus, 
Stojalowski’s focus on the needs of the peasantry and workers could have been equally 
important for all nationalities, but the Christian background of his ideas was not 
appropriate for Jews, and in any case Stojalowski himself raised anti-semitic ideas too 
often. Regarding Ruthenians, for whom the Christian background was not a problem, 
there were other problematic factors. Stojalowski never made a lot of effort to engage 
Ruthenians and did not emphasize the possibility of uniting the peasants around Catholic 
values. The cases below demonstrate the complex interaction between Stojalowski and 
the representatives of Ruthenians and Jews. 
One of the reasons why the social Catholic ideas of Stojalowski were not 
attractive to Ruthenians was his emphasis on the Polish nation; however, he accepted the 
importance of the Ruthenian national project as well. A great example of Stojalowski’s 
attitude towards Ruthenians and the Greek Catholic clergy was when Stojalowski was a 
parish priest in the Eastern Galician village of Kulikow. Kulikow was not only a Roman 
Catholic village, so Stojalowski had to interact with Ruthenians on a regular basis. Thus 
the village of Kulikow is just one of the examples of how national differences reinforced 
religious ones and vice versa at the very lowest level.  
During this period, a funeral of a local judge’s daughter took place in Kulikow. 
As the village was a mixed one (with Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic laities), the 
local judge invited priests of both rites to be present at the funeral. Such engagement of 
both rites in public religious services was very common in Galicia. A significant number 
of villages had a mixed population and thus had Greek and Roman Catholic communities 
and churches.  
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During the funeral in Kulikow, Stojalowski refused to let the Greek Catholic 
procession into the Roman Catholic church. The Greek Catholics viewed this negatively 
as an affront to the Ruthenian nation. The local starosta stated that the reason for 
Stojalowski behaving in this way was the shape of the Greek Catholic crosses being 
carried. Stojalowski said that he could not let such crosses into a Roman Catholic 
church.286 Thus, Stojalowski used minor differences between the customs of Greek and 
Roman Catholics to highlight that two rites are not equally as important and could not 
be present in the same church. Such behavior delivered a clear message about 
Stojalowski’s low level of respect for the gathered crowd and provoked an angry 
response. The Greek Catholics shouted: “for as long as the world exists, Ruthenians and 
the priest Stojalowski will not be brothers.”287 After this short protest, the Greek Catholic 
priest wanted to calm his laity and convinced them to leave.288   
This short episode demonstrated that within one village, there were no close 
relations between the priests of the two rites or their laities; indeed, there was enough 
space for nurturing disagreements instead. As a result, both rites preferred to seek their 
own paths in life. The emphasis on the inappropriate shape of crosses suggested that 
Greek Catholics were not proper Catholics. As the Greek Catholic Church resulted from 
a union between the local Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church at the end of the 
sixteenth century, there were many differences between the two rites. The Greek 
Catholic Church kept its Orthodox traditions and calendar. However, such differences 
became at a time of growing nationalism a reason to treat Greek Catholics, and thus 
Ruthenians, as inferior. 
Stojalowski realized the benefits of Ruthenian support for his movement from 
1896, after losing his parish and becoming more involved in politics. There were a few 
attempts by Stojalowski to encourage Ruthenians into his party. Besides the difference 
in rite, the peasants still lacked strong identities like a nation one, but they faced similar 
problems and needs.289 Stojalowski attempted to involve the Ruthenians in his political 
movement by organizing rallies in Eastern Galicia or intending to publish newspapers in 
Ruthenian in order to force a Polish identity onto them and gain more votes for the 
parliamentary elections.  
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One such attempt was to issue his newspapers in Ruthenian,290 but it was never 
realized, probably due to financial reasons. In addition, the starosta of Jaroslaw reported 
that during a political gathering in Jaroslaw, Stojalowski gave a speech in Ruthenian 
(and there are other such examples).291 During the elections in 1898, Stojalowski planned 
to spread his agitation to the eastern part of the province, inhabited by Ruthenians, if he 
had extra time: however, this never happened. 
On the one hand, Stojalowski declared the importance of political rights for 
Ruthenians with the motto “Ruthenia for Ruthenians” 292 and his desire to grant them 
wider freedom in a future Polish state.293 On the other, he was suspicious of Ruthenian 
mobilization; writing about the strike of Ruthenians in 1902 that I analyzed in the first 
chapter, Stojalowski saw its main aim as agitation against Poles.294 However, the official 
reports of starostas, newspapers, and witnesses stated that this was an economic strike 
with the goal of increasing wages. He blamed the Social Democratic Party for the desire 
to inspire struggle against the Poles,295 but there was little evidence to prove this. It seems 
that Stojalowski was not satisfied with the success of Ruthenian mobilization and saw it 
as a threat. 
The other source of competition with Ruthenians was that the Ruthenian 
language in Eastern Galicia was more widely used, so some Roman Catholics were 
speaking Ruthenian. There was an analogous case in Western Galicia, where Greek 
Catholics used Polish. The Roman Catholics in Eastern Galicia were important for 
Stojalowski, as well as other political forces, and he did not plan to let them become 
Ruthenians. In 1902 in Wieniec, he stated that “if somebody wants to be Ruthenian, I 
would tell him, go in the name of God and be Ruthenian”: the same should be true for 
Poles. Further, he emphasized that Ruthenians should not try to mobilize Ruthenian-
speaking Greek Catholics.296 
As the differences between the nationalities were not clearly shaped by national 
ideas, there was still a chance for agitators to engage the representatives of the other 
nationalities in their political programs. However, the difference in rite and competition 
between local national activists prevented a significant number of supporters of one 
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national project from joining another. For the Church’s hierarchs, it was very important 
to avoid possible conflict between the politically active clergy of the two rites and 
prevent conflicts within its laity. As a result, both clergies and national activists 
cooperated separately with their nationalities/rites, and there were no leaders, or even an 
intention, to unite the needs of the peasants and address them together. 
The relations between Stojalowski and Ruthenians reveal why Stojalowski’s 
ideas, based on political Catholicism, did not attract much attention from Greek 
Catholics. The peasantry of Galicia had the potential to become a force united under the 
ideas of political Catholicism: however, Stojalowski’s focus on the Polish nation 
prevented Ruthenians from joining this movement. The controversial personality of 
Stojalowski and his conflicts with the ecclesiastical and secular authorities were also 
important factors that discouraged clergy and laity from supporting him during elections.  
It is hard to reconstruct, because of the limited sources, Stojalowski’s exact 
attitude towards Greek Catholics and how it coexisted within the framework of the 
growing Ruthenian nationalism. It is conceivable that Stojalowski focused on the Polish 
nation and thus designed his program for Roman Catholics and Poles. However, he made 
a few attempts to involve Ruthenians as well and never directly rejected Ruthenian 
nationalism as such. As can be seen in the parliament speech analyzed above, 
Stojalowski promised to support the rights of Ruthenians in parliament. Most likely, 
national ideas overrode Catholic ones, preventing Stojalowski from cooperating with 
Greek Catholics to spreading social Catholic ideas together. Additionally, Stojalowski’s 
newspaper Wieniec named all Ruthenian deputies as enemies: “we have 32 clear 
enemies, to whom belong Social Democrats and all Ruthenian groups”.297 Certainly, 
there were some Greek Catholic priests among the Ruthenian deputies, but Stojalowski 
did not consider aligning with them a possibility. It is doubtful whether Stojalowski was 
actually seeking an opportunity to unite the two Catholic groups under the ideas of social 
Catholicism: rather, he was using Catholicism as a tool for national mobilization.  
It is not explicit to what extent the example of Stojalowski’s political activity 
stimulated Greek Catholic priests and the laity into active participation in politics. In 
most cases, the Greek Catholic periodicals and secular Ruthenians newspapers informed 
their readers about Stojalowski’s actions and journeys, but only briefly. There was no 
comparison or reference to Stojalowski’s activity as an example of successful Catholic 
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mobilization, nor was there any criticism. Taking into account the fact that Stojalowski 
entered into conflict with the secular and ecclesiastical  authorities, referring to him as a 
good example was not an option for Greek Catholics. Simultaneously, the Greek 
Catholic clergy were facing similar problems and had the same audience to deal with. 
Certainly, the constant attention paid to Stojalowski’s ideas had an indirect influence on 
the Greek Catholic clergy, especially in terms of working closely with peasants and 
mobilizing them before other political activists could do so.  
In conclusion, the example of Stojalowski shows that Roman and Greek 
Catholics were constantly making political choices that divided more than united them. 
Growing nationalism reinforced the differences between rites and became much more 
attractive than social Catholicism. The controversial activity of Stojalowski and the 
absence of a clear plan to involve Greek Catholics in his movement were among the 
main reasons why he was not able to unite all the Catholics of Galicia under his 
interpretation of social Catholicism. Additionally, as Stojalowski considered himself a 
leader of social Catholicism in Galicia, the movement had a strong association with his 
personality and thus was less attractive to Greek Catholics. 
Stojalowski and Jews 
 
The Jewish population was the third most numerous group in Galicia. Both Polish and 
Ruthenian activists, as well as the laity and clergy, had developed certain attitudes 
towards neighbouring Jews. As Jews were not peasants, and were mostly considered to 
be the owners of taverns and inns, relations with them were far from positive and 
tolerant. Stojalowski was among those who named Jews as one of the reasons for poverty 
and alcoholism. Stojalowski openly discussed this idea in newspapers and public 
speeches. He managed to use extant hostility and suspicion to increase his own 
popularity.298 Stojalowski built his argument around concern for Catholics: “Catholics 
cannot become disciplined, sober, hard-working modern people until they shun the Jews’ 
taverns, alcohol, credit, and shops”.299  
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Stojalowski and his Christian People’s Party developed strong anti-Jewish 
propaganda in the newspapers.300 Jews were a comfortable target to blame, as they did 
not belong to the Polish nationality and were associated with having a more privileged 
position in society than peasants. Stojalowski gave a simplistic definition of anti-
semitism: he stated that it was “defense against Jews”.301 He differentiated between 
‘silent’ and ‘knightly’ anti-semitism. The first one was about soft methods against Jews, 
such as via their economic and spatial isolation, while the second one was about actively 
fighting, such as through pogroms. He himself approved of the first one as useful to 
Galician peasants, while the second one was dangerous because it brought disorder and 
led to peasants being jailed.302 Additionally, Jews who suffered from pogroms might 
receive compensation from the state for their losses,303 and thus would keep their 
privileged position. However, it was not so easy to control the interpretation of these 
ideas by peasants, and often the peasants acted more radically than expected, especially 
because there were rumors that it was legal to persecute Jews.304 
The question of Stojalowski’s involvement with anti-semitic propaganda and 
pogroms is well developed in the historiography.305 For example, Kerstin Jobst analyses 
this question in her article Die antisemitischen Bauernunruhen im westlichen Galizien 
1898,306 while Daniel Unowsky looks at it in his Peasant Political Mobilization and the 
1898 anti-Jewish Riots in Western Galicia.307  I focus in this section on why anti-semitic 
ideas were used for the mass mobilization of Catholics and how Stojalowski connected 
anti-semitism and Catholicism. Similar to Stojalowski, the national activists from both 
Ruthenian and Polish sides used anti-semitic ideas: from this perspective, it is interesting 
to trace how Catholics and nationalist had similar views on the same question.  
Unowsky has described how “major incidents most often commenced in towns 
flooded with visitors from surrounding areas during market days, Corpus Christi and 
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other holidays.”308 This means that important religious holidays were associated in 
peasants’ minds with the possibility to attack Jews: they also gave them the feeling of 
being an organized and powerful group against possible Jewish plots. Unowsky 
elaborates further that only a complex view on the riots, including Catholic action in 
them, can guarantee us an understanding of how the riots occurred.309 Together with 
Nemes, Unowsky continues that “Catholic institutions, journalists, and politicians 
posited anti-Jewish action as the key to modernizing the rural economy.”310 Stojalowski 
was a vivid example of this statement, since he encouraged his followers to block Jewish 
business whenever possible. A similar strategy was also used by national activists on 
both the Polish and Ruthenian sides. 
Unlike Roman Catholics (and especially Stojalowski), Greek Catholics 
developed their own anti-Semitic agenda more slowly: as both Jews and Greek Catholics 
belonged to minority groups, they were looking for possible alliances against the Poles. 
During the elections in 1907, several Jewish representatives were elected to parliament 
thanks to the support of Greek Catholics. The details of such cooperation are analyzed 
in the works of Joshua Shanes and Johanan Petrovski-Stern, who states that Jewish and 
Ruthenian political activists benefited from mutual support during the first universal 
suffrage elections.311 Stojalowski, however, did not need such alliances because of his 
popularity and was only cautious about not causing trouble with the authorities by 
spreading anti-Jewish ideas. As Unowsky and Nemes show in the introduction to Sites 
of European Antisemitism in the Age of Mass Politics, “the history of antisemitism also 
can clarify important topics in social and economic history, including relations between 
city and countryside, the role of states in the lives of their citizens, and the place of 
religion in modern societies”.312 Stojalowski’s agitation was an example of the 
intersections that Unowski and Nemes have highlighted, as he was acting in the 
framework of state laws (encouraging people to avoid explicit violence) while using 
religion as a dividing line between Catholics and Jews and emphasizing how Jews were 
negatively influencing the economic position of peasants.313  
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As relations between the nationalities were built on an economic background, the 
changes in the economic and political sphere had a significant influence on the dynamic 
of such relations. Poles and Polish culture were associated with the nobility and the 
governing authorities, while Jews, who were mostly workers, merchants, and 
innkeepers, were seen as the reason for poverty and peasant drunkenness. For Greek and 
Roman Catholic priests, anti-Jewish agitation was naturally a part of anti-alcohol 
campaigns,314 so even before mass male suffrage priests of both rites were slow to build 
relations with Jews. As such, the ideas of Stojalowski were not unique, just rather more 
reinforced and dispersed more widely thanks to his larger resources.315  
With the development of mass mobilization, Jews were associated with 
socialism, or at least sympathy for it.316 Both churches saw the greatest threat in 
socialism, with its anti-clerical and secularist ideas. Unowsky and Nemes brilliantly 
summarize that “antisemitism as a distinctly modern phenomenon is inseparable from 
the emergence of mass politics across the continent.”317 The novelty of Stojalowski’s 
approach was that he, following the example of Lueger, was developing this 
phenomenon in Galicia, giving it a strong political and religious background. 
Stojalowski combined the existing hostility towards Jews in Galicia with his political 
ideas and desire to become elected. 
Reaction: the response of the Church and government to Stojalowski’s 
mobilization 
 
Mass mobilization inevitably disturbed the existing hierarchical order in Galicia and 
prompted reactions from the local Church and the government. In particular, activists 
were seen as a threat, and there was a need to react accordingly. Yet, the reaction on a 
local level was not always supported by the high hierarchy of the Church or the state; 
the problems of mass mobilization were seen as a local problem which did not require 
imperial or Patriarchal interference. Whilst the Church and the local government were 
often at odds or in competition for support of the masses, they could still act together 
when defending their mutual interests against the common threat of mobilization. 
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In the case of Galicia, mass mobilization was very much seen as a localized 
problem. Agitators such as Stojalowski tended to mobilize masses around issues of 
privilege and social injustice on a local level whilst appealing to higher ideals or even 
higher authorities to support their cause and challenge local power structures. In this 
way, as shall be shown through the examples of Stojalowski and later Greek Catholic 
activists (priests like Bachynskyj, Popel, and others discussed in chapter four), agitators 
exerted pressure from two sides: from the bottom, through the mass mobilization of 
workers and peasants, and from the top, by appealing to the senior authorities of the 
empire and the Church. 
In the Appeal to the Emperor, Stojalowski listed all of his misfortunes and named 
the officials who caused them. The Appeal demonstrates how Stojalowski positioned 
himself within the hierarchy of the state and the example he gave to his followers. An 
appeal to the imperial authorities was normally the last step taken because it meant that 
the other attempts to solve the problem had not worked. It was popular among Galicians, 
who were convinced that the local government was unjust and that only the imperial 
government was capable of solving problematic affairs. The arguments used in the 
petition are essential, as they demonstrate why a certain situation (in this case, the 
persecution of Stojalowski) was dangerous for the whole state. Stojalowski wrote: “It 
would be a shame for Austrian justice and constitution if what was done to me could 
remain unpunished”. This was because it would mean that under the monarchy “a loyal 
and honest citizen cannot feel safe”, as at any moment he could be easily persecuted by 
the authorities.318 Furthermore, Stojalowski explained that he was persecuted by the 
governor of Galicia for issuing a Christian newspaper loyal to the dynasty: this was 
because the governor was very conservative and disliked the content of Stojalowski’s 
newspapers. 
Besides this, Stojalowski struggled with the local government and entered into 
conflict with the church hierarchs of Galicia. It was typical for the Christian Social 
movement to raise anti-episcopal and even anti-clerical sentiments:319 Stojalowski 
expressed this anti-episcopal approach in terms of a history of personal conflict and 
accusations that representatives of the Church and local government had united against 
him. Certainly, Stojalowski, as a member of the Church, was not against church 
hierarchy as such, but, as is evident from his relations with bishops discussed below, he 
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relied on the authority of the pope much more than on the opinions of the Galician 
hierarchs. 
Conflict with the Catholic Church hierarchy 
The conflict with church authorities was one of the most significant problems for 
Stojalowski in his political and religious career. It is important to analyze it in depth as 
it provides us with an understanding as to why Stojalowski, who was a wholehearted 
supporter of Catholicism and actively wanted to bring Catholic ideas into politics, was 
not blessed by the bishops and was excommunicated by them. In addition, he did not 
have many followers among priests and was never able to restore good relations with the 
Galician clergy.  
The conflict with the bishops shows that some methods of modern politics (such 
as questioning of the social and ecclesiastical hierarchy, populism, etc.) were not 
acceptable to the church hierarchy. However, Stojalowski, through his activism, 
involved the Roman Catholic Church in a discussion about what kind of modern politics 
is appropriate for the Church and how it should be implemented. Certainly for 
Stojalowski the main focus was the needs of working people, as they were the largest 
and most neglected group. The most essential contribution of Stojalowski was as 
tangible example that Catholic ideas and the Catholic clergy had the power to make a 
difference in the social and political spheres.  
The first bishop who expressed his concerns about Stojalowski was Leon 
Wałęga, the bishop of Tarnow, in 1893. In this bishop’s opinion, Stojalowski was putting 
dangerous ideas into peoples’ heads and inspired them to disrespect the existing order of 
society. The bishop’s greatest fear was that other clergy would follow Stojalowski’s 
example and start to encourage peasants to be critical towards the secular and religious 
authorities. Tarnow’s bishop asked the archbishop in Lemberg to forbid the clergy from 
supporting the gatherings of Stojalowski, which was done shortly after. However, the 
bishop later reported that Stojalowski was gaining support from local pastors and held a 
religious service with them in a small village house.320 Stojalowski’s network proved to 
be more efficient than the prohibition of the bishops, especially because Stojalowski 
used this network for religious purposes and not to organise a rally (which was 
forbidden). In other words, Stojalowski was a huge challenge to the church hierarchy, as 
he was craftily combining his position as a priest with the role of a political activist. 
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The next step for Bishop Leon Wałęga was to fight against Stojalowski’s 
newspapers, so he requested the archbishop to condemn the newspapers. The bishop 
suggested damning the newspapers in a collective letter. However, he emphasized that 
such a condemnation would not be easy because Stojalowski would resist to it and 
probably would report it to the Vatican. Therefore, Wałęga saw a danger in Stojalowski’s 
ability to build a good argument and so arranged for all three Galician bishops to act 
against Stojalowski together. Tarnow’s bishop managed to create a strong opposition 
party of Galician bishops against Stojalowski, even though the other bishops were not 
primarily concerned about his behaviour and newspapers. The coalition of bishops 
significantly worsened the position of Stojalowski within the church hierarchy, as he did 
not have any support from the Church in Galicia.  
However, the bishop of Tarnow knew that the alliance of bishops was not enough 
in the case of a well-educated and widely supported opponent like Stojalowski. Bishop 
Wałęga highlighted to the archbishop that it was extremely important to be precise and 
detailed when writing about the harm of Stojalowski’s newspapers: “The Vatican does 
not understand the complexity of our position and is more eager to support Stojalowski, 
as he is better at arguing”.321 Then the bishop elaborated further on the problem with the 
newspapers: he emphasized that the church hierarchy could not forbid issuing 
newspapers (apparently only the state could do this), so the only solution was to forbid 
the clergy and laity from reading them. At the end of his letter, the bishop wondered 
where Stojalowski obtained all his money.322 Stojalowski placed the bishops in a more 
demanding situation. Apparently, the church hierarchy was more afraid of controlling 
Stojalowski than he himself was of disobeying the church authorities and losing his 
position as a parish priest. 
Stojalowski’s reaction to Bishop Wałęga suggestions was immediate. He 
published in his newspaper Wieniec Polski that all the persecutions from the bishop were 
not significant and that most of the clergy who had agreed to join this persecution had 
done so under pressure. In addition, Stojalowski emphasized that his actions were not 
the responsibility of Tarnow’s bishop as he belonged to the Lemberg diocese and thus 
was a subordinate of Archbishop Morawski. At the end of the article, Stojalowski 
highlighted: “our truth won in secular trials, it will win in religious ones as well”.323 Such 
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references to the truth were an example of populist agitation aimed at emphasizing that 
Stojalowski was a defender of just behavior. In addition, confidence in gaining justice 
was a way to highlight Stojaloswki’s strong belief that he had sustainable alliances with 
some representatives of the secular authorities. 
There is not much evidence successful cooperation between Stojalowski and 
influential figures. One of the best known is the support of Katarzyna Potocka, who 
twice gave donations to his newspapers.324 When Stojalowski has left Galicia for Silesia, 
the local bishop had no issues with his activity. However, this was not the case for 
Galician bishops in the 1890s, where the situation escalated very fast and led to 
Stojalowski’s excommunication. 
 Archbishop Morawski took the side of Tarnow’s bishop and forbade reading and 
keeping all newspapers issued by Stojalowski. In addition, the archbishop suspended 
Stojalowski from his priestly duties for three months (from November 1893).325 
Stojalowski wrote a telegram to Pope Leo XIII reporting that the Galician bishops were 
against Christian newspapers and asking him not to make a final decision before having 
heard the readers of the newspapers. In Wieniec Polski, Stojalowski argued to his readers 
that if the bishops were against a newspaper with Catholic values, it meant that in fact 
they were against peasant movements as such. Stojalowski concluded that the bishops 
had misused their authority in his case, because they persecuted something not 
acceptable to them from a socio-political perspective: “it is sad that bishops are using 
faith and the Church for politics.”326 In other words, he was arguing that the Church and 
secular authorities did not support the peasant movement and were actually afraid of 
peasant activities: thus, the authorities were using all available means to stop a peasant 
mass movement. In addition, Stojalowski’s accusation that the bishops were using 
Church for politics was quite ironic, since Stojalowski himself was doing the same. 
In the next editions of Wieniec Polski (1894), Stojalowski continued to criticize 
the actions of the Galician bishops, emphasizing that they were not his authority because 
they supported the landowners and not the people’s spiritual well-being. In his defence, 
Stojalowski claimed that the pope supported and praised his activities and the 
newspapers he issued.327  
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Stojalowski had little evidence to prove that the pope was really on his side. John 
Boyer has highlighted that Stojalowski simply manipulated the letter he received from 
the Vatican. Stojalowski sent congratulations to Leo XIII on the occasion of his jubilee 
and described his activity in Galicia. Since the Vatican received plenty of similar letters, 
it provided a typical response to it. This included thanks and blessings to the person who 
sent the missive, which Stojalowski interpreted as special recognition from the pope.328 
Most likely, Stojalowski knew that this was not an act of support, as he was quite familiar 
with the Vatican and its processes. Regardless of whether the support of the pope was 
real or fake, it was one of the tools that Stojalowski used to bring a strong argument 
against the bishops, prove that his actions were in the framework of the Catholic Church, 
and protect himself and his political party from being banned. 
After the bishops forbade people from reading the newspapers in question, local 
starostas started reporting to the Vice-regency about how many people stopped 
subscribing to them. This mutual cooperation between the secular and religious 
authorities is a good example of how they reinforced each other in Galicia. Meanwhile, 
Stojalowski took the same step as in the conflict with Governor Badeni: he appealed to 
the Vatican. In order to be more effective, he traveled there and was proved innocent by 
the pope. Afterwards, he decided to change diocese in order to avoid any further conflicts 
with the Galicial hierarchs. None of the dioceses in the Habsburg Monarchy wanted to 
take him except Antinor in Montenegro.329 
As Stojalowski had not stopped his activity in Galicia, the local bishops issued 
one more pastoral letter against him. In this letter, they were more precise, emphasizing 
that his newspapers provoked hatred between the poor and wealthy, as well as 
disobedience to the government. The bishops fought against the idea that the Pope 
supported him, saying that Stojalowski misinterpreted a personal blessing from the Pope 
(concerning the organization of a pilgrimage) as a blessing for his political activity. 
Thus, the bishops wanted to ‘protect’ the laity from Stojalowski’s lie and emphasize that 
the nuncio had proved that the pope was not supportive.At the end of the letter, the 
bishops condemned Stojalowski’s newspapers and the socialistic Naprzod [Forward],330 
thus putting both into one and the same category. 
The bishops’ letter is a telling example that for the church hierarchy in Galicia, 
the ideas of Stojalowski seemed the same as socialistic ones. Additionally, the attempt 
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to condemn Stojalowski’s newspapers and the way in which both sides involved the 
Vatican demonstrated how the bishops and this particular priest competed to represent 
‘real and actual’ Catholicism in the province. The bishops saw their right as one given 
by their positions within the Church, while Stojalowski was convinced that he was the 
better representative of Pope Leo XIII’s ideas, in particular the ned to improve the living 
and working conditions of the lower classes. For the bishops, the importance of 
obedience was the principal component of their view on the lower class.331 Only in 1900 
did the new Archbishop Józef  Bilczewski start to focus on following Rerum Novarum 
and preaching about improving the lives of the peasants and workers.  
The most essential outcome of the conflict with the bishops was that Stojalowski 
actually won. He managed to prove to the pope that the accusations of the Galician 
bishops were wrong. After overcoming his excommunication in 1897332 and receiving 
support from the Vatican, Stojalowski was able to emphasize that his ideas and actions 
had not deserve the fact inflicted upon them by the Galician bishops. In addition, he 
maintained that Catholic ideas were more important than the hierarchy because the latter 
was associated with and actively involved in supporting the nobility and cooperating 
with unjust local power. Stojalowski criticized the Church hierarchy for putting secular 
power higher than Catholic values and for persecuting him for such criticisms in tandem 
with the local Galician authorities.  
Despite the conflict with the Galician bishops in 1894, Stojalowski tried to find 
an agreement with the higher hierarchy in the next decade,333 especially with the new 
archbishop supporting and promoting the ideas of Leo XIII Throughout his political 
career, Stojalowski did not declare strongly anti-episcopal thoughts: he rather sought to 
highlight his loyalty to the Church and its hierarchy.334 It was essential for Stojalowski 
to receive at least some support from the higher hierarchy and especially the Vatican, as 
this brought him the necessary legitimization and allowed him to recover from 
accusations that he was not a proper pastor. In 1901-02, Stojalowski made an attempt to 
return to the Galician eparchy and receive support from Józef Bilczewski, the recently 
nominated Archbishop Metropolitan of Lemberg.335 This is an important episode to 
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mention: Bilczewski declared himself as a follower of Rerum Novarum and was very 
invested in social work, while Stojalowski’s interest in Galicia remained intense, even 
after building a network in Silesia. Stojalowski corresponded with Bilczewski to arrange 
a meeting and establish a good image. Stojalowski emphasized that he had twice been 
in Rome (the Vatican) and that the Officium had not found anything in his actions that 
was against the faith: he also noted that he always sent his newspapers to all the 
consistories so that they could be checked any possible misinterpretations of Catholic 
values. However, nobody ever replied to him. Stojalowski concluded with a request that 
he not been judged before the meeting.336 In his next letter, Stojalowski explained further 
about the orthodoxy of his newspapers and suggested sending them to a censor 
nominated by the archbishop.337 In such a way, Stojalowski attempted to justify himself 
and his newspapers and tried to build relations with the new archbishop. 
Apparently, Stojalowski hoped that the archbishop would be more open to him 
and his activity than the previous bishops and thus wrote a number of letters to him. 
Even though Stojalowski’s activity was not criticized in the Vatican as it was in Galicia, 
he needed to have support from the high hierarchy in Galicia as well. However, this 
never happened. Unfortunately, we do not know how the archbishop replied to 
Stojalowski, but it is certain that they never met. 
Stojalowski explained to Archbishop Bilczewski that his main motivation was to 
create unity among different Polish political Catholic movements, since this was the only 
way for them to be productive. When Stojalowski wrote the letter, he was a deputy in 
parliament, and as such cooperation between the political parties was very important for 
him. The tonnes of letters addressed to Bilczewski were very different from his previous 
writings because here he stressed his victimization and highlighted his obedience: 
earlier, during the conflict with the Galician bishops, he was more radical and proud. 
The other strategy to influence the archbishop was to emphasize the uniqueness 
of his actions. Stojalowski wrote that he was the only one who had organized a 
pilgrimage to the Holy Land, a trip he was planning to do again if the archbishop would 
give his blessing. This blessing was very important because most of the pilgrims would 
be from Galicia, so for the pilgrimage to be valid the blessing was needed.338 Stojalowski 
explained further that his party, Stronnictwo  Chrześcijańsko-Ludowe [the Christian 
Peoples’ Party], would also take part in the pilgrimage. This should not have been a 
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problem because the ideology of the party was based on the teachings of Leo XIII and 
its aim was to improve social relations through better cooperation in the sacral and 
religious domains.339 Thus, Stojalowski demonstrated again how he managed to intersect 
politics and religion and how he used all available resources, such as rallies, newspapers, 
brochures, and the support of the religious authorities, to promote his party and its 
activity. Probably, this was the reason why Archbishop Bilczewski was not eager to 
cooperate with Stojalowski. 
The conflict with the Galician bishops and the desire to establish cooperation 
with Archbishop Bilczewsky shows how the local clergy were able to close ranks against 
political agitators, particularly when the agitator was preaching against them. The more 
Stojalowski failed to gain support or patronage from his fellow Galician clergy, the 
further he went to defend his own position and criticise the injustices and actions of his 
local peers. As a religious and political activist, Stojalowski was not playing the local 
political game according to the established rules of the Roman Catholic priesthood in 
Galicia. This example shows how those in positions of local authority could portray 
agitators as generic threats to existing religious or state power structures and thus unite 
support against them. The case of Stojalowski shows the conservatism and 
‘togetherness’ of the clergy as they covered each other’s backs and even worked with 
government or local officials when it was mutually beneficial to defend the existing 
concentrations of power and authority. 
Stojalowski’s conflict with the bishops reveals different vectors of behaviour in 
a time of mass politics. On the one hand, Stojalowski, as a representative of lower clergy, 
combined religious and political ideas to encourage more followers to be active citizens 
and increase the importance of the Catholic Church in the public domain. On the other, 
the growing mass involvement of laity was seen as a chaotic and powerful movement 
that might sweep away the existing social order and question the respect given to the 
high authorities. From their side, the Galician bishops tried to control and even stop the 
agitation of Stojalowski by excommunicating him from the Church and forbidding the 
reading of his newspapers. Stojalowski managed to prove to the Vatican that his 
newspapers were not anti-Catholic, but he failed to rebuild relations with the Galician 
hierarchs, even when a new archbishop arrived. The confrontation with the bishops led 
to Stojalowski’s move from Galicia and the continuation of his activism in Silesia. As 
will be discussed in the next chapter, the Greek Catholic priests who spoiled the relations 
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with the Church hierarchy because of their political activity also did not manage to 
continue their careers as priests in Galicia. Thus, the support, or at least neutrality, of the 
bishops was extremely essential for the clergy and shaped their actions in a political 
space. 
Conclusions 
 
The advent of universal male suffrage released the huge potential of the peasantry to 
influence the political landscape of Galicia. Various groups and ideologies competed 
over support from the newly franchised peasants. For the Church, there was a duality of 
interests: to retain control over the peasantry and ‘protect’ them from undesired 
influences within society. The second interest consisted of extending the Church’s own 
political influence over the laity and secular governing organizations. For both these 
interests, the Church perceived the peasantry as a tool when obedient to the status quo 
and as a threat when unified in opposition to the ruling hierarchy.  
The example of Stojalowski shows that at the local level, preservation of the 
existing social hierarchy and order was at the heart of the Church’s reaction to mass 
mobilization of the peasantry. However, such an approach was not a priority of the laity, 
as working people were looking for the improvement of their economic position and the 
opportunity to have an influential role within society. New political ideas such as 
nationalism and social Catholicism were becoming more attractive and gaining 
popularity among the clergy and laity. 
Stojalowski, through his own initiative and a variety of mass mobilization tools, 
demonstrated how Catholic values and practices could be used to mobilize the laity along 
different politically sensitive grievances, be they national identity struggles, legal 
injustices, or petty corruption. Stojalowski always emphasized that his politics was 
supported by the Pope and fell within the framework of Social Catholicism, and in this 
way legitimized his own political strategy and actions while being criticized by the 
Galician government and local bishops. With such an approach, Stojalowski claimed 
that the power of Vienna and the Vatican was the most important, while local 
representatives misued their authority for their own benefit. 
Stojalowski also referred actively to national identity in his agitation and 
promoted combining of patriotism with Catholicism. On the one hand, Stojalowski was 
fully concentrated on Polish working people. On the other, he had plans to involve 
Ruthenians in his movement, but never developed them further. His relationship with 
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the Jews was much more complex and intense, as Stojalowski openly and repeatedly 
expressed anti-semitic ideas. While Stojalowski himself did not encourage violent 
actions against Jews, his constant blaming of them for all kinds of economic problems 
was an implicit call to action and resulted in pogroms in 1898.  
Political activists like Stojalowski swiftly spread the ideas of their parties among 
the laity thanks to printed means of communication (newspapers and brochures) and 
public gatherings. Very often, these ideas were combined with religious ones and had a 
populist character. Stojalowski’s agitation is an excellent example of how to construct, 
spread, and succeed in political mobilization by combining the sacred and secular. Thus, 
his political activism reveals a lot about mass mobilization, in particular how mass 
mobilization challenged the authority of state and church institutions and how these 
institutions responded to such challenges.  However, due to his conflicts with the state 
and the hierarchy of the Church, Stojalowski did not manage to build a network of 
agitators (especially among the clergy) that would have the potential to cover the whole 
of Galicia and become a strong and decisive political force. This failure was perhaps due 
to an overly confrontational manner that turned other Catholic priests against him, but it 
nevertheless shows how Catholicism had the prospect of becoming a powerful player in 
the politics of Galicia. In the long run, Stojalowski’s main achievement was not his 
political program but the development of mass mobilization strategies through 
gatherings, peasant clubs, newspapers, and participation in celebrations. He taught 
peasants and workers how to organize themselves in the public domain and inspired 
other political agitators to develop closer connections with the peasants and how to 
understand their needs. 
 
114 
 
Chapter 4. Greek Catholics and mass mobilization: conflicts 
between priests and local authorities  
 
Introduction 
 
After having explored the example of Stojalowski and his role in the Roman Catholic 
Church, it is fruitful to focus on similar processes that took place in the Greek Catholic 
Church. The main aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the influence of mass 
mobilization on Greek Catholic clergy and the interdependence of different spheres of 
power within Galician villages in the context of mass mobilization, as well as to reveal 
similarities and differences between the two churches. Careful observation of village 
governance and its interplay with the lives of priests and the laity provides a fruitful 
background for understanding the problems, challenges, and particularities that priests, 
the high church authorities, and the laity experienced. This chapter is an attempt at 
microhistory intended to represent the complexity of the issues connected with mass 
mobilization. My emphasis is not on political slogans or strategies, but on the 
interconnections between actors at different levels. It is a story of the behind-the-scenes 
struggle connected to mass mobilization, with the Greek Catholic parish clergy as the 
main heroes. 
For the Roman Catholic Church, the most challenging issue relating to mass 
mobilization was the activity of Stojalowski. Stojalowski managed to successfully 
agitate laity to involve themselves in politics, question the existing social hierarchy, and 
promote Polish nationalism and anti-semitism. In the Greek Catholic Church similar 
issues existed, but they were stimulated by different priests. So, in this section, I discuss 
a few cases of the priests connected to mass mobilization. In comparison to the Roman 
Catholic Church, the Greek Catholic Church had to deal with threats by the laity to 
change their rite. Additionally, the Greek Catholic priests competed with local 
authorities and teachers for influence in the village. However, intensive political 
agitation that interfered with priests’ religious duties and the rising national issues were 
common for both churches. The cases of four priests discussed below address each of 
these problems and together represent a general picture of the difficulties that the Greek 
Catholic Church faced as a result of mass mobilization.   
I focus on relations between state power (county administrators, the provincial 
government, central ministries in Vienna, and the local and high courts) and 
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representatives of the Greek Catholic Church (from high church institutions, especially 
the Consistory and Ordinariate, down to the parishes).  In some cases, I also consider the 
local intelligentsia: teachers, the lawyers of accused priests, and the writers of articles in 
the press. In particular situations, all these actors could simultaneously represent 
institutional and personal interests. It would be useful to trace the intersection of personal 
and professional motivations; however, the sources available (i.e., the archive of the 
Presidium of the Galician Vice-regency) are official documents that provide only limited 
clues as to where the line between professional duty and personal relations fell. For 
example, personal conflicts could lie behind the filing of a formal accusation. However, 
due to the paucity of personal information in the sources, this chapter focuses on actors 
as representatives of certain institutions or communities.  
The dynamics between the actors changed depending on spatial proximity or 
distance to each other. It is clear from the archival record that for the local actors 
involved in this case study, the situation was much more tense, important, and emotional. 
Meanwhile, more distant actors (like the central government or high church officials) 
reacted slowly and often did not take the complaints of starostas or parishioners as very 
seriously.340 Indeed, such cases were of low priority as they were viewed as provincial 
problems. For example, one starosta complained about a priest over the course of several 
years, and yet there was no reaction from the Vice-regency or Ordinariate (the high 
authority of the Greek Catholic Church).341 The only cases that resulted in an immediate 
reaction from the government were connected to strikes or political agitation.342 
Apparently, this was a serious matter for the Vice-regency, as strikes had economic 
consequences and were a danger to the public peace. Thus, such slowness in fixing 
problems in the village contributed to aggravating the tension between starosta and priest 
or priest and parishioners (depending on the sides involved in the conflict). 
This chapter focuses on the cases of four politically active Greek Catholic priests 
who were accused of abusing their positions as parish clergy for their own benefit, 
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including “agitating against the Austrian government” or “against parliamentary 
elections” and the “organization of agricultural strikes.”343 All four priests mentioned in 
the archival sources had conflicts or misunderstandings on the local level that led to the 
involvement of the higher ecclesiastical and secular authorities; all of them were put on 
trial because of the accusations of illegal behaviour. From the sources, it is not easy to 
determine whether the priests were truly abusing their power or whether those who were 
against them accused them falsely. Examples of false accusations are presented in the 
next chapter, which deals with the election process directly. In the end, the veracity of 
the accusations is not particularly significant for the story of mass mobilization, in which 
the goal is not to discover how appropriate the behavior of the priests was but rather to 
trace the interconnections and complexity of relationships within Galician villages.  
Threats by the laity to change their rite 
 
The issue of changing rite was very sensitive in Galician society. On the one hand, the 
Greek and Roman Catholic clergies were interested in widening their parishes by 
attracting the laity of the opposite rite. As theoretically both rites were part of one Church 
and the religious rituals had equal value, there was a chance to substitute one rite for the 
other. This happened in territories that did not have two different priests, where the laity 
decided to use whichever priest was closer. However, due to historical tensions between 
the two rites, officially changing rite was allowed only with the approval of the Vatican. 
Attention to changes in rite became even more intense as a result of growing national 
differences between Poles and Ruthenians. While the relations between the Greek and 
Roman Catholics were already settled by religious and state laws, the problem of 
changing rite from Greek Catholic to Orthodoxy was quite new.344  Firstly, Orthodoxy 
was not considered a state religion and thus was not established or regulated by any law. 
Secondly, the intention to become Orthodox was strongly connected to one’s political 
background. As Orthodoxy was the state religion of the Russian Empire, a fascination 
with Orthodoxy meant sympathy for the Russian state and was considered as disloyalty 
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to the Austrian Empire. Austrian officials were particularly concerned about possible 
disloyalty on the Russian-Austrian border.345  
As was already mentioned, Orthodoxy did not have proper place in the Austro-
Hungarian legal system. It simply did not exist as a rite, and it was not legally easy to 
implement. It was possible to be considered Greek Orientalist (the same as Orthodox),346 
but people who wanted to change rite petitioned to convert to Orthodoxy; this 
complicated the starostvo’s (county administration’s) work, as such a change was not 
possible and put Orthodox people outside the law. However, it was not the starostvo’s  
troubles which shook local communities, but newly converted Orthodox priests who 
established successful propaganda.347 These priests were often Austro-Hungarian 
citizens who traveled to the Russian Empire and became priests there. Afterwards they 
came back to Galicia and created their own congregations – again, congregations that 
were illegal. In addition, the Orthodox priests were not considered priests in the Austrian 
Empire. Such a change in rite was characteristic for Ruthenians with Russophile political 
preferences. Under such circumstances, it was essential for local authorities and Greek 
Catholic priests to put an end to such ‘threats by the laity’ and regain influence over their 
own subordinates.  
The priest of the village of Hrabe, Fileman Kisilevskyj, had his own methods to 
deal with new converts to Orthodoxy. He refused to bury an Orthodox child in the 
absence of the Orthodox priest and pulled a cross out from the ground on the land of a 
parishioner who had converted to Orthodoxy, declaring that this parishioner was now a 
pagan.348 Similar problems beset priests from neighboring parishes.349 For example, in 
one village, newly converted Orthodox peasants stole the old Greek Catholic church 
building from one village by dismantling it and then reconstructing it again.  
After the Greek Catholic priest Kisilevskyj, the starosta was the second person 
to become preoccupied with the peasants’ desire to change rite; he wrote constantly to 
the Vice-regency, asking them to take action. The starosta explained that the Orthodox 
agitators were very crafty: they came to the village through forests and swamps, arrived 
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at a pre-established place in the village at night, held a meeting with the peasants, and 
disappeared before morning.350 Generally speaking, the starosta claimed these agitators 
were invisible and therefore impossible to discover and punish.  
The subsequent court proceedings brought against Kisilevskyj, as well as the 
local and church authorities, found him not guilty of any criminal actions.351 The starosta 
gave Kisilevskyj a positive character reference, claiming that any possible hatred 
towards the priest was caused not by money but by his political views. As the priest was 
known to be a Ukrainophile, the Russophile352 student Kolder had written the report 
against the priest. Bishop Chehovych also spoke positively about Kisilevskyj, reporting 
that his parish was well-organized.353 Thus, the idea that the priest was the reason that 
some of the laity converted to Orthodoxy was proven to be unrealistic. 
The case attracted wider attention, including the interest of the Polish socialist 
newspaper Naprzod. Here, Tadeusz Tokarski highlighted the danger of Russophile 
propaganda, which had already inspired 46 families to convert to Orthodoxy; 36 others 
had expressed their determination to follow suit.354 According to Naprzod, the main 
reasons for Orthodoxy’s popularity – and, correspondingly, that of Russophilism – was 
the lack of education among the peasants, too much trust in priests (unsurprisingly, given 
Naprzod’s socialist leanings), and the lack of political rights, especially the exclusion of 
local Ruthenians (also known as Lemky) from electing their own representatives. The 
newspaper stated: “there is no deputy from the 90 thousand Ruthenians in 
Lemkivshchyna”.355 The article’s author states that if this injustice was rectified, then 
there would be more political differentiation in the region and the Russophiles would 
lose their majority.  
In addition, Naprzod named other reasons for growing interest in Orthodoxy. It 
criticized the government and the hierarchy of the Greek Catholic Church for not doing 
enough to change the current ‘dangerous’ situation; it also pointed out that Kisilevskyj 
was not suited to preventing people from changing rite because of his financial affairs.356 
Several local starostas were even accused of supporting Russophiles as a remedy against 
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growing Polish nationalism. At the end of the article, the author highlighted that local 
starostas had had little success in defeating the Russophiles and that only the 
government, with a wise approach and without repressions, could bring balance to the 
region.357 
The question of repression is also raised in the Memorandum on the Matter of 
Defeating the Orthodox and Russophile Propaganda in Austria, which provided 
extensive analysis of the problem and suggested 14 steps that could be taken to overcome 
it.358 The author (name not indicated) argued that repression of peasants only made this 
type of agitation more attractive and thus more dangerous for the local authorities and 
priests.359 Persecuted peasants and Orthodox priests became heroes and martyrs in the 
eyes of communities, as there were no effective methods for dealing with Orthodox 
priests besides short-term arrests and warnings. The author of the Memorandum made 
an analogy with the case of Stojalowski, who was extremely popular while being actively 
persecuted. In the author’s opinion, his popularity and persecution were mutually 
reinforcing.360 In addition, peasants were not afraid to be imprisoned because, on the one 
hand, imprisonment raised their importance in the community and, on the other, they 
were given better food in prison than at home.361  
As there were no regulations concerning how to legally combat Orthodoxy, 
Greek Catholic priests worked together with local teachers and gendarmes362 to write 
reports about inappropriate behavior and then physically forcing peasants to go to court. 
This type of persecution was not very effective, especially in the winter as 
Lemkivshchyna (the region where all this took place) has a mountainous landscape.363 
Sometimes priests behaved like Kysilevskyj, resorting to acts of rage like pulling out a 
cross from a new convert’s land. All such methods did more to denigrate the authority 
of the Greek Catholic Church than to fix the problem. 
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The Memorandum stated that the only alternative was propaganda against the 
Russian Empire: proclaiming the “barbarity of tsarism” could improve the situation in 
Lemkivshchyna.364 The author suggested using all sorts of methods: lectures, brochures, 
and wandering theatres and cinemas. The cinema was seen as having great potential 
because peasants were very responsive to visual images. Basically, the author suggested 
employing all forms of propaganda known at the time to deliver the message against 
Orthodoxy among the peasants.365 He was also very concerned about raising such 
awareness among Poles and Ruthenians because Orthodoxy, as a tool of the Russian tsar, 
posed a threat to Austria and aimed to assimilate Ruthenians into the Russian nation.366  
The other method that would be effective in overcoming the problem, according 
to the Memorandum, was the selection of appropriate Greek Catholic priests who were 
not actively politically engaged.367 The political preferences of priests could be an 
inspiration for the laity and thus lead to either a Ukrainian-oriented parish or one that 
supported cooperation with the Russian Empire (Russophile). In the author’s opinion, 
there were a large number of unsuitable priests about whom the church authorities had 
no idea because when a problem arose the authorities questioned only the suspected 
priests without seeking a third opinion, from the parishioners for example.368 Thus, the 
Memorandum saw the clergy as a large part of the problem and suggested that priestly 
political activity be prohibited. The Memorandum also reveals that propaganda and 
counter-propaganda was viewed as an effective tool to encourage peasants to follow 
proper social behavior (being loyal to the Austro-Hungarian Empire) at the beginning of 
the twentieth century.369  
A closer look at the problem of changing rite demonstrates how religious rites 
were the subject of agitation and mobilization, how a disadvantaged position provided 
fertile soil for certain forms of agitation, and how counter-agitation functioned as an 
essential element of mass mobilization. It was not very easy for Greek Catholic priests 
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to adjust to the role of being a counter-agitator against Orthodoxy. However, with the 
growing political engagement of priests and laity, confrontation in the religious realm 
was becoming unavoidable. Alongside bringing confrontation, the threat to change rite 
demonstrates how mass mobilization was also making the laity more aware of their own 
ability to challenge the authority of priests. Thus, although at this stage the threat to 
change rite was not political, it reveals the potential and growing awareness of the power 
of the lower ranks of society. 
Competition for the influence in the village 
 
The relationships between different village actors were complex and centred largely 
around competing for power or influence. Parish priests were very important figures in 
the life of the village, but they were not the only influence. The starosta, as well as other 
local officials, desired to exert authority and influence. Through analyzing the case of 
Bachynskyj, it will be shown that mass mobilization intensified relations between village 
community members as the peasantry became more aware of their own ability to 
exercise power and influence. 
The story of the priest Myhaylo Bachynskyj is a great example of growing 
tensions with the local teacher: it reveals that teachers had mobilizing potential as well 
and could become alternative figures of influence in the public domain. Furthermore, the 
case of Bachynskyj, a Greek Catholic agitator, reveals many similarities with 
Stojalowski. There are common themes of national conflict and political agitation, as 
well as common tools such as mass gatherings, petitioning, and using the press. This 
reveals how the Greek Catholic Church, like the Roman Catholic Church, was struggling 
with the shifting environment of mass mobilization. 
A closer look at the story of the priest Bachynskyj provides great insights into 
the relations between starosta and priest in the village and the role of the high church 
and state institutions in regulating these relations. The problems surrounding the 
Bachynskyj started very soon after he had arrived in the village of Ropchyci. 370 He 
arrived with the intention of making a difference to his parishioners’ lives, and started 
by trying to overcome alcohol problems in the village. The Greek Catholic Ordinariate 
at this point was satisfied with the priest and characterized him to the Vice-regency 
positively. The Ordinariate stated that Bachynskyj was a young, talented, intelligent, and 
enthusiastic priest, and his only fault was that he entered the priesthood with a great 
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desire to reform parish life. The Ordinariate further justified the priest’s behavior by 
arguing that the parish itself was not ready for reforms: the former priest had not cared 
for his flock well enough, as a result of which the parishioners had become less moral 
and less sober.371 Because Bachynskyj undertook to reform the situation and founded a 
fraternity of temperance, he brought the hatred of some parishioners on himself. In 
addition, the local teacher Uliarij Harbynskyj was opposed to the priest and had filed a 
false report about him. The teacher held anti-religious views and was strongly anti-
clerical. Because of Harbynskyj’s behavior, the Greek Catholic Ordinariate asked the 
Vice-regency to take action against the teacher.372 Thus, the highest institution of the 
Greek Catholic Church supported and protected the priest and involved the Vice-regency 
to clarify the situation in the village (especially the behavior of the teacher). 
There is no clear evidence why the teacher was against Bachynskyj: one possible 
explanation is that the teacher saw Bachynskyj as a bad priest and thus wanted to protect 
the laity from his influence. Other reasons could include differences in political 
preferences or personal conflicts. As both the teacher and the priest were represented in 
official documents as passive actors, the motives behind their actions are unknown. 
However, the methods and strategy of the participants in this conflict are clear enough 
and shine a lot of light on the competition between the teacher and the priest. 
The teacher engaged in a fight with the priest for the attention of the peasants. 
The teacher was quite creative in mobilizing peasants against his opponent. Very likely 
he was writing and distributing anonymous letters. One such letter under the title “Letter 
of God” was written as if God himself had given instructions to the parishioners to act 
against the priest. It stated: “do not give a lot of money for the funeral because your 
relatives will be in hell…instead of giving money to the priest, feed your family and buy 
shoes for your kids.”373 (This claim was quite ironic, as in many cases children did not 
go to school because they did not have proper shoes). The letter went on to refer to the 
fraternity founded by Bachynskyj, deeming it harmful: “if you go to the fraternity, I 
[God] will not let you into heaven.”374 Then ‘God’ reveals that Bachynskyj had 
embezzled from the church treasury and would be punished with an early death. The 
letter concluded with the advice to read it twice a day, carry it at all times and share it 
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with others; this would earn the reader remission of their sins and entry into heaven.375 
In general, the letter appealed to peasant religiosity and used it against the priest. 
We cannot measure the effectiveness of this letter, but Bachynskyj was definitely 
upset by the teacher and wrote personally to the Consistory, asking for help. He testified 
that the teacher was mentally ill and had already spent some time in a mental hospital. 
The most interesting thing about the “Letter of God” is its structure, mimicking Biblical 
language with prohibitions and promises. This was a language familiar to and 
understandable for parishioners. Although Harbynskyj was using Biblical language 
ironically, the similarity to Stojalowski’s actions should be highlighted. Like 
Stojalowski, Harbynskyj used peasant familiarity with Biblical language as a tool to aid 
in mobilization.  
The teacher was not Bachynskyj’s only problem. With or without inspiration 
from the teacher, some parishioners initiated their own fight against Bachynskyj. 
Apparently, the laity were also dissatisfied with the priest and planned to involved state 
and church authorities to resolve this. The first complaints from parishioners were 
addressed to the starosta, and he forwarded them to the Vice-regency. The starosta 
claimed to have 2,500 signatures for these complaints, but he did not send any proof of 
this. In general, the parishioners complained about high prices for sacraments, impolite 
behavior, and pressure from the priest to support him during elections.376 As voting was 
not totally anonymous, it was possible for the priest to know who had supported him and 
refuse to provide sacraments to non-supporters afterwards. The parishioners stated in the 
conclusion that they wanted another priest, or else they would convert to Roman 
Catholicism.377 Thus, in this case as well as the one mentioned above, the laity 
understood their power and threatened the Church hierarchy with changing to another 
rite. This demonstrates how the peasantry was growing increasingly aware of their power 
to influence church authorities.  Indeed the threat of converting to Orthodox Christianity 
was a common feature of mobilized peasantry in Galicia at this time. 
A similar letter from parishioners was addressed to the Greek Catholic 
Ordinariate. In this one, the parishioners claimed that the priest stole 40 guldens from 
the parish treasury to pay for his court proceedings and that he always kept all the money 
gathered during services for himself; furthermore, he could be absent from the parish for 
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weeks and then arrive dirty and sleepy to serve mass.378 The priest baptized children not 
in the church but in a room that was dirty and stunk of his dogs. He had recently been 
beaten by Jews and only managed to survive because his wife protected him. In addition, 
he was about to be put in jail for his deeds, which was considered shameful even for a 
peasant, let alone a priest.379 On account of everything they alleged Bachynskyj had 
done, the parishioners asked the Ordinariate to remove him or else they would report the 
entire affair to the newspapers.380 It is worth noting that the letter was written in a very 
emotional and rude style: the parishioners employed many offensive words while 
speaking about the priest. It is clear that they were not making a request, but rather posing 
demands and threats. Again, this example demonstrates how the laity became more 
critical about their parish priest and saw different options on how to improve situation 
besides threatening to change rite. As the Ordinariate was not fast in their reply to 
another letter from laity, they wanted to make the matter more public than just involving 
high institutions. 
When the Ordinariate did not act, the parishioners kept their promises and wrote 
to the local newspaper Kurier Drohobyckyj and to the major newspaper Kurier Lwowski. 
Their letter was published as a brief article, which stated that the priest was persecuting 
parishioners, and was involved in several court proceedings, and as the church 
authorities were unwilling or unable to take action, the parishioners would convert to 
Roman Catholicism.381 Bachynskyj wrote a response to this article. He tried to disprove 
the parishioners’ statements, claiming that he was not persecuting anybody – he had only 
refused to perform sacraments for serious sinners – and, what’s more, the court had 
found him innocent upon appeal.382 The parishioners wrote to the newspaper again, 
accusing the priest of new frauds: taking money from the treasury for his legal 
proceedings and using money intended for church renovations for his own purposes. The 
priest continued to defend himself in a subsequent article: he had applied to the 
government for funds to renovate the church, and the reason he took money from the 
treasury was because his legal affairs were directly connected with church issues. This 
was the end of the newspaper dialog between parishioners and priest. This dialog reveals 
that when the communication was not possible in the realm of the village, it became real 
in the newspapers and thus encouraged both sides to seek for the good argument. 
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Certainly, such approach was one of the manifestation of mass mobilization, when 
besides direct participants a mass was involved through the newspaper to discuss the 
situation. 
As this back-and-forth in the newspapers did not solve anything, the villagers 
kept complaining about Bachynskyj to the starosta. A new set of complains maintained 
that Bachynskyj had influential friends and relatives, who were protecting him. Among 
his friends were supposedly the lawyers Okynevskyj and Korosh, who supported the 
priest during the elections and helped him to publish a brochure entitled Our weapon 
[Nasha zbroia].383 Finally, the deanery of Greek Catholic Church conducted an 
investigation, which revealed that only three parishioners were actually opposed to 
Bachynskyj and consistently testified against him.  The others found him to be a good 
pastor, who taught about religion and was respected in the community, and therefore he 
was elected to the local council. Such a mismatch between possible and real 
oppositionists of Bachynski is very fascinating as it suggested that either the peasants 
were still afraid to oppose openly to the clergymen, or there was indeed a little group of 
peasants that managed to arrange resistance to the priest and raise suspicion to his 
personality.  
The political activity of Bachynskyj was becoming a central issue that determines 
relations in the village. On the one hand starosta was very much concerned about 
possible strikes in the village as they could lead to chaos and economic losses. In 
addition, political views of the priest were national oriented and could cause problems 
between nationalities. Bachynskyj’s agitated the peasants to go on strike against the 
‘liakhy and Calvinists’ [Poles and Germans], and to demand wages of at least two crowns 
per day.384 Starosta reported that the priest was using church and public space to spread 
his message and argued that Poles should be made to live on the other side of the river 
San, in Western Galicia. Furthermore, the starosta reported that all agricultural work was 
delayed because of Bachynskyj’s rabblerousing. Such an interection between starostas 
and priest was very common during the preparation to election and elections itself, 
however in the case of Bachynskyj, their relations were more intense and thus well 
documented for the Vice-regency and the Greek Catholic Ordinariate. As was evident 
from the chapter on Stojalowski, politicaly active priests were always under careful 
observation by Church and State. 
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The starosta and the teacher were not the only enemies of Bachynskyj. 
Bachynskyj’s activism was also influencing a local landowner who was afraid of 
Bachynskyj’s popularity. This landowner, Juliusz Frej, alleged to the Vice-regency that 
Bachynskyj wanted to bankrupt him, as the priest encouraged peasants to go on strike 
and thus not work for Frej. The administrative council of the local charity fund (which 
consisted of landowners) also confirmed that Bachynskyj was campaigning against Frej, 
and in addition was fostering aggression between two “fraternal nationalities” (Poles and 
Ruthenians). Thus, the representatives of the fund asked the Vice-regency to do 
everything in its power to avoid further confrontations between nationalities, preferably 
by replacing Bachynskyj. Therefore, as a result of active political involvement the priest 
had provoked a major campaign against himself which included all representatives of 
the community (peasants, the teacher, landowners, and the starosta) and raised suspicion 
about his actions in the highest institution of the province. It is noteworthy that all the 
parties involved in the fight with Bachynsky believed that the Vice-regency would take 
just action and suspend the priest. Thus, they demonstrated loyal and trusting behavior 
to the state authorities and addressed their complaints to them. 
The involvement of Frej and other landowners reveals how closely economic and 
national interests were intertwined in Galician life and how these factors together 
influenced mass mobilization. Nevertheless, the fact that landowners were typically 
associated with the Polish nobility had already made the planned strike a national matter. 
This also provoked antagonism between representatives of the local authorities and 
Bachynskyj, as strikes were always complicated and dangerous events: they could 
disrupt the balance within the village and provoke disorder. Before the intensification of 
mass mobilization, priests were seen as allies of the secular authorities in supporting 
calm and order in society. However, the opportunities brought by mass mobilization 
gave the clergy a chance to decide how to use their social position and with what 
motivation. In the case analyzed here, it is very hard to separate Bachynskyj’s personal 
hatred of the landowner from a noble intention to help Ruthenian peasants earn better 
wages. So, the real motives remain behind the scenes, but the priest’s desire to get 
involved and be a decisive actor is evident. 
Bachynskyj was apparently a very persistent agitator, as the Vice-regency paid a 
great deal of attention to him and instructed the starosta to take appropriate actions to 
control the priest. Normally, the Vice-regency was not very responsive to the complaints 
it received, especially when it came to priests, as the priests had their own leading 
institutions (Ordinariate and Consistory). However, in this case, the Vice-regency 
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reacted immediately, probably out fear for economic losses in the event of a strike, which 
could spread to other villages as well. The Vice-regency informed the starosta that the 
Ruthenian National Committee [Narodnyj Ruskyj komitet] was organizing a massive 
campaign to migrate for work to the Prussian Empire in addition to calling for local 
strikes. The campaign to go and work in Prussia was connected to the call to strike, 
because the possibility of other work opportunities could be used to pressure landowners 
into increasing wages. The Vice-regency recommended that the starosta take counter-
propaganda measures, especially among wealthy peasants, explaining how harmful 
strikes would be for them and for the government.385  
The school council was bothered that Bachynskyj recruited teachers from 
neighboring villages in his strike campaign and that the organization Prosvita 
disseminated brochures about strikes. A similar account of teachers’ involvement was 
reported by the starosta as well. Meanwhile, the existing conflict between the teacher 
and the priest continued to escalate, especially because the priest had encroached on a 
sphere considered the teacher’s realm of influence (agitating other teachers). Apparently, 
Bachynskyj’s behavior had touched all empowered in the villages around and 
demonstrated how one active priest could make a substantial difference in his 
community. 
Over the next few years, the Bachynskyj saga continued. The starosta repeatedly 
informed the Vice-regency of Bachynskyj’s radical and systematic propaganda 
activities. The Consistory responded that there were not sufficient grounds to replace 
Bachynskyj, as he had not committed any crimes against his religion or the Church; in 
the same way, the legal proceedings against him were not enough to merit his 
replacement because the priest had never been jailed. This continuous replay 
demonstrated that despite the strong connections and cooperation between the sacral and 
secular authorities, in practice they had separate fields of influence, which gave a lot of 
space for maneuver to those at the bottom of the hierarchy.  
The parishioners also came to the Ordinariate in person to report that Bachynskyj 
was neglecting his duties and participating in social and radical agitation.386 In addition, 
they suspected him of setting fire to houses belonging to Frej. The parishioners stated 
that many people believed that Bachynskyj conspired to burn Frej’s property.387 The 
confused starosta wrote to the Ordinariate, requesting that they do everything they could 
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to maintain order and peace in the village. It is noteworthy that this starosta had no 
problem writing in Ruthenian when appealing to the Ordinariate. This time, Bishop 
Chehovych replied promptly. The bishop explained that because of various complaints 
against Bachynskyj, canonical proceedings against him were underway.388 When the 
parishioners complained again, the bishop issued very strict instructions to Bachynskyj 
to stop persecuting his parishioners, and in particular to drop the legal proceedings he 
had initiated against them.  
It appears that Bachynskyj was angry at those peasants who had systematically 
complained about him. The bishop emphasized that the complaints against Bachynskyj 
were not particularly numerous, and they came from a minority of parishioners. The 
majority of the parishioners (as attested to by 162 signatures) supported the priest and 
stated that Bachynskyj had renewed the parish morally, economically, and intellectually. 
He had also contributed significantly to the development of local reading clubs (Prosvita 
and Obshchestvo Kachkovskoho).389 At any rate, as there were some discontented 
parishioners, the bishop promised to do his best to fix the situation, thus showing how 
the Greek Catholic Church was willing to bow to public pressure to retain its own 
security and the public peace. 
Meanwhile, as Bachynskyj took the parishioners who testified against him to 
court, the Ordinariate finally decided to take action and replace Bachynskyj via a transfer 
to a less important parish (oeconomica remotio a beneficio). The Ordinariate asked the 
Vice-regency to agree to this transfer.390 Surprisingly, the starosta was the first to object 
to the idea of transferring Bachynskyj. His main arguments centered on the futility of 
this change, as the other village was already under Bachynskyj’s influence and the 
removal would not affect anything in the existing situation. The priest had become a very 
famous campaigner and had an entourage of peasants who helped him to disseminate his 
propaganda. The starosta wrote that “the priest is too much involved in public activity, 
as none of the elections could happen without him.”391 From this perspective, the starosta 
insisted that Bachynskyj posed a threat to the public peace, and therefore it was important 
to move him to a place where he could not exert any influence. Again there is a reflection 
of Stojalowski in this case, with Bachynskyj being perceived as a potential threat to 
existing hierarchical authority. 
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Eventually the proposed transfer was approved, but Bachynskyj was not happy 
about it and decided to lodge an appeal. He first applied to the Metropolitan’s Court in 
Lemberg, and when that appeal was rejected, he made an appeal to the Vatican.392 Such 
actions were also similar to Stojalowski’s approach, who always involved the high state 
authorities to question the decisions of provincial bodies. As all these appeals took a 
while to be processed, the starosta and parishioners had to stay with Bachynskyj. The 
starosta continued to write reports denouncing the priest because the priest refused to 
obey the starosta’s instructions to use a newly constructed cemetery. The parishioners 
continued to threaten to convert to Roman Catholicism, and 66 people even applied to 
do so.393 All parties in the conflict were patiently waiting for the authorities to resolve 
the matter. In the end, it is very likely that Bachynskyj was removed from the parish, as 
after 1908 no more complaints were filed against him.394  
In conclusion, the case reveals how complex and interconnected the relations 
between village actors were. In particular, it shows how under the influence of mass 
mobilization, priests became politicized and driven by a desire to be the peasants’ leader. 
Such an active public position was not appreciated by the local and church authorities, 
especially when a priest’s agitation strayed across the line between legal and illegal 
actions (such as threatening public order). In addition, the starosta and teacher saw 
themselves as alternative village activists, and were not always satisfied with the 
growing popularity of the priest. Before the intensification of the mass mobilization 
process, priests and the secular authorities worked closely for mutual benefits. The case 
of Bachynskyj, like that of Stojalowski (for the Roman Catholic Church), shows that the 
relationship between the secular and ecclesiastical authorities was beginning to be put 
under strain. This strain was especially manifested in the local representatives of these 
authorities, such as parochial clergy and district administrators. Mass mobilisation was 
causing localised competition for power, one that was further affected by growing 
political agitation. 
The priest and intensive political agitation 
 
The intensification of political agitation was becoming a more and more significant 
factor in determining the relations between local authorities and parish priests. In the 
previous examples, there was not that much information about the political preferences 
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of the priest. The case of the priest Ioan Popel395 covers this gap. Popel was a very active 
supporter of the Ukrainian-oriented Radical Party and the national organization Sich (a 
network of radical semi-military nationally-oriented organizations), even though both 
the party and the organization were not approved by the church authorities. Support for 
the Radical Party not well suited to clergy, since it was considered dangerous by the 
authorities. The radical aspect of Popel’s political agitation was very troublesome for 
local authorities and the Greek Catholic Church, as radicals generally had little sympathy 
for the Church’s high hierarchy.  
The other aspect of this case was a conflict with peasants and, as a result, the 
constant complaints of the laity against their priest. The parishioners took the initiative, 
showed persistence, and mobilized against the priest, resulting in his suspension from 
his duties. The local authorities accused the priest of two sorts of crime: immoral 
behavior and radical agitation.396 The first person to report Popel’s actions to the Vice-
regency was Jedzej Wierzajski, a lawyer from Bukovina, the neighboring crownland. He 
stated, as a spokesperson for other citizens, that Popel was once a priest there and had 
obstructed elections, agitated, and proclaimed himself a “martyr for the Ruthenian 
cause”; he also supported a lover and made his relationship with her public.397 This report 
led to an investigation and legal proceedings. However, Popel refused to take part in the 
trial, claiming that he was falsely accused. The starosta informed the Vice-regency of 
Popel’s refusal and added that his political behavior was becoming dangerous, as at 
election time this priest was joining the Radicals.398  
The large number of complaints drew the Greek Catholic Ordinariate in 
Stanislaviv into the investigation. The Ordinariate reported to the Vice-regency that 
witnesses under oath confirmed that Popel had been preaching against the doctrine of 
the Catholic Church; he spread atheistic and radical thought; he supported the spread of 
the anti-Christian Sich; and made alliances with people hostile to Church and State.399 
After such a report, both the church and local authorities considered Popel a danger. 
While the authorities were not in the hurry to take action in Bachynskyj’s case as his 
views were not radical or connected to forbidden political forces, in the case of Popel 
the response was much faster, as the priest was considered more dangerous.  
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As a final solution to this mixture of religious and political crimes, the 
Ordinariate decided to proceed with an ecclesiastical disciplinary court. However, the 
problem was that such a procedure took a very long time, and thus the Ordinariate asked 
the Vice-regency to take measures against the priest as soon as possible because he had 
the potential to inflict a great deal of damage with his agitation. From their side, the 
Ordinariate issued a suspension ab officio et beneficio,400 which forbade Popel from 
performing any religious sacraments. This sequence of actions revealed that it was not 
easy even for the secular and ecclesiastical hierarchies of Galicia to control and 
neutralize the problematic priest, even with each other’s support. 
At this point, Popel had lost the protection of both authorities; however, he was 
aware that it would still take quite a while until a final verdict would be passed and that 
suspension was intended to serve as a warning and could be lifted. In addition, he 
realized he could garner some support from politicians. The Vice-regency had already 
stopped his salary and a new priest had arrived in his village, but Popel refused to leave 
and instead drove away the new priest.401 This episode was very confusing for the 
starosta, as the Vice-regency and Ordinariate confirmed their decisions while Popel 
refused to leave. The starosta appeared to be helpless against the strong personality of 
the priest, even while having the support of the state and church authorities. 
There is no sufficient explanation of why Popel’s suspension was lifted and he 
remained at his parish. From this point, the parishioners took the initiative. They reported 
in a letter to the Vice-regency that Popel was refusing to perform religious sacraments 
and was about to have a child with his mistress.402 Clearly there was not much progress 
in relations between Popel and his parishioners, as more than a year later parishioners 
published an open letter to the Vice-regency and the bishop (probably in the newspaper 
Ruske slovo) with complaints that their demands were ignored and that Bishop 
Khomyshyn had done nothing to save them from an immoral priest.403 The laity claimed 
that the inaction of the bishop was a result of Popel’s national position. There was a 
belief (mainly promoted by the Russophile newspaper Halychanyn) that Bishop 
Gryhoryj Khomyshyn had strong Ukrainian proclivities and thus supported priests with 
similar political preferences, even if these priests were unsuitable.404 In this case, it is 
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significant that political convictions were seen as good motivation to exercise the power 
of one’s position and ignore inappropriate behavior. Political preferences were thus 
becoming dominant and influential on a social level.  The idea emerged that protection 
came not just because one belonged to a particular social group but because of political 
views shared with the high hierarchy. 
The starosta claimed that Popel himself was convinced that he had free license 
to behave as he liked because Bishop Khomyshyn, another Ukrainian nationalist, would 
protect him.405 There is no evidence to prove or disprove that Bishop Khomyshyn was a 
supporter of Popel. However, it is clear that political preferences were seen as a way to 
garner sympathy and patronage. Thus, political views were becoming a new moral 
category: one’s position could be exploited for the good of the party or ideology, 
including increased leniency for like-minded individuals and severity for those who held 
different political views. 
In conclusion, the story of the priest Popel demonstrates that priests’ realm for 
freedom of action, including disapproved political behavior, was quite wide and gave 
the possibility to continue acting against the instructions of the authorities. Even the 
active involvement of the laity, who may have been mobilized by Popel’s political 
opponents, could not force the displacement of the priest. Thus, the example of Popel, 
similar to that of Stojalowski, emphasized that if the priest wanted to misuse his position 
for his own politically motivated interests, he could do so for a while. Certainly, such 
behavior was not acceptable, and both secular and religious institutions were doing their 
best to prevent repetitions of such cases and moving the clergy away from extreme or 
radical political agitation. Furthermore, the case of Popel also suggests the arrival of 
political preference as a means for courting favor amongst the high hierarchy. 
Rising national issues as a way to resist the starosta 
 
The case of this section is focused on the role that national identity played in the relations 
between priests and local officials. It further builds on the use of strategies and tools for 
mobilization, and highlights how targeted approaches could unite fellow clergy behind 
a common cause. Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence to state whether the case 
was a conflict over gaining more power in the village or a national one, or indeed both. 
The beginning of the conflict was marked by the priest Petryckyj’s delay in providing 
information from the parish register on population data (births and deaths) and a list of 
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those who were supposed to be recruited to the army.406 In the beginning, there were no 
national issues visible, only the problem of performing this duty. However, the 
obligation to provide population data was a very important one, as only parish priests 
had documentation on the subject for the state. The priests needed to fill in the standard 
forms and send them to starostas on a regular basis.407   
As the Vice-regency and authorities in Vienna mandated and relied on these lists, 
the starosta was greatly distressed and reported to the governor that Petryckyj was 
impeding the local authorities’ work; the same was reported to the Greek Catholic 
Consistory.408 In addition, the starosta provided a document in which parishioners 
complained about the high prices demanded by Petryckyj for sacraments. The starosta 
continued to complain about Petryckyj regularly and thus systematically constructed an 
image of a bad priest for the Galician government. As these complaints were not 
effective, the starosta used gendarmes to get the population data he needed.409 In 
comparison to three cases discussed above, the actions of the starosta here were much 
more determined and rapid: he also used all possible means to influence the priest. Most 
likely, this urgency was caused by the way in which the priest’s irresponsiveness was 
ruining the diligent and loyal reputation of the starosta in the eyes of the Vice-regency. 
  However, Petryckyj was not an easy victim and continued to resist the starostas’s 
actions with similar enthusiasm and methods. The priest reported to the governor, the 
archbishop, and a lawyer, Okunevskij, that the commissar and two gendarmes “had 
attacked” his home while he was ill and took the parish register books without his 
permission.410 As a response to these accusations, the starosta wrote to the Vice-regency 
claiming that he was forced to take such measures, as he needed data on population 
changes as quickly as possible. Archbishop Sembratovych responded to the Vice-
regency with dissatisfaction, arguing that parish registers should not be removed without 
permission from the Consistory.411 This interaction between different authorities 
concerning Petryckyj and the parish register lasted at least eight years. The case clearly 
shows two things; firstly, that Petryskyj stubbornly applied his rights and, secondly, that 
the Church was interested in defending its own power and influence as opposed to 
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resolving the conflict. During this time, the case took on other interesting and significant 
aspects; the dominant one was the priest’s public activity. 
Some of these clues were proffered by the starosta in his next report to the Vice-
regency about the priest’s participation in the local council and municipality. The 
starosta stated that Petryckyj was not elected as an advisor to the local council, and 
because of that he wanted to demonstrate his power and importance in another way. In 
addition, Petryckyj applied for the position of municipal secretary; he was elected, but 
then, according to the starosta, some of the locals protested that he was not suited to this 
position. The arguments against Petryckyj were that he was irresponsible and agitated 
against the local government. The starosta went on to elaborate how dangerous such 
behavior could be, as it inspired other Greek Catholic priests to be disrespectful towards 
the authorities and distracted them from their proper work.  The starosta initiated legal 
proceedings against Petryckyj: as a result, Petryckyj was fined 150 guldens, to be paid 
into the local poverty fund. However, Petryckyj continued to neglect demands from the 
local authorities and ignored the court’s decision. Again, it is clear that the priest behaved 
as if the secular authorities, especially the local ones, had little influence on him and 
their decisions were not obligatory. This example highlights once more that priests 
acknowledged their privileged position in society and very often abused it for their own 
benefit. 
The starosta knew that he also had an opportunity to influence the priest through 
the laity, so he opened a new line of conflict with Petryckyj. This time the starosta used 
complaints from parishioners as evidence.412 The origins of such complaints are 
questionable because the low level of literacy in villages left a great deal of room for 
manipulation. Villagers could be tricked into signing documents or their testimonies 
could be elucidated in exchange for benefits offered by the starosta. There was a huge 
gap between the power and influence local authorities had over villagers and the 
villagers’ ability to influence local officials. Simply put, because of illiteracy and an 
absence of knowledge about their rights, villagers were easy to manipulate, intimidate, 
and bribe. A mediator filed almost all the written complaints from villagers. In many 
cases, lawyers wrote the most effective complaints;413 peasants were only able to write 
threatening complaints (for example, that if there were no improvement they would 
change their rite or write to the newspapers).  
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In this particular case, the parishioners (with or without help of the starosta) 
addressed a letter to the Vice-regency and the Consistory, complaining that the priest 
was demanding inflated prices for sacraments, was in conflict with the local authorities 
and dragged villagers into this conflict, had managed the church’s lands poorly and thus 
had no money, and was not teaching religion at school.414 Apparently, all possible 
complaints were gathered together to emphasize how unsuitable the priest was. The 
solution proposed by the 35 parishioners who signed the petition was the same as for the 
starosta’s: they asked for a different pastor to be assigned to their parish.415 For the 
starosta, it was clearly important to mobilize, or at least be seen to have gained, the 
support of people from lower society because a group opinion from the priest’s laity 
would give the starosta’s appeal to the church authorities more weight. However, as there 
was nothing radical in the action of Petryckyj (unlike the aforementioned priest Popel), 
the authorities did not provide any response to the complaints of the peasants or the 
starosta. 
Four years after the parish register affair began, Petryckyj finally explained his 
actions to the Vice-regency, writing why he was having problems reporting the 
population data. Petryckyj stated that he was receiving letters from the starosta in a 
language that he did not speak (apparently Polish); therefore, he expected the starosta to 
write to him in Ruthenian.416 Even though Ruthenian was one of the official languages, 
the majority of correspondence, especially between secular authorities, was written in 
Polish. It is impossible that Petryckyj could not understand Polish: however, he also 
knew his right to request information in Ruthenian. Here Petryckyj was clearly playing 
the ‘national card’ to help him manipulate the situation and appear as a victim – notably 
eight years after the issue regarding data began. 
Petryckyj managed to convince the Consistory that the violation of language 
rights was at the core of his tensions with the starosta. Archbishop Sheptyckyj stated that 
Petryckyj had not received all of the letters, but had responded to those written in 
Ruthenian and would keep doing that.417 Therefore, in this instance the Consistory took 
Petryckyj’s side and protected him from the starosta’s accusations. Furthermore, the 
Consistory justified Petryckyj’s delay in supplying information about the population by 
arguing that he had not received the appropriate blank forms to fill in. At the end of the 
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letter, the Consistory asked the Vice-regency to respect existing language legislation and 
send Petryckyj the forms in Ruthenian.418 In the matter of population statistics, Petryckyj 
was instructed to respond to letters written in Polish as well; in other cases, the 
Consistory asked him to inform them.  
From the perspective of the Consistory, it was a question of respect for language 
legislation, not a problem of communication, as the starosta had framed the matter. It is 
absolutely impossible that Petryckyj had difficulty understanding Polish. He could have 
invoked the language law to prove his innocence and irritate the starosta; this would also 
have demonstrated his patriotic attitude towards his nationality and language. At this 
point, Petryckyj either desired to demonstrate his national position clearly or was using 
his national position as an opportunity to demonstrate neglect to the authorities. This 
situation appears similar to that of Popel; it once again demonstrates how growing 
politicization was used by priests as an important criterion to justify their actions.  
Once again the starosta began to write to the Vice-regency, claiming that despite 
the Ordinariate’s promises, Petryckyj was not responding to his letters, including those 
written in Ruthenian. He claimed that Petryckyj refused to accept letters from the postal 
service and that he had received the tables (which were without any text to avoid 
problems), but had not filled them out.419 Also, the post confirmed that the letters had 
not been accepted. In response, the Ordinariate promised to give Petryckyj another strict 
warning. At the end of 1902, the Ordinariate suspended Petryckyj and assigned a new 
priest, Teodor Velychkovskyj, to take his position.420 The story appeared to be over. 
In July 1903, the story repeated with the same scenario. The Vice-regency 
received a new letter from Petryckyj, where he claimed that the starosta was not 
following the language law. The starosta responded that, as always, Petryckyj refused to 
provide population statistics, and the Ordinariate responded that they would interfere 
only if Petryckyj ignored a letter written in Ruthenian.421 The starosta claimed that 
statistics were not a local matter but a governmental one, and in this case he was allowed 
to use Polish as a governmental language. Here, it is visible that the starosta had no 
intention of accepting the conditions that priest was insisting on and that it was also 
essential for him to defend his rights before the Vice-regency. 
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The argument that Petryckyj was using to justify his actions served as an 
inspiring example for others. The priest Bachynskyj (mentioned earlier in this chapter) 
was also accused of disobeying the starosta’s instructions regarding population data. 
Bachynskyj’s reasons for failing to obey the starosta were the same as those given by 
Petryckyj: he demanded that the starosta write to him in Ruthenian or German, the 
languages he spoke.422 This complaint seems strange, as this starosta was regularly using 
Ruthenian in his appeals to the Ordinariate and thus clearly was able to write in that 
language. Moreover, Bachynskyj’s lawyer Olesnyckyj pointed out that the job 
description of a parish priest did not require him to know Polish. Most likely in this 
situation, Bachynskyj had heard about Petryckyj’s case and decided to follow suit.   
The Petryckyj case fell quiet for three years. There is no documentary evidence 
as to why Petryckyj remained in his position and how long his suspension lasted, but 
even six years later the situation had not changed significantly. In 1906, a new conflict 
arose between the starosta and Petryckyj. The starosta, convinced by past experience 
that no other methods would be effective in dealing with this priest, ordered his arrest 
for eight days. The starosta claimed that Petryckyj had organized a strike and put up 
resistance against the gendarmes.423 Petryckyj was convinced that he was mistreated in 
this case and thus made his dissatisfaction publicly known. One of the means he 
employed to attract attention was a petition to the Ministry of the Interior with a request 
to punish the gendarme’s commissar for unreasonable arrest.424 Similar to the priests 
mentioned before, Petryckyj was convinced that the high state authorities would cancel 
the decision of the Vice-regency, or at least that the petition would postpone any decision 
about him by the Vice-regency. 
In 1906 during a peasant strike, Petryckyj was arrested, which initiated a new 
wave of tensions between the starosta/gendarmes and the priest. In the strike, Petryckyj 
was reading a newspaper aloud for the peasants, and a gendarme named Isidor Derejko 
interrupted him constantly. Petruckyj told him to stop interrupting and instead go and 
make sure no crimes were being committed in the village; the gendarme took offense at 
Petryckyj’s remark and filed a complaint against him. As a result, the commissar (a 
representative of the Vice-regency) sentenced Petryckyj to eight days under arrest. 
Petryckyj appealed and his sentence was shortened to three days, but he appealed that 
sentence as well. However, the starosta was not eager to postpone the punishment, and 
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the gendarme Derejko came to deliver the priest to the prison. During the arrest, Derejko 
walked around the room and hurled insults at Petryckyj in an attempt to offend him.425 
This, in short, was the content of Petryckyj’s petition to the Ministry of the Interior. The 
petition was not the only tool that Petryckyj used: he also involved newspapers.  
The clerical newspaper Nyva reported on the case and characterized Petryckyj as 
a victim.426 The newspaper stated that the entire Ruthenian community was outraged 
because it was so unjust for local authorities to treat a priest and a citizen in this manner. 
As a reaction to Petryckyj’s arrest, all the local priests decided to hold a meeting at which 
Petryckyj could give his account of what had happened. After that meeting, the clergy 
concluded that: 1) Petryckyj was acting according to the law in trying to force the local 
authorities to use the Ruthenian language, 2) it was because of this request to write in 
Ruthenian that the local authorities imposed fines on him (this was done by the court 
and not the local authorities, so here the priests were badly informed) and persecuted 
him, and 3) Petryskyj succeeded in forcing the authorities to translate certain tables into 
Ruthenian, but as a result he was persecuted even more and then brutally arrested in his 
home with the use of force.427 In conclusion, the meeting declared that all actions taken 
against Petryckyj were the result of a well-planned fight against the Ruthenian nation 
and clergy. This shows how a problem that began as a personal conflict transformed, 
with information from a manipulative agitator, into an issue about national equality. 
It is likely unnecessary to point out that this clerical gathering was inspired by 
nationalistic views and preferred to view the situation in a simple manner. The priests 
then affirmed their solidarity with Petryckyj’s brave behavior and decided to encourage 
all priests in Galicia to support him by reporting his case to the high church and state 
authorities.428 Everything the starosta had feared was coming true: other priests found 
Petryckyj’s behavior inspiring and heroic. This is in contrast to Stojalowski, who tried 
but failed to gain the support of fellow priests. Whilst Stojalowski opposed the church 
hierarchy, Petryckyj was able to manipulate it.  Petryckyj carefully fought his conflict 
on one front, the secular front, whilst Stojalowski also antagonized the sacral front: thus, 
in contrast to Stojalowski, Petrycky managed to convince his colleagues to take his side. 
Most importantly, the matter of Petryckyj’s arrest was treated in the press not as 
misbehavior on the part of a particular official, but rather as a national conflict and a 
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threat to all Greek Catholic priests.429 Here Petryckyj was seen exclusively as a hero and 
an example of successful behavior, while the local authorities were demonized. Of 
course, the newspaper was not interested in discovering the truth about this case; what 
mattered was attracting attention, and  facile conclusions and references to the national 
question served as excellent tools. As a way to avoid similar occurrences in the future, 
Nyva suggested founding an organization for the clergy that would protect their interests 
as a group.430  Unfortunately, no documentary evidence demonstrates how the matter 
against the arresting commissar was resolved. In 1911, the Metropolitan’s Consistory 
declared that Petryckyj was suspended ex informata conscientia for his various abuses. 
This ended the documentary record on his case.  
The details of this case unveil the nuances and complexity of the motivations of 
all sides involved in the conflict. On one hand, the starosta needed to fulfill the Vice-
regency’s request for population data and thus used all the means at his disposal against 
Petryckyj, mainly gendarmes and arrests. On the other hand, the Consistory was 
protecting the legacy and property of the Church (in this case, parish registers); they did 
not, however, react to complaints about the priest’s behavior. Petryckyj’s motivation is 
not made explicit in the documents; it is only the later development of the story that 
provides clues as to why he so systematically refused to provide information from the 
parish register.  
What is particularly notable about this case is that both secular and religious court 
trials could drag on for years. This allowed all actors significant time to continue their 
former behavior, even if it was illegal; it also left time for them to become loved and 
hated, to gain support or rejection from the higher authorities. At the start of this case, 
the Ordinariate and the Consistory, the two highest institutions of the Greek Catholic 
Church, were on Petryckyj’s side, but in the end he was suspended, which means that at 
some point he lost this protection and approval.  
There was no national conflict in the late nineteenth century, but by 1906 the 
Petryckyj affair was tied to the national question. This case has demonstrated again that 
the relationship between the secular and religious powers was influenced by growing 
national ideas and was placed into a national framework. In the early years of his conflict 
with the starosta, Petryckyj did not express any nationalist leanings; he merely 
complicated the local government’s work. As Pieter Judson summarizes in his study on 
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the conflicts in Bohemia: “Where nationalist accounts linked disparate events across 
region, province, or country in order to frame them as component parts of coherent 
conspiracies, the district administrator painted a picture of individual incidents…”431 
Conclusions 
Mass mobilization influenced the complexity of relations between local Greek Catholic 
and secular authorities. The cases of four priests revealed various aspects of the clergy’s 
relations with secular and religious authorities, as well as the increasing power of the 
laity. Growing political engagement had significantly influenced these relations. The 
priests had control over certain aspects of their parishioners’ lives and were therefore 
able to exercise their power for political or personal gain. The secular authorities were 
dependent on the clergy to provide population data and fulfill other social duties: this 
gave priests a way to exert influence and express disobedience towards secular officials. 
At the same time, the laity was recognizing and exercising their potential power as a 
group. Thus, the position of the parish priest made the clergy important actors in the 
process of mass mobilization as they straddled both the secular and sacral arenas in a 
village. For the priests and secular authorities, this was not a new phenomenon. 
However, for the laity the growing mobilization of village residents amidst a climate of 
increasing political action presented new potential opportunities.  
There are also clear similarities with the case of Stojalowski, namely that 
agitation was common to both Greek and Roman Catholic churches with just minor 
differences in the methods, tools, and personnel. The conflict between the priest and the 
starosta frequently began apolitically and gradually took on political significance, 
mainly from the national perspective or, in the case of Popel, from furthering one’s own 
influence through political agreement with high hierarchy. In the cases of Bachynskyj 
and Petryckyj, the nature of the conflict was interpreted in a national light. 
Simultaneously, the parishioners, intelligentsia, and press took an increasingly active 
role in these conflicts and in expressing their views on the problem. The parishioners felt 
a sense of their own importance and began to threaten ecclesiastical authorities to get 
them to fulfill their demands; this often took the form of threatening to switch rites. Legal 
proceedings in which both priests and peasants were involved served as important factors 
for mobilizing participants to play an active part in defending their own convictions, as 
in the case of the starosta versus Petryckyj.  
 
                                                          
431 Judson, Guardians of the nation, 199. 
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Chapter 5. A crowd disease: priests, elections, and the 
transformation of local violence, 1897-1908  
 
Violence in the village 
 
The Greek Catholic clergy and the national activists of both nations connected to politics 
mobilized different groups within Galician society. Tracing such violent events unveils 
the relationships between different social groups (local administration/gentry, priests, 
and peasants) and demonstrates how the tensions between them morphed into a 
confrontation between two national groups (Ukrainians and Poles). Violence proved to 
have the potential to advance different perceptions, and these explanations of violent 
events were able to shape society. Acts of violence required an immediate reaction from 
the state and the Church because violence posed a threat to the political and moral order 
of society.  
In this section, I focus on manifestations of violence during the electoral process 
in Galicia in order to demonstrate the complexity of priests’ roles in these events. I have 
selected two cases of violent actions that took place during parliamentary elections (the 
clash in Dawidów 1897 and in Horucko in 1907) and one during the elections to the local 
diet (in Koropiec in 1908). These cases were directly connected to electoral fraud and 
took place in villages in Eastern Galicia. The fact that there were no similar clashes in 
Western Galicia demonstrated that the eastern half of the province was experiencing 
much more complex social turbulence, particularly because the majority of the 
population were neglected Ruthenians. 
I have selected these elections (1897, 1907, and 1908) for three reasons. Firstly, 
these elections provoked a broad debate within Galician society, mainly because of the 
abuse of administrative powers and instances of political violence. Secondly, they 
influenced and transformed the relationship between the two nationalities of the province 
and stimulated further antagonism between them. Finally, the local governors, namely 
Kazimierz Badeni and Andrzej Potocki, who were responsible for organizing the 
elections in the province, had strong support and protection from Vienna (both 
implemented similarly autocratic policies in the province).  
The elections of Galicia frequently resulted in violent clashes between locals and 
representatives of the authorities. This section aims to unveil how violence influenced 
relations between laity and clergy and what consequences violence had on the 
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coexistence of different nationalities in the province. Violent events in the Habsburg 
Empire were by no means confined to Eastern Galicia. In his book Guardians of the 
Nation, Pieter Judson emphasizes the important features of rural violence throughout the 
Austrian Empire. According to Judson, the most novel aspect of these events was not the 
acts themselves, but rather “the attachment of nationalist significance to such events”.432 
Thus, national activists viewed this spontaneous violence as “enduring local 
commitments to maintain national traditions in the face of increased challenges brought 
by outsiders to the community”.433 Through highlighting violent events, nationalists 
hoped to garner and mobilize popular support.434  However, their representation of 
violence conflicted with the government’s perception, which focused on the 
manifestations rather than the motivations behind these events.435  
All the features named by Judson were present in Galicia. The violence in the 
province lacked strong national rhetoric: social differences within Galician villages were 
so extreme that they were the main focus of attention. This was the case especially for 
the peasants with their marginalized position. Those in the village community who had 
higher social status and, consequently, higher levels of education/literacy occupied more 
influential positions, with which came the ability to misuse their influence (without 
significant consequences). Therefore, the most prevalent sentiment in rural (and urban) 
communities was a sense of injustice and insecurity resulting from social inequality, 
rather than national differences.  
I analyze immediate responses in the press to these events and the documented 
court hearings. Paying close attention to court hearings enables me to place violent 
events within a longer period (the court hearings took place more than half a year after 
the events themselves). This unveils the complex interactions between the accused and 
the authorities in the process of the investigation and court procedures, and restores 
multiple interpretations of the events. I emphasize the different roles the clergy played 
in those events: the ‘hated priest’ and the ‘pacifying priest’. In addition, by comparing 
cases from the end of the nineteenth century (1897) and the first decade of the twentieth 
century (1907-1908), I demonstrate how the role of the priests was transformed and even 
                                                          
432 “Vandalism, name-calling,  stone  throwing,  and  brawling  had  long-established traditions  in  rural  
Europe  but  the  attachment  of nationalist significance  to  such  events  around  the  turn  of the  century 
was  a relatively new  phenomenon”. Judson, Guardians of the Nation, 179. 
433 Judson, Guardians of the Nation, 179. 
434 Judson, Guardians of the Nation, 200. 
435 Judson, Guardians of the Nation, 178. 
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marginalized because of the successes of nation-building projects and the growing role 
of national activists in the villages. 
As the events unfolded, it was not very clear what precisely was occurring: the 
official reports told one story, the witnesses told another, and each side blamed the other. 
I aim to analyze the role of violence in Galician society and its interpretation as well as 
further exploitation for ideological, political, and national purposes. My core argument 
is that interpretations of violent events were more important than the violence itself and 
furthermore that these interpretations had altered significantly over the course of a 
decade of election experience (1897-1908). No longer was public discussion focused on 
the unfair and oppressed position of the lower classes; instead, it had shifted to 
perceiving discrimination against one’s national group.  
The first mass elections in 1897 and local violent clashes 
 
The election in 1897 was the first one in which the vast majority of peasants could 
participate (because of the curial election system). During this parliamentary election, in 
comparison to the ones following in 1907-8, there were significantly more trials of 
priests. One of the possible explanations for this high number was the popularity and 
success of the Roman Catholic priest Stojalowski during the 1895 elections to the local 
Diet. The other explanation for the particular attention paid to priests’ activity was the 
fact that priests still exerted significant influence on the laity: there were not enough 
secular agitators and activists to take over the role of enlightening and agitating the 
peasantry.  
Over the course of ten years, as the 1907-1908 case study demonstrates, the bond 
between priests and laity had changed and thus depended on good relations between 
priest and peasants. By 1907-8, the local authorities no longer viewed the clergy as a 
threat. By this point, political parties and nationalist activists presented, in the eyes of 
the authorities, a far greater danger. In 1897, the political forces of the province were 
still in a rudimentary state. 
Several court trials against Greek Catholic priests took place after 1897. The 
priest Ivan Koliankovskiy was accused of spreading false and disturbing ideas; more 
precisely, he had allegedly threatened “to tear off the ears of the peasants who vote for 
the landowners”.436 In his defense, the priest argued that he was only preaching peace 
and was helping peasants during the elections. He considered his help essential, as 
                                                          
436 “Povyborchyj Proces o Paragrafi 308” [Court trial after elections according to paragraph 308], Dilo, 
April 20, 1897. 
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previously elections were conducted contrary to the electoral law and without being 
properly announced in advance. Witnesses and Koliankovskiy’s lawyer proved the 
priest’s innocence.437 Another priest, Andriy Sumyk, was blamed for inciting violence 
against the local policeman Petro Vojevodka, and also for inappropriate behavior during 
liturgy. The report against him claimed that the priest had criticized the local authorities’ 
behavior during the election.438 The priest was accused of shaming a policeman during 
liturgy, which resulted in people mocking the policeman. In response, the policeman 
pushed over a banner; the priest asked him to leave after this, but he refused. The 
parishioners themselves removed the policeman from the church. For this, the priest was 
accused of public violence. Later, during the investigation, it was revealed that the 
policeman had not announced the date of the coming election, which irritated the priest 
and laity. The priest was declared innocent, as his behavior during the liturgy did not fall 
under the secular authorities’ jurisdiction.439 At this point, state authorities did not want 
to enter into the sacral domain, especially because the conflict with the policemen did 
not seem worth the trouble and had not threatened peace in the village. 
These two examples revealed that priests took active part in agitation and the 
election process itself and that the local authorities were carefully observing the 
possibility of violent ideas or clashes that might result from a priest’s agitation. The 
accusation of inspiring violent behavior or actually committing it was a serious charge 
that almost immediately led to arrest. In the case of Koliankovskiy, the violence was 
only verbal, but it was directed against the landowners and thus threatened the social 
order. In the other case, the priest Sumyk was accused of attacking the gendarme because 
the latter was violating the election process. Thus, the two priests were in some way 
protecting their laity against the injustices of the local authorities, while also the laity 
refused to testify against their priests.  
The next two priests were brought to court over accusations of causing rebellion 
and spreading hatred. The priest Jeronim Barysh was charged with rebellion: according 
to some witnesses, he had encouraged his parishioners to attack the gendarmes and had 
asked them to pray for the peasants imprisoned after the election. According to other 
witnesses, the mayor, Vynnychuk, was the one who had made accusations against 
Barysh because the latter had instructed the peasants on how to vote, which might have 
prevented Vynnychuk from being elected as a deputy. The trial found that there was no 
                                                          
437 “Povyborchyj Proces o Paragrafi 308” 
438 “Proces o.Andrija Sumyka” [The trial of the priest Andrij Sumyk], Dilo, August 25, 1897. 
439 “Proces o.Andrija Sumyka.”  
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proof for such accusations. 440 So Barysh, like his colleagues, was very concerned about 
the election results and was eager to use all his resources to resist possible injustices 
connected to the election process. It is worth mentioning that there were plenty examples 
from the past that characterized elections in Galicia as unfair, involving as they did the 
misuse of power by the authorities and corruption: thus the priests aimed to minimize 
the potential reoccurrence of such problems.441 
Another priest, Alexander Rotka, was accused of fomenting hatred towards Poles 
and agitating for Ruthenian candidates.442 The local teacher (who was probably the 
person who reported Rotka to the authorities) emphasized that Rotka’s behavior had 
made him so indignant that he had wanted to leave the church and encourage his pupils 
to do the same, but then he had changed his mind in order not to cause a scene. During 
the trial, the priest contended that he was not speaking against Poles or landowners, just 
against drinking, and that his precise words were: “vodka is the lords’ dishwater”.443 His 
intention, he said, was to make the peasants hate vodka and understand the importance 
of electing abstinent and honest deputies. The investigation also proved that the pupils 
had attended the church with their relatives, not with their teacher. In the end, the priest 
was found innocent.444 
Village authorities normally composed the formal accusation against the priests 
and took care to provide witnesses to support that accusation in court. After the court 
trials, all of these priests were pronounced innocent, mainly because there was no 
evidence that they had broken the law in any way. Certainly, the witnesses did not 
provide enough evidence against the priests. Some witnesses even behaved so poorly 
that they were banished from the courtroom. One of the peasants appeared in informal 
clothing with tousled hair: “he looked like a scarecrow from the field, and it was not 
God’s words that came out of his mouth” (apparently he was swearing a lot).445 In the 
end, all the trials were very similar and gave the impression of a constructed drama based 
on elaborate interpretations of the priests’ words and behavior.  
The significant aspect of this drama was its meaning and function. Above all, it 
demonstrates priests’ importance in their villages and the significance of their role during 
                                                          
440 “Proces o.Jeronima Barysha” [The trial of the priest Jeronim Barysh], Dilo, July 2, 1897. 
441 Pieter Judson has emphasized that the newly enfranchised peasants “treated the hard-fought right to 
vote as critical to their lives.” This was especially true for Galicia, where Ruthenians and Jews had less 
representatives than Polish peasants. Judson also adds on the huge role of the way that elections were held: 
the “crownland of Galicia generally had a reputation for corruption at the time.” Judson, Guardians of the 
nation, 12. 
442 “Proces o. Aleksandra Rotka” [The trial of the priest Aleksandr Rotko], Dilo, September 6, 1897. 
443 “Proces o. Aleksandra Rotka.” 
444 “Proces o. Aleksandra Rotka.” 
445 “Proces o.Jeronima Barysha.” 
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elections. In all court cases, accusations against the priests came from local authorities, 
especially those whom the priests had criticized for their dishonest behavior during 
elections. Very often, local leaders simultaneously served as representatives of the 
authorities and were interested in being elected or promoting certain candidates.  
The priests criticized dishonest behavior and fraud: in revenge, local leaders 
brought accusations against the clergy in order to discredit the priests in the eyes of the 
laity. In Zhydachiv district, the faithful wrote an appeal to the archbishop asking for his 
help to stop the persecution of priests.446 The parishioners claimed that priests were being 
arrested without sufficient cause: “imperial officials are undermining respect for the 
clergy in order to ruin their influence over the people. They [clergy] were treated like 
criminals and accompanied by gendarmes.”447 The peasants emphasized that all orders 
to arrest priests came from the starosta. The only reason for such treatment, the authors 
of the appeal maintained, was that the priests were chosen to be electors/voters (those 
who voted directly for deputies), while the mayor had a different elector in mind. 
According to the curial system, the voters elected electors and then electors voted for 
deputies. Therefore the clergy involved in the curial system could exercise influence but 
might also endure misfortune from political maneuvering. 
The accusations against and persecution of priests revealed the tensions and 
struggles between representatives of local power and the clergy for the support of 
peasants. The priests were protectors and teachers of the peasantry when it came to this 
new phenomenon of elections. The local authorities strove to retain – and preferably 
strengthen – their access to the higher powers and thus used all the resources available 
to achieve that goal. One such resource was the possibility to employ gendarmes, another 
to compile fake accusations. It is noteworthy that in the cases mentioned here, the priests 
were proved innocent and there were no further investigations into their behavior, 
whereas in chapter four, the priests were long-term subjects of observation and 
investigation, and their fate was not always so kind. 
A more precise look at the sentenced priests can be found in chapter 4, as the 
cases in this chapter are too short to understand the complexity of mass mobilization in 
the village. However, these cases are extremely important because they were directly 
linked to the election process and demonstrate that there were many actors (local 
authorities, teachers, landowners) involved simultaneously. For these actors, the priests’ 
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desire to instruct the peasants to make a specific electoral choice was considered 
dangerous, which led them to attempt to defeat the priests by bringing them to court or 
causing their arrests. Furthermore, these cases demonstrate that priests were considered 
highly influential; this influence could be exercised mainly through the liturgy, 
preaching, and raising important public issues. At election time, the liturgy could serve 
as a great mobilizing tool because gatherings in the church could serve as a public space 
(as most of the village public was there) and provided a prime opportunity to discuss 
various issues raised by the priest after the religious service was concluded.  
In 1897, it was not clear whether priests belonged to or sympathized with any 
particular political party. It was not clear whether there was a nationalist background for 
the conflicts between priests and the local authorities. Therefore, the struggle between 
priests and official authorities can be attributed to social causes. However, over time, as 
is demonstrated below in the cases from 1907, the national and political identities of the 
clergy became very important and thus were always emphasized. Such small details 
make evident the transformation that happened within ten years of political and social 
life in Galicia. 
These events also demonstrate the connection between the activity of Greek 
Catholic priests and their Roman Catholic counterparts. As is clear from chapter three, 
the Roman Catholic priest Stojalowski was very successful in mobilizing peasants in 
Western Galicia. Certainly, his activity was widely known in Eastern Galicia as well. 
Therefore, Stojalowski’s success challenged and undermined the existing social 
hierarchy, demonstrating that peasants had more power and influence than they realized. 
This approach was decidedly threatening to those who already had power (local 
authorities, landowners), and thus inspired them to prevent a possible strengthening of 
the peasantry in the province. 
The killing of an elective commissar in the village of Dawidów 
 
The tensions between the peasants and local authorities tended to worsen. During the 
election in the village of Dawidów, near Lemberg, on 13 March 1897, a frustrated crowd, 
which suspected the elective commissar and some other members of the election 
committee of fraud and falsifying the election, began to attack the elective commissar 
Stanislav Popel. While Popel was trying to escape, he shot one of the attacking peasants 
in order to defend himself. This made the crowd more violent; the peasants caught Popel 
and beat him to death. There were only two gendarmes in the village, so they could not 
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cope with the crowd.448 As Dawidów was known as a very calm and homogenous 
village, with around 1,300 inhabitants (mainly Polish and Roman Catholics),449 no one 
had foreseen any possible aggression towards the officials there.450  
The skirmish in Dawidów was noteworthy for several reasons. First, it was the 
peasants who initiated the aggression and killed a local official (this had never happened 
before, nor did it occur again). Secondly, as Dawidów was close to Lemberg, the events 
made an impact on the provincial capital. The workers of Lemberg and the peasants of 
Dawidów supported the same candidate during the election. When the gendarmes 
delivered the accused peasants to Lemberg after the event, it provoked violence and 
disturbances in the city (attacks on the gendarmes, throwing stones, demolishing 
windows in the courthouse, etc.).451 It is hard to determine whether this reaction in the 
city was fueled by sympathy for the peasants or if it was instead a way to rebel against 
the gendarmes and the army. Finally, the Dawidów case was significant because the 
priest was also involved as an active participant; in this case, as in other examples from 
1897, he was in conflict with local authorities. 
The violent event in Dawidów was one of the first to initiate an election-related 
court trial. It also revealed the gap in relations between peasants and the local authorities, 
emphasizing that this gap was not due to nationality (at least at the end of the nineteenth 
century). This event became part of the public discussion and raised a number of issues 
that remained important for society. It demonstrated that tensions between authorities 
and peasants were intense and were rooted in social differences. That is to say, even in 
the absence of national agitation, there were sufficient grounds in terms of social 
deprivation for violent clashes.  
There were 29 peasants accused in the Dawidów killing, of whom 24 were 
sentenced to prison (with sentences ranging from five years to two months).452 Almost 
half of them were Greek Catholic and supposedly identified as Ruthenian; however, the 
village was considered to be Polish, probably because the village land was owned by a 
Dominican monastery and the majority of the inhabitants were Polish. It is also likely 
that the Ruthenians did not have a clear national identity, and thus both Polish and 
Ruthenian activists recognized the village as a Polish sphere of influence. 
                                                          
448 “Krovavi podii' v Davydovi i rozruhy u L'vovi” [Bloody events in Dawidów and the violence in 
Lemberg], Dilo, March 13, 1897. 
449 Skorowidz wszystkich miejscowości, 32. Last modified May 18, 2014. 
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450 "Rozruchy v Dawidówie” [The violence in Dawidów], Czas, March 13, 1897. 
451 “Krovavi podii' v Davydovi i rozruhy u L'vovi.” 
452 "Rozruchy v Dawidówie” [The violence in Dawidów], Czas, June 11, 1897. 
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Most of the information about village dynamics came from upper-class villagers, 
as they were called as witnesses at the trial. One witness, a member of the election 
committee, testified that the peasants started to show interest in the election only after a 
candidate named Kozakevitch visited the village: this future deputy sparked the 
peasants’ desire to participate in the election.453 The impact, effectiveness, and 
consequences of election campaigning are important markers for understanding conflicts 
and transformations in rural communities.  
The relations between the local priest and starosta also had a lot of influence on 
the behavior of the peasants. The Roman Catholic priest in Dawidów, Fialkowsky, had 
a specific reputation in the village. On the one hand, the peasants had elected the priest 
as the elector, which was a demonstration of trust. However, a local blacksmith claimed 
that the peasants were dissatisfied with Fialkowsky as an elector because the priest 
demanded high prices for performing rituals: “one needed to sell a cow in order to ask 
the priest for a funeral”.454 There is no other evidence  for tension between priest 
Fialkowsky and the peasants, but there was a clear conflict between the local starosta 
and the priest. Fialkowsky, who stated that the starosta was also a part of election 
injustice (causing delays during elections, compiling a falsified list of voters, and putting 
all the responsibility on the elective commissar Popel, the one who was killed).455 The 
starosta responded during the court trial that the priest had personal issues with him. 
Such tension between the starosta and the priest most likely affected the behavior of the 
laity: the priest cast suspicion on the local authorities and thus the peasants took actions 
into their hands and enacted their own form of justice on Popel. 
The speeches made by the lawyers and the public prosecutor during the trial 
reflected the different interpretations of the event. The public prosecutor emphasized the 
negative consequences of political agitation in the village, especially from socialist 
agitators (most likely candidate Kozakevitch) who had provoked hatred towards the 
landowners. He stated: “it was unbelievable that the lowest class of peasants armed with 
sticks had attacked the elective commissar and the gendarmes. The elections were fair 
and Popel was behaving according to the law”.456 These words reflect the indignation 
and fear of the authorities towards the peasantry: they saw peasantry as a threat to the 
local social hierarchy, not only in terms of politics but also security. In addition, the term 
used by the public prosecutor to refer to the peasantry applied specifically to the lowest 
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strata of peasants (chern); this term could have an offensive meaning. This 
understanding of peasants, not as citizens but as a very low and aggressive part of 
society, indicated the elite’s perception of what was happening in the village and how 
violent clashes became connected with the peasantry and their supposed brutality. 
The lawyers emphasized, in the contrast to the prosecutor, the negative influence 
of electoral fraud on the peasants. The first lawyer called attention to the complex 
dynamics in the village: the hostility between the priest and the starosta, the lack of 
leadership for the peasants, and the success of socialist agitation. He named these factors 
as the reasons for such a tragic death. The other lawyer spoke about the importance of 
justice among peasants and the desire to protect their votes.457 The other interesting 
aspect of the defense’s argument was their appeal to crowd psychology and its influence 
on individuals’ actions. The two lawyers underlined in their defense speeches that the 
crowd changed the psychology of people and made them behave differently. One of the 
lawyers asked the doctor present at the trial about a recently discovered ‘crowd disease’. 
The doctor the confirmed existence of this disease, calling it a ‘contagion’ which 
enveloped the crowd and forced it to finish what it had started (in this case, catching and 
killing the elective commissar).458 The lawyer expressed similar ideas during Koropiec’s 
court trial (analyzed below). He applied the ideas of the psychiatrist Kraft Ebing and his 
concept of ‘paranoia politica’ (obsession with politics) in order to explain the actions of 
the peasants during elections as a cause of mass unrest.459  
Apparently, such psychological explanations aimed to make the guilt of the 
peasants less serious and blame everything on the effect of the crowd. Simultaneously, 
such an attitude towards the behavior of the crowd (as a danger and disease) is a 
significant element for attaining a historical understanding of the occurences in 1907-8, 
when even a small crowd was sufficient reason to employ the harshest methods (shooting 
peasants). Associating a crowd with paranoia gave it an irrational and negative 
connotation and thus activated suspicions and fears. 
Between universal male suffrage and the curial system: the elections in 1907 and 1908 
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Horucko was a village of more than 2,000 inhabitants around 80 km from Lemberg460 
where the vast majority of the population was Ruthenian.461 Here, on 24 May 1907, six 
peasants were killed and more than ten injured because of clashes with gendarmes. The 
event in Horucko (today Hirske) can be analyzed on various levels: as national and social 
struggles (between Polish authorities and Ruthenian peasants) or an intra-Ruthenian 
conflict (a dispute over the election of a Russophile or Ukrainian candidate). It also 
highlighted the gendarmes’ disdainful attitude towards the peasantry.  
The most interesting aspects of this case relate to the conflicting political views 
of two Greek Catholic priests – one Russophile, the other Ukrainianophile. As mentioned 
above, active political engagement in mutually exclusive ideologies could lead to 
confrontation, either amongst the clergy or between the laity and clergy. In the case of 
Horucko, a large number (possibly the majority) of the villagers supported the election 
of the Russophile priest Vasyl Davydiak. The chairman of the election committee was 
the parish priest Feofil Skobelski, who was a Ukrainophile. Thus, the supporters of the 
Russophile priest suspected Skobelski of committing fraud in favor of the Ukrainian 
candidate.462 The gossip and chaos surrounding this suspicion resulted in resistance from 
the peasants. It is not clear how dangerous this resistance was; according to local 
authorities, the gendarmes were forced to use their weapons, as the peasants were 
throwing stones and behaving aggressively. The peasants testified during the court trial 
that they had only shouted and were not throwing anything, while the gendarmes had 
shot at them without need.463 
The Horucko event was widely discussed in the local press. The Russophile 
newspaper Galychanyn promoted a narrative that blamed the parish priest Skobelski, 
whose preference for a Ukrainian candidate in the village resulted in tensions between 
the priest and his faithful.464 The witnesses quoted by the newspaper had seen the priest 
committing fraud in order to support the Ukrainian candidate in this electoral district, 
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thereby causing indignation among the peasants, who widely supported the Russophile 
candidate.465 The Ukrainophile newspaper Dilo blamed the local authorities, who were 
seen as Polish; Dilo claimed that over the years they had shown little respect for the 
peasants’ lives and had not ensured a fair electoral procedure. In addition, the newspaper 
blamed the Russophiles for agitating against Ukrainian-oriented Ruthenians and for 
encouraging the peasants to suspect everyone, even their own priest, of being unfaithful: 
“the people were blinded and attacked their priest”.466 The Polish Catholic newspaper 
Glos Narodu highlighted that the conflict was a local problem: “Why were the Poles 
blamed? The gendarmes were protecting a Ruthenian priest. This was a struggle between 
Ruthenians.”467 Glos Narodu emphasized that the event in Horucko proved that “a 
situation could easily break out of control if the authorities do not react immediately.”468 
Similar rhetoric was typical for violent conflicts in other provinces of the Empire. 
American scholar Pieter Judson reveals in his research on the violent clashes in Bohemia 
that after the conflict “each side maneuvered to gain greater legitimacy for its political 
claims both in the eyes of its own public and with the imperial government.”469 The 
situation was similar in Galicia, as newspapers were justifying the event in the eyes of 
their readers while deputies discussed it in parliament. 
The Russophile priest Vasyl Davydiak, after he was elected as a deputy, gave a 
speech in parliament. In his opinion, the problem was not a conflict between priests or 
advocates of different political ideologies, but rather the behavior of the previous 
starosta, who had frequently committed fraud and was never punished.470 Davydiak 
stresses an alternative argument of what was occurring in this situation. He suggested 
that it was the local authorities were to blame for the clash and not the different political 
visions of the clergy.471 It could have been combination of all these factors that caused 
tragic events in Horucko. Below, I elaborate on the trial to find more insights into the 
event. 
Horucko became the focus of attention again with the trial of 66 peasants (among 
them 16 women, mainly the wives of the accused peasants). The trial started in October 
1907, but was then postponed until February 1908, mainly because of the large number 
of defendants. The peasants were charged with provoking public violence (especially 
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threatening to hurt/kill a priest) and with ignoring the officials’ orders to disperse. The 
trial resulted in the conviction of 39 peasants, including two women. The convictions 
varied in degree and amounted to a number of months in prison.472 27 of the 39 peasants 
were set free. 
During the trial, the accused peasants reported that they had behaved calmly and 
had not threatened anyone; they had not heard the gendarmes’ order to disperse or the 
warning to stop shouting. What is noteworthy is that sixteen women were among the 
accused, including some who had been very active in the crowd. This means that 
elections and public activity were not exclusively male spheres. Women considered this 
domain important as well, despite not having a political voice at the ballot box. One 
woman, accused of threatening to hurt the Ukrainian priest, explained that she was 
innocent and that the sixteen witnesses who testified against her were scorned would-be 
lovers. The same woman, together with another, also faced accusations of offending the 
gendarmes.473  
The election committee, including priest Skobelski, claimed that there was no 
fraud and that the elections were fair but that the crowd rebelled anyway. He testified 
that the crowd was rebellious because of propaganda.474 The commissar of the election 
committee (one of the few Poles involved in the trial; the other two were gendarmes) 
testified that the crowd became tense after the election results were announced. The 
peasants then supposedly started to call the priest a “fleecer” (lupij) and threatened to 
tear him to pieces. The other members of the election committee testified to the same 
effect. Most likely, the priest did not have good relations with his laity and thus could 
not control them at the moment of excitement. 
The tense relationship between the priest and his congregation was obvious; 
however, it was not clear why the peasants did not like the priest, and whether, more 
precisely, it was a political or personal conflict. A peasant woman, one of those blamed 
for threatening to cut the priest into pieces and cook him for dinner, claimed that she was 
only calling the priest a “thief” and “potboiler” because he was stealing votes. The 
woman explained that people did not like the priest in general, as “he would beat and 
disgrace people during confession and called women ‘slatterns’”.475 Another accused 
peasant also denied that he had called for tearing the priest into pieces, but confirmed 
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that he called him a “fleecer” because the priest declined to bury one of his relatives.476 
These testimonies suggest that the priest had a conflict with at least some peasants; 
adding to this the suspicion in the unfair behavior of local administration, the laity 
decided to depend on their own strength. 
The Russophile deputy Markov called the behavior of the priest into question in 
the Galician Diet. In his petition, Markov accused priest Skobelski of tactless and brutal 
behavior.477 The Greek Catholic Ordinariate responded to the petition, defending the 
priest. Bishop Chekhovych emphasized that if the priest had beaten someone, as the 
petition claimed, a complaint would have been filed, not only with the bishop but with 
the court as well. In addition, the bishop highlighted that there were no complaints 
against the priest in his current position or from his previous parishes, where the priest 
was viewed with sympathy and respect.478 Thus, the Russophiles’ attempt to make the 
priest’s political or social behavior the main cause for the peasants’ deaths failed. As in 
the cases in chapter four, the Ordinariate defended the priest against his accusers, 
assuming that the parishioners would have complained about their priest if he was 
actually misbehaving.    
From the testimonies, it is difficult to conclude whether the disrespectful 
behavior of the priest during the elections in Horucko was what caused people to mistrust 
him,or whether it was the fact that he supported the Ukrainian candidate that made him 
a political enemy to some of his congregation. Most likely, a combination of these two 
factors (that he was both a bad priest and a bad member of the election committee) 
provoked this dissatisfaction and the threats of aggression towards him. As the second 
case of violence demonstrates, political differences by themselves were not sufficient to 
incite the faithful against their priest. 
The trial did not particularly help in understanding who was actually guilty. The 
court did not question the behavior of the priest or that of the gendarmes and the head of 
the elective committee (Polish commissar Shyshka). Nevertheless, the court hearings do 
give important information about the life of the peasant community, namely the 
importance of political preferences (the struggle in the village was between two 
Ruthenians), the desire to resist fraud, and challenging the authority of the priest. The 
feeling of injustice was intensified during elections because, on the one hand, agitators 
emphasized the injustice faced by the peasantry in order to mobilize them for active 
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participation in the elections while, on the other, the same agitators strove to raise 
peasants’ awareness of the possibility of fraud, because fraud would decrease the 
candidate’s chances of being elected. 
The killing of the election activist in the village of Koropiec 
Koropiec was a village of more than 800 inhabitants (the vast majority being 
Ruthenians), where the land belonged to the famous Polish Badeni family.479 There, on 
8 February 1908 (the day before the Horucko peasants’ sentences were announced), 
gendarmes killed a peasant. A crowd of peasants worried about fair election lists 
gathered in the center of the village and refused to disperse at the request of gendarmes: 
then one of gendarmes killed the peasant Kaganets.480 In the case of the violence in 
Koropiec, the parish priest Ivan Proskurnytskij also had different political preferences 
than the majority of laity. However, the role he played in the event was very distinct. 
The priest tried to calm the peasants and warned the victim to be more cautious in dealing 
with the gendarmes. It is also possible that because of the calm behavior of the priest, 
there was only one victim in the clashes. 
The event in Koropec had a long-lasting impact. According to some newspapers, 
the Ukrainian student Sichynski, right before killing the Vice-governor of Galicia 
Andrzej Potocki, claimed: “This is for our [Ruthenian] injustice, for the elections, for 
the death of Kaganets”.481 During his trial, Sichynski cited the injustice committed 
against Ruthenian peasants as one of the reasons why he decided to kill the governor 
(the other was injustice towards Ruthenian students at the university in Lemberg).482 I 
elaborate on the assassination of the governor below in the part especially focused on 
this case.  
In general, the killing of the peasant Marko Kaganets received a lot of attention 
in various Ruthenian press reports. This event was presented as a noble act of sacrifice 
for justice and the good of others. The newspaper Osnova wrote: “Let us all be like 
Kaganets, with clean hands and with God in our hearts, and there will not be enough 
bayonets for all of us” (“us” meaning all politically-active Ruthenians).483 Osnova’s 
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rhetoric was very important as it brought together ideas of justice, nation, and faith 
(“with God in our hearts”) into one narrative and presented such qualities as necessary 
characteristics of a national hero.  
The role played by the priest in this event was completely different than in the 
Horucko case, even though he was a representative of the Russophiles when the village 
was very Ukrainian-oriented. The priest, Ivan Proskurnytskij, took an active part in 
pacifying the crowd, managed to give the last rites to the dying Kaganets,484 and 
participated in his funeral.485 He never emphasized his political preferences and testified 
during the trial486 that the killing could have been avoided if there had been a higher 
level of tolerance and less chauvinism among the participants. Also, the priest mentioned 
that he was trying to protect Kaganets by telling him to be more careful with the 
gendarmes because he knew that they hated Kaganets.487 This example reveals that the 
relationship between priest and community could play different roles in village conflicts: 
in some cases that relationship limited the conflict while in others it aggravated the issue.  
Another important point was that the ability of the priests to manage their 
political and social functions successfully in the village depended partly on whether the 
priest managed to build a trusting and respectful relationship with his laity. The examples 
of violence listed above demonstrated the importance of the social role of the priest as a 
representative of the peasants. In the case of Horucko, the priest was assumed to be 
associated with the unfair electoral process and the unjust local administration; this 
impression was intensified because he had not taken the side of the peasants when the 
conflict started. In the case of Koropiec, the priest avoided strong involvement in politics 
and did his best to prevent further clashes by trying to calm the peasants. Proskurnytskij 
is an example of a priest who, through the combination of secular and religious 
involvement, managed to minimize conflict and tension in his parish. 
The attention given to Kaganets’s death continued after the trial. With money 
collected from peasants and Ukrainian activists, a cross was erected on his grave. The 
inscription read: “Here rests Marko Kaganets, born 12 January 1881 and died 6 February 
1908 from gendarmes’ bayonets in defense of national rights…Let the native land, 
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watered with the innocent blood of a national martyr, be soft for him.”488 According to 
the Ukrainian scholar Olena Arkusha, this inscription was discussed by the governor and 
the local authorities because it mentioned “gendarmes’ bayonets”, thus raising the 
possibility of newly heightened tensions. Finally, in 1911, the local starosta convinced 
the governor not to destroy the inscription in order to avoid attracting attention to the 
event.489 This means that the death of Kaganets was already a very important national 
symbol and the manipulation with the inscription could have been an extra mobilizing 
stimulus.  
Conclusion on the violence in the villages 
This violence took place only in the eastern part of the province, in the territory where 
both nations were represented, the majority being Ruthenian. A close examination of the 
events does not reveal a clear national division as a backdrop to the events. The most 
evident reasons for antagonism between the sides involved in each conflict can be traced 
back to conflicts between social roles. As the two case studies above demonstrated, the 
most intense and tragic clash was between gendarmes and peasants. Nevertheless, these 
social conflicts were not the only causes that led to deaths. The other important factors 
were relations between different actors in the village, previous experiences with local 
authorities, the political preferences of the participants in the conflict, and the behavior 
of the clergy. In one case, the active role played by the priest intensified the conflict; in 
the other, it minimized the conflict.  
The way violent events were interpreted had a strong impact on relations in 
Galicia. Each side directly or indirectly involved had its own version of the events, and 
they were framed accordingly. Ruthenian deputies used the violent events in order to 
attract attention in parliament to inequality in the province and to demonstrate the abuse 
of power by the Polish administration. The deputies demanded Vienna’s direct 
involvement to better enforce Austrian law. Ukrainian nationalists used the same events 
to increase mobilization of the masses and to emphasize how a national program would 
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help prevent such conflicts and guarantee a better life. In addition, the national activists 
started to create a very effective cult of national martyrs that may have increased 
mobilization and gave intense, even sacred, meaning to the importance of the nation. 
The opponents of these Ukrainian activists (mostly Russophiles) emphasized the danger 
of a national program because this would introduce hostility into village communities. 
Polish activists and representatives of the local authorities used these events to stress the 
effectiveness of the local administration in preventing the further escalation of conflicts 
and to demonstrate the violence of Ruthenian political movements. In conclusion, the 
violent events reveal the perceived polarization of national identities and thus 
highlighted how complex the involvement of the clergy and churches was.  
Conclusions 
Tracing events from 1897 to the beginning of the twentieth century reveals the 
changing role of priests in the villages. A decade later, the importance of priests became 
less evident and was much more dependent on the relationship the clergy managed to 
build with the faithful. While in 1897 the faithful attempted to protect their clergy against 
gendarmes and the local administration, in 1907 some of the laity (in the case of 
Horucko) were ready to physically attack their own priest. In addition, comparing trials 
demonstrates that the clergy was under more pressure from local authorities in 1897, 
while later there were no important trials concerning the actions of priests.   
On the other hand, this comparison of trials reveals that political preferences and 
the successes of the mass mobilization of believers were very important challenges for 
the priests. If in 1897 the clergy only had to concern themselves with mobilizing the 
peasantry for participation in elections, in 1907-1908 they had to manage the political 
preferences of their parishioners and to adapt their own political views in keeping with 
their role as a representative of the churches. Relations between the clergy and laity were 
heavily influenced by nationalist and other political agitators, who not only actively 
promoted their political programs in the village but also taught the peasantry to be 
critical, even towards their pastors. This new situation was more demanding for the priest 
and forced them to be compliant (as in the case of Koropiec, where the priest played a 
pacifying role in the conflict). 
Within a decade, social circumstances had changed as well. The emphasis in 
interpreting violent events had shifted significantly, from the unfair position of the 
peasants in society in 1897 to the unfair position of the national group in 1907-08. This 
longer perspective also demonstrates the progress of agitation and mass mobilization and 
the growing significance of political identity. A further stage in the interpretation of 
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violence and the role of the churches in society was provoked by the assassination of the 
governor of the province in 1908. 
Violence in the city: the assassination of the governor in 1908 
 
The displays of violence in connection with parliamentary and local diet elections 
manifested themselves in urban space as well. The most notable example of urban 
violence was the assassination of the provincial governor in 1908. This event 
demonstrated continuity with the previous examples of violence and the buildup of 
tensions within Galician society. As a result, a new challenge was posed to the Roman 
and Greek Catholic churches of the province for several reasons. They felt the need to 
maintain influence over the faithful, especially because Polish and Ruthenian 
nationalists interpreted the killing as the peak of antagonism between them, and to 
integrate popular patriotic ideas with Catholic values.  
The Greek Catholic Church found it more complicated because the assassin was 
himself a Greek Catholic (his father was a Greek Catholic priest and a deputy to the 
Galician Diet) and considered himself a Ukrainian socialist.490 It seemed to some that 
the Catholic Church’s nightmare had become reality because now the socialist threat was 
no longer purely theoretical. At the same time, this threat had a strong nationalistic 
component, as the killing was done in the name of the Ruthenian nation.491 The Greek 
Catholic Church had to react clearly and quickly in order not to be suspected of 
sympathizing with the killer because of his nationality and religion, and thereby not to 
worsen relations with local and central authorities. However, it also needed to balance 
this with maintaining its influence among the laity, who could celebrate the killing as an 
act of justice.  
The background for the Greek Catholic Church’s actions was complicated by 
national activists (those who published articles in Dilo with anti-Polish messages) and 
previous experiences of violence and injustice. From the perspective of the 
assassin/murderer, the assassination was a natural solution that, at least, emphasized the 
unjust balance of power between the self-willed, autonomous administration (mainly 
comprised of the gentry) and Ruthenians, who were already mobilized and aware of their 
unequal position (mainly nationalistic peasants and students). From the perspective of 
activists in the Polish and Ruthenian national movements, the assassination 
                                                          
490 “Myroslav Sichyns'kyy pered sudom” [Miroslav Sichinsky in the court], Dilo, June 30, 1908. 
491 “Myroslav Sichyns'kyy pered sudom.” 
161 
 
demonstrated a national division in the Galician population and thus resulted in a need 
to defend their own national interests. On the one hand, the Polish press exaggerated the 
danger of the Ukrainophile movement as rebellious, violent, and dissatisfied with the 
numerous changes made during the last decade. On the other, the Ukrainian press 
emphasized the unequal governing practices in Galicia and the resulting Polish 
domination in the province. 
The most significant aspect of the event was the fact that it affected the whole 
province. The previous violent clashes with gendarmes during elections were rather 
local, focused mainly in Eastern Galicia. However, the killing of an Austrian official 
close to the emperor influenced not only Galicia, but Vienna as well. The killing was an 
unexpected culmination to the existing tensions and it significantly influenced relations 
in the province. Even nationally-oriented newspapers, while blaming the other 
nationality for injustice and violence, suggested that “the blood of the governor would 
bring peace to the two fraternal nationalities”.492  
I do not closely analyze the national rhetoric surrounding this event for a number 
of reasons, above all because I view it as only one of the dominant tensions that existed 
in Galicia. The assassination certainly served to divide the population in Galicia and 
create a stronger sense of national belonging, at least for a while, but within time this 
effect wore off. I am more interested in examining the web of different mutually 
reinforcing tensions in Galician society. Using this approach, I emphasize the 
complexity of the issues (such as the clash between national and religious values) that 
both vhurches of the region dealt with, especially when the laity of the Roman Catholic 
Church participated in services for the murdered governor while some lay people of the 
Greek Catholic rite considered praying for clemency to be shown to the assassin.493  
The assassination on Palm Sunday 1908  
On the fatal day (12 April 1908), a Ruthenian student, Miroslav Sichynski, entered the 
room of the Polish Galician Governor Andrzej Potocki at the Landesgubernium and 
immediately fired three shots.494 When Sichynski left the room after committing the 
crime, he told the Ruthenian peasants still waiting for an audience with the governor: 
“This is for our [Ruthenian] injustice, for the elections, for the death of Kaganets”.495  
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After being shot, Potocki was still alive for approximately two hours. During this time, 
he managed to say farewell to his wife and children, confess and accept Holy 
Communion, and asked to telegraph the emperor that he was his faithful servant and 
would die at his post. Meanwhile Sichynski was taken to the police office and the 
investigation started. The police suspected that this action was organized by some group 
or organization, and members of his family and friends were arrested. The police looked 
for evidence in the offices of Ukrainian organizations. Eventually, the police 
investigation concluded that he must have acted alone and all who had been arrested 
were set free.496 
Lemberg was shocked by the crime. All at once, the usual activities stopped, 
while newspapers (framed in black) spread the news and sought explanations for the 
murder. At the same time, officials telegraphed Vienna; the police searched for possible 
accomplices, suspecting a plot; and local youth took justice into their own hands.497  
It is difficult to reconstruct precisely the events of the following few days. The 
Ukrainian newspaper Dilo reported that Polish youths started to organize demonstrations 
and threw stones at Ukrainian national organizations and activists.498 The Polish press 
preferred to marginalize these events by describing them as typical behavior of young 
gangs and to refuse to connect the Polish position with some street hooligans who threw 
stones through windows.499 According to an article in the conservative Polish newspaper 
Czas, the police dispersed these demonstrations and protected the buildings from future 
invasions.500 At the same time, Dilo described another reality, writing that the ‘stone 
demonstrations’ continued for several days and caused substantial damage to Ukrainian 
property; they claimed that the police only showed up during the very last moments and 
did not arrest anyone. One of the targets of the Polish protests was the Greek Catholic 
seminary and the dormitory of the seminarians. In the seminary building, some stones 
thrown by the protesters reached the room where the Greek Catholic bishops had 
gathered for the funeral.501  
The funeral became a mass event, with thousands of Polish participants from 
three empires (Russian, Austrian and Prussian) and representatives of the central powers, 
as well as the bishops of both Catholic churches. All the representatives of the local 
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Polish elite and authorities attended the funeral as well.502 Thus, the funeral served as a 
unifying event for the Poles. However, the emperor himself was not present. The 
Ukrainian historian Olena Arkusha argues that the absence of the emperor and his heir 
at the funeral demonstrates that Vienna was trying to remain as neutral as possible in 
this situation.503 
The symbolic value of the murdered and the murderer played a large role in 
mobilizing society. Their personalities were, to some extent, a reinforcing symbol of the 
tensions that existed in the society at that time: the social tension of gentry vs. peasants, 
the national tension of Polish activists vs. Ukrainophile activists, and the religious 
tension of Catholics vs. non-believers/socialists.  
Andrzej Potocki, the governor of Galicia since 1903, was a member of a 
conservative, traditional aristocratic family that, from an economic perspective, was very 
influential in the province. Potocki, as a representative of the nobility and landowners in 
the minds of the Ruthenians in the province, was not only a symbol of the current 
inequility but also of previous injustices, like serfdom and the exploitation of the 
peasantry by the gentry. As the previous case studies have demonstrated, at the turn of 
the century, under the influence of national movements, tensions between gentry and 
peasants were evolving into tensions between two nationalities. 
Miroslav Sichynsky was a young national activist and a student of philosophy. 
His family was always active in political life. His father was a Greek Catholic priest and 
a deputy to the Galician Diet, but he died when Sichynsky was a child. Sichynsky himself 
became an activist in the villages: he founded educational clubs there and took part in 
election campaigns as a social democrat.504 Sichynsky also had met (by coincidence) 
some of the peasants injured in the Horucko events in the hospital and was very shocked 
that they were injured from behind (not from attacking gendarmes, but while running 
away). In addition, he was an active participant in the student campaign for a Ruthenian 
university and was arrested during demonstrations. He claimed that his experience of 
injustice towards Ruthenians gave him the idea of killing of the governor. This idea 
emerged in Vienna, where he had first seen the governor. Sichynsky testified that he 
thought at that moment: “You [Potocki] are walking here [in Vienna], when over there 
[in Galicia] the people are dying and blood is flowing because of you”.505 The last straw 
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for Sichynsky was the death of Kaganets in Koropiec. After this, Sichynsky spent the 
money he had earned working for a professor on a Browning pistol and signed up for an 
audience with the governor. 
With his act of killing, Sichynski contributed to the existing cycle of violent 
clashes in Galicia. He himself emphasized the huge influence of the Horucko and 
Koropiec events on his decision:506 however, these events did not only have an impact 
on Sichynsky. As the events were discussed in public space (press and parliament), this 
discussion influenced the masses and created a rhetoric on the subject. As Pieter Jusdon 
has brilliantly highlighted in similar cases, “every new example of violence only added 
to the existing catalogue, and over time journalists and politicians trotted out the growing 
collection to prove both the inevitability and the normalcy of nationalist violence.”507 In 
such terms, Galicia was not an exception but the rule. 
Sichynski justified his actions by pointing to the need to improve the political 
position of his fellow Ruthenians in a province ruled by the Polish gentry. He claimed: 
“I wanted to achieve change, not revolution or paradise, but a change, especially 
rethinking the dominance of the gentry and attracting attention to injustice towards 
Ruthenians.”508 Legal methods were not effective or even possible in his view. He was 
hoping to give moral satisfaction to his nation and to stimulate an extralegal struggle in 
case the legal struggle was not effective. Sichynsky considered unfair local and 
parliamentary elections to be amongst the greatest injustices towards Ruthenians in the 
region. Sichynsky claimed: “previously people had not felt injustice so strongly and had 
perceived it as normal, because they did not know about elections and parliament.”509 
According to Sichynsky, “Potocki was governing not as an official or an Austrian public 
servant but as a king, so he should be punished for supporting only the gentry and 
neglecting all working people regardless of nationality.”510 Such a focus on Potocki’s 
negative qualities was a practical display of the national vision, which was at its core 
very one-sided: either positive or negative for the nation. Such a one-sided approach led 
to the radicalization of politics. From the words of Sichynsky, it was also evident that he 
and other activists had a lot of loyalty to and trust in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and 
were only requiring that officials behave in the framework of the law in Galicia. Thus 
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the assassination was an example of radical but loyal politics, and can be seen as a case 
of political radicalization in the public space of the Habsburg Empire. 
Sichynsky’s thoughts, which he shared during the trial, give significant insight 
into Galician political life. First, as in the cases of rural violence during elections, the 
main emphasis was on the struggle against an unfair system, especially the dominance 
of the gentry and the arbitrariness of local administrations. The second was the growth 
in peasant activities, mainly during elections, and the chaotic attempts to control or limit 
them. Instead of discouraging political activity, attempts to deny political participation 
stimulated it. The desire of students and political agitators to involve peasants in politics 
also resulted in bringing villages and cities closer together. This shortening of the 
distance between village and city was also furthered by trials regarding peasant violence 
that took place in the cities. The third aspect of Galician political life highlighted by the 
trial was the mutual reinforcement of nationalism (both Polish and Ruthenian activists 
motivated each other when manifesting their ideas in the public domain). 
Sichynsky was sentenced to death after two trials, but the final decision belonged 
to the emperor. The new governor of Galicia, Bobrzynski, had insisted on amnesty 
because he understood the danger to the province’s stability if Sichynsky were executed. 
Sichynsky’s death penalty was commuted to 20 years of imprisonment. In 1911, helped 
by Ukrainian nationalists, he managed to escape from prison and immigrated to the 
United States, where he continued working as a local Ukrainian activist. He died at the 
age of 92, never regretting what he had done.511 
Catholic vs national visions of the assassination 
 
The Greek Catholic Church responded to the crime with a strong sense of urgency. This 
was mainly due to various accusations coming from the Polish side towards Ruthenians, 
in particular blaming Ruthenians for the murder and calling them rebellious. The Greek 
Catholic hierarchy produced several sermons on the assassination and thereby stimulated 
further discussions on the role of Catholicism and the clergy in the nation-building 
process. Here, I focus on the position of the Greek Catholic Church because the Roman 
Catholic Church did not provide any specific reaction to the event, mainly since it 
considered the matter only relevant to the Ruthenian population and therefore the Greek 
Catholic Church. 
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The Greek Catholic Church developed two main strategies in response to the 
assassination: (i) to set the Christian boundaries of political life in the province and (ii) 
to separate the crime from national discourse and reframe it as a moral issue. Soon after 
the assassination, Metropolitan Archbishop Sheptytsky claimed that “society had 
witnessed a public crime and this crime should be condemned publically and be actively 
protested by Christians.”512 Furthermore, he stated that a crime in the name of patriotism 
was a crime not only against God and society, but also against the Motherland. He 
emphasized that it was important to distinguish this crime from the Ruthenian political 
movement, especially because some press (literally the “hostile press”) put the 
responsibility for this crime on the entire Ruthenian nation. Also, Sheptytsky warned 
that young people would see this event as a heroic act513 and the “unchristian” press 
believed that everything was allowed in politics and there was no need to follow 
Christian teaching.514 Commenting on this sermon, the Greek Catholic newspaper Nyva 
added that the Greek Catholic Church had clearly omitted the national and political side 
of the crime and aimed solely to condemn it from the view of Christian morality.515 Thus, 
the Greek Catholic hierarchy was doing everything possible to minimize the 
radicalization of the Ruthenian national movement and focus all the attention on Catholic 
values such as the priceless value of human live and the importance of morality in 
politics. 
The Greek Catholic Church preferred to stay away from nationalist sentiments 
and tensions between nations. However, Sheptytsky’s official stance against the crime 
was not fully shared either by the Greek Catholic Church or by the national activists, 
among whom there were representatives of the clergy as well. An anonymous priest 
criticized the archbishop in Dilo by saying that the archbishop should not concern 
himself with a political crime.516 In Nyva, a priest responded to this, saying that some 
priests, caught up in a pseudo-patriotic passion, thought that they had a better 
understanding of Christian ethics than their bishops and that the priests role-played as 
national activists: consequently, this pseudo-patriotic clergy saw political motives where 
there were none.517 This rhetoric revealed that nationalism was not an external force that 
the churches had to reckon with, but an internal process that could cause division and 
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even antagonism among the clergy of the same Church. This is why it was so significant 
for the hierarchy to unite the clergy and, through the clergy, the faithful with their 
perception of the assassination.    
For the Greek Catholic hierarchy, the solution for unifying interpretations of the 
assassination lay in condemning the crime and suggesting an alternative way to serve 
the nation. Archbishop Sheptytsky sought to provide a way that would combine Catholic 
and national identities. So the Greek Catholic bishops, in an episcopal letter, emphasized 
that nationality is blessed by God as much as family because the nation is a unity of 
families:518 the “Motherland is after God the most sacred thing for a person; the love for 
the Motherland after the love for God is the best, the highest, and the most beautiful 
feeling.”519 Thus, Sheptytsky was highlighting that serving the nation and the 
Motherland was a holy service dedicated to God and should be free of any crime (“for 
this service it is necessary to have clean hands, without any blood on them”).520 This is 
an essential point because it shows that the Church turned service to one’s own nation 
and Motherland into a strong and even sacred value. The Greek Catholic Church’s views 
were the result of a long-term transformation that began with the idea of enlightening 
parishioners and encouraging them to elect Catholic candidates and culminated in an 
allegiance with the moderate nationalists, the most successful political force. 
For Archbishop Sheptytsky, it was important to state exactly how service to the 
nation should be performed: “it is necessary to serve the nation with love, sacrifice in 
work, virtue, and sanity.”521 This particular vision aimed to be a long-lasting 
manifestation of the relations between Greek Catholic Church and Ruthenian/Ukrainian 
nationality. The words of the archbishop shaped in the desired way the discussion in the 
press on how to contribute to the well-being and future of Ruthenians. Commenting on 
the archbishop’s words, the Greek Catholic newspaper Osnova added the importance of 
education and economic development.522 The other Greek Catholic newspaper, Nyva, 
looking to avoid conflict with the nationalists, emphasized that the role of the Church 
should be limited to keeping society in line with Christian views.523 In other words, the 
Greek Catholic Church hierarchy strengthened the importance of Christianity for 
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politics, but simultaneously underlined the necessity to dissociate oneself from political 
life and especially from tensions between nationalities.  
Certainly, national activists (the journalists of Dilo) and priests with a strong 
national identity did not favor this approach. Sichynsky voiced one of the common 
complaints regarding the neutral position of the Greek Catholic Church. During the trial, 
Sichynsky stated that he was aware that Archbishop Sheptytsky condemned his deed, 
even though Sheptytsky was undoubtedly a Ruthenian patriot. According to Sichynsky, 
the Greek Catholic Church (especially its hierarchy) always had very close ties to state 
authorities, and it was the duty of the Church to condemn actions against the state.524 
Thus, Sichynsky expressed the vision that many national activists had: on the one hand, 
the activists understood that the Catholic Church needed to support the state and its 
representatives while, on the other, the Greek Catholic Church was the proponent of 
national values imbedded in Catholic values. 
The other issue raised by the Greek Catholic Church concerned the clergy’s 
behavior and participation in mass politics. There is a distinct contrast here to the pastoral 
letter of 1907 that advised the clergy to be active in mobilizing peasants and to act as 
defenders of the Ruthenian national.525 After the assassination of the governor in 1908, 
the archbishop instructed the clergy to prioritize the religious sphere; the political-
national sphere needed to be a secondary priority. The latter would not exclude 
participating in political parties so long as the clergy were not used against the Church 
and its discipline. These priorities were supposed to define a new identity for the priests: 
“most important was their Catholic identity, then Ruthenian, and lastly the Ukrainian 
national-democrats or Russophiles (the only parties clergy could belong to).”526 Thus, 
the growing power of the mobilized masses was influencing the Church and required 
adjustments of the latter to new circumstances. In this way, the Greek Catholic clergy 
were supposed to limit their involvement in politics, because rising nationalistic activism 
among the clergy was also dangerous for the Greek Catholic Church. This demonstrated 
the thin line between the clergy’s need to be present in the political domain in order to 
protect Catholicism in politics and the danger of using the Greek Catholic Church’s 
resources for the benefit of a particular ideology (mainly nationalism). 
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In conclusion, spurred by the assassination, the Greek Catholic Church 
developed its own methods and mechanisms for participating in the nation-building 
process. The Church’s most important task was to find a narrative that could place 
nationalist tendencies within a framework of Catholic values. The hierarchy did this 
though assimilating national values (love for the Motherland, the importance of 
nationality) into Christian values and specifying a hierarchy of values by placing the 
Catholic above the national aspects. In this way, religious and national identities did not 
conflict and could only reinforce each other. The other important task facing the Church 
was setting rules for how the clergy should behave in order to unify and strengthen the 
Church’s position among the laity. Finally, the Church’s intention was to stay away from 
nationalist tensions and thus preserve their neutrality. Therefore, the Greek Catholic 
Church did not conflict openly either with the other Catholic Church or with the local 
authorities, made up of Poles. This approach was certainly idealistic and did not always 
work in practice because parish priests could act otherwise.  
While the Church was strengthening the importance of Catholic morality in 
politics, activists like Sichynsky were developing their own vision on what was moral in 
the framework of mass mobilization. During his speech at the trial, Sichynsky stated that 
his moral approach was “Mann für Mann” [Man for Man], which meant that he believed 
the human value of the governor and of the Ukrainian-oriented student was the same 
because both had the same “human dignity.”527 As Sichynsky expected to be hung for 
his crime, he assumed that he had exchanged his life for the life of the governor. 
Sichynsky saw himself as a sacrifice, maybe even a martyr, for the cause of the nation 
because he knew he would receive the death penalty. 
Rhetoric regarding the moral aspect of the crime was particularly evident in the 
pages of the clergy-oriented Nyva and the Literaturno-Naukovyj Visnyk [Literary-
scientific Herald]. Nyva argued that the distinction between just and unjust (moral and 
immoral) killing is determined by the presence or absence of self-defense or whether it 
could be seen as a punishment for a crime (death penalty) and an act to preserve social 
order and ethics.528 From this point of view, the killing of peasants could not be compared 
to killing authority figures because the former was an incident that could be avoided, 
whereas the latter was a planned and fanatical act.529 In this way, religious discourse 
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defended not only the importance of human life, but also a certain social order with a 
specific religious-based morality.  
The writer, historian, and politician Myhailo Hrushevsky contributed to the 
moral discussion of the assassination from a secular perspective. Hrushevsky criticized 
the bishops’ position towards the assassination by stating that their real motives were to 
demonstrate loyalty to the political powers and that they were afraid of losing their 
privileged positions.530 His view represented a new morality that was separate from 
Catholic morality, introducing the idea of the importance of human life in all situations. 
Hrushevsky argued that the governor’s murder was the result of social double standards. 
Society was protecting its ‘order’ while oppressing some of its representatives (in this 
case Ruthenians), thereby creating a sense of hopelessness and despair in those who were 
trying to legally obtain justice.531 According to this view, Sichynsky and his generation 
were attempting to create their own moral code that legitimized Potocki’s killing from a 
moral perspective because it was done in the name of justice. 
As a result, the Greek Catholic Church was challenged by growing nationalism 
and the questioning of the Church’s right to determine morality. Some nationalist clergy 
emphasized the separation between politics and religion and called for more freedom for 
clergy in their political views. The Greek Catholic hierarchy saw such freedom as a 
danger to church unity and morality. Intellectuals like Hrushevsky criticized the Church 
for its double standards and for caring more about the elite and the existing social order 
than about ordinary followers.  
Conclusions 
 
The assassination prompted religious and secular discussion over the morality of murder, 
and the emergence of new values that combined service to God with service to 
nationality. It made it necessary for the Greek Church to create its own visions of the 
limits between political and religious behavior, especially with the increasing 
participation of Christians in public life. In addition, the Greek Catholic hierarchy 
needed to respond to challenges from nationalists and intellectuals of the time in order 
to maintain their influence among the laity. The best solution, in the view of the 
hierarchy, was to limit the clergy’s participation in the nation-building process in order 
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to preserve the Church’s neutrality in political life. As was mentioned in previous case 
studies, active engagement in politics was very dangerous for the Church as an institution 
because it threatened the hierarchy from within.  
Galicia was not a unique place in the Habsburg Empire in terms of witnessing 
displays of violence at the time. Pieter Judson, in his book Guardians of the Nation: 
Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria, analyzes examples of violent 
clashes between Czech and German activists. Judson highlights that the incidents 
themselves were quite minor, but that they managed to produce “political repercussions 
that were felt as far away as Prague and Vienna and at the highest levels of 
government.”532 The cases of Horucko and Koropets were discussed in parliament. The 
interesting observation is that the events in Bohemia researched by Judson happened in 
the same year as the trials of the Galician peasants from the Horucko and Koropets cases 
and the assassination of the governor: thus it is possible to suggest that different 
provinces influenced each other and that they simultaneously started a new way of 
making politics. 
The above case studies contribute to a better understanding of the role of the 
Catholic churches in the Austrian Empire and in Galicia in particular; they reveal how 
the role of the clergy was transformed under the influence of mass mobilization and 
violence. The Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic churches emphasized the necessity 
of the clergy’s active participation in the political life of their parishioners while still 
preserving distance from political parties and limiting the clergy’s ability to manifest 
their personal political preferences. This strategy was intended to preserve the influence 
and control of the clergy over the politicization and mobilization of the laity and 
simultaneously to avoid clashes rooted in political differences amongst the clergy or 
between the clergy and laity. In some cases, this approach was effectively implemented 
(the case of Koropiec), while in others it was not (the case of Horucko). The reason for 
this difference lay in the complexity of clergy-lay relations in Galicia. 
With regards to the relations between the clergy and the laity, there was a major 
transformation from the rather traditional and respectful vision of the clergy to one that 
contested their role. Under the influence of political and social changes, the laity become 
more critical towards their pastors and therefore demanded that the clergy participate in 
public debates and suggest effective responses to the challenges of the time. The cases 
of violence are excellent examples of how such challenges played out and how the 
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churches managed to handle them. As most of the events happened in Eastern Galicia, 
the Greek Catholic Church was mostly tasked with providing effective and fast solutions 
to the threats coming from inside (the political preferences of the clergy) and outside 
(the agitation of different political forces) of the Church. When the Greek Catholic 
Church feared the threat of socialists and radicals, the clergy suggested an alternative, 
Christian socialism and radicalism; when the nationalist movement became the most 
influential one, the Church emphasized the importance of love for the Motherland and 
service to the nation. 
This accommodating nature of the Church’s behavior was a crucial 
demonstration that both churches were not outside the influence of the nationalization 
process or the politicization of public life: rather, they were actually trying to be an 
influential actor in these processes. The most important task for the Greek Catholic 
Church, especially after the killing of the governor, was to re-contextualize national 
tendencies within a framework of Catholic values. This was done by assimilating 
national values (love for the Motherland, the importance of the nation) into Christian 
values. The Roman Catholic strategy was the same. Thereby, religious and national 
identities did not conflict and could reinforce each other. Certainly, this was not an easy 
task to manage, and very often the ‘disease of the crowd’ was much stronger than the 
social hierarchy or the importance of Christian values.  
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Final Conclusions 
 
At the turn of the century, Galicia was influenced by historical transformations relevant 
to the whole Austro-Hungarian Empire. These phenomena included modernization, the 
radicalization of political movements, the emergence of political violence, increasing 
mass participation of citizens in public and political life, the development of the nation-
building process and the widening autonomy of the provinces. These processes resulted 
in challenges for both Roman and Greek Catholics in a region where religious identity 
and the sense of belonging to either the Greek Catholic or the Roman Catholic churches 
remained an important marker in social relationships.  
Both Catholic rites experienced similar challenges during mass mobilization: 
however, the churches managed them in parallel because of the differences in rite, 
language and social position. The priests of both rites acted as leaders of village 
communities by getting involved in mass rallies, being drawn into conflicts with local 
officials and, through their pastoral roles, actively influencing their laity. The clergy 
stated to their parishes that they felt responsible for caring for the good of the laity. 
Simultaneously, the motivation of the clergies stemmed from a need to adjust political 
and social ideas within Catholic doctrine to keep pace with changing circumstances. 
Both the Roman and Greek Catholic churches were loyal to the government, objected to 
violent or illegal actions and tried to prevent or limit the spread of socialist ideas.  
The clergy in mass mobilization movements 
The manifestations of mass mobilization discussed in this thesis are mass participation, 
the appearance of new identities and tensions between the secular and religious spheres. 
These displays were manifested in mass events such as strikes, celebrations and 
elections. The agricultural strike in 1902 was one of the first important opportunities for 
priests to explore their potential as secular leaders. The priests were often mediators in 
negotiations with landowners, as well as guardians of the peace in the villages. The 
clergy managed both roles successfully and gained experience and trust for the future 
moderation of mass events. The upper hierarchies of both rites emphasized how 
important it was for parish priests to regulate and control their laity in the secular sphere. 
Such regulation was a significant opportunity to build better and closer connections in 
the community and prevent possible conflicts between the secular and social spaces. 
Thus, social and political practices remained in touch with religious practices: they 
intersected and mutually influenced each other. For example, the majority of mass rallies 
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started and ended with a prayer or service and with the priests being the speakers or 
moderators of proceedings. 
When the planned franchise reform was announced in 1906, the Catholic Church 
decided to support it: parochial clergy from across the empire were among the first to 
explain the meaning of the reform to the laity and to encourage them to support it. This 
was a new step that enabled the Catholic Church to position itself in the midst of mass 
mobilization and to develop its own way of participating in mass events. At this stage, 
the language and religious differences in Galicia became decisive when choosing which 
political program or party to support, as both rites had a certain number of representatives 
to elect. 
The Catholic mobilization of women 
If enfranchising men caused the Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic clergies to have 
similar reactions, their attitudes to women’s roles within society was slightly different. 
This difference was caused by two factors: the Roman Catholic laity consisted of both 
peasant and urban women, while the Greek Catholic Church was dominated by ‘clerical 
women’, the wives, sisters or daughters of priests who were widely involved in church 
life. Greek Catholic women from clerical families were educated to be an example for 
local women by supporting the active participation of their husbands in social and 
political life and by promoting ideas of education, particularly Catholic ones. Roman 
Catholic women were more active in the cities and worked there on educating and 
supporting working girls and women in order to engage them more actively in urban 
moral and cultural life.  
The actions performed by women activists in Galicia were typical for Catholic 
women in other provinces, who often sent petitions to Vienna to achieve support for their 
educational initiatives (like schools for girls or kindergartens). The particularity of 
Galicia was the presence of ‘clerical women’, who, together with their families, worked 
on involving peasants in the public domain. Both churches saw the potential of women, 
especially in terms of their importance in the sacral sphere and their utility in influencing 
the choice of their husbands when actively participating in elections. 
The probation of social Catholicism 
The clergy of both rites intended to entwine emerging political visions with Catholic 
views and ideals. The Roman Catholic priest Stanislaw Stojalowski was the most 
successful leader when it came to combining national and social ideas with Catholicism. 
His agitation demonstrates the immense potential of Catholicism within politics and 
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shows how, by becoming increasingly drawn into the spheres of power and influence 
that had hitherto been largely secular, the Church was now linked to mass mobilization. 
Stojalowski used a variety of mass mobilization tools to combine Catholicism 
with the social needs of the time, like education for the peasants, improving their 
economic position, developing a cooperative movement and struggling for wider civil 
rights. Stojalowski highlighted his intention to follow the policies of Pope Leo XIII and 
Karl Lueger on Galician soil and managed to gather a wide group of supporters. 
However, he was not very successful at building a network of activists and ran into 
problems because of his numerous conflicts with the ecclesiastical and secular 
authorities. Nonetheless, Stojalowski’s political activity remains an excellent illustration 
of how to construct, spread and succeed in political mobilization by combining the 
sacred and the secular. 
Anti-semitism, a component of social Catholicism, also had a special place in the 
agitation of Stojalowski, as well as in Lueger’s. Jews, as a third large and non-Catholic 
group of the province, provoked much attention in the process of mass mobilization. In 
particular, the attitude towards the Jews was negative and, in the case of some political 
activists like Stojalowski, openly hostile. Stojalowski’s newspapers encouraged boycotts 
of Jewish shops and goods as well as other kinds of non-violent actions against Jews. 
Violent acts were criticized because the organizers could be jailed. In the view of the 
clergy of both churches, Jews were also a reason for heavy drinking: thus, the laity 
should resist taverns or having any other business with Jews. The clergy of other 
provinces shared a similar attitude.533 With the growing nationalization of the churches, 
the relationship with Jews only worsened. In the following decades of the 20th century, 
these anti-semitic attitudes deepened the confrontation between Catholics and non-
Catholics throughout the empire. 
Stojalowski managed to perfectly combine the increase of political rights with 
national ideas to influence the secular life of Roman Catholics, especially when it came 
to encouraging peasants to participate in public life. The skillful combination of Catholic 
values with patriotic ones initiated the nationalization of the Catholic Church in Galicia 
and the sacralisation of the idea of the nation over the next few decades, which was 
typical for Greek Catholics as well. Thus, the intersection of different identities in 
Stojalowski’s agitation only reinforced them and contributed to his popularity.  
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The strong emphasis on national identity and conflicts with representatives of the 
Church and the state were among the factors that blocked the development of social 
Catholicism in Galicia. Stojalowski used Lueger’s ideas and popularity to promote his 
own party, but he did not manage to achieve similar success, as he seemed more focused 
on the national background of his followers and his own popularity than on developing 
a strong network of leaders. The personality of Stojalowski was too controversial to unite 
even the representatives of the same church and nationality, so there was no way to 
involve the other rite in his movement. 
At the same time, the political activity of Stojalowski was exemplary for other 
activists and clergy in the province. Explicitly or implicitly, Stojalowski’s critical 
approach to the church hierarchy and the involvement of the Vatican or Vienna in his 
conflicts in Galicia encouraged other representatives of clergy to do the same, like the 
Greek Catholic priests Bachynskyj (appealed to the Vatican) and Petryckyj (petitioned 
the Ministry of the Interior). Thus, Stojalowski managed to initiate changes in the 
relations between the secular authorities and the parochial clergy and inspired priests to 
act more independently. 
Clergy vs. local administration: a new struggle for power 
When the clergy actively combined secular and religious leadership roles in their 
communities, they often came into conflict with local administrators or secular 
administrative processes. The priests of the Habsburg Empire had control over certain 
aspects of their parishioners’ lives due to their closer relations with peasants; they were 
therefore able to use this relationship for political or personal gain. At the same time, the 
secular authorities were dependent on the clergy to provide population data and fulfill 
other social duties. The secular duties of priests provided them a space to exert certain 
influences or pressures on officials and their own laity. These social roles had the 
potential to extend church influence and power but coincided with a time when the laity 
was recognizing and exercising their potential power as a more politically active social 
group. At this time, the laity, constituted by peasants and workers throughout the empire, 
was becoming increasingly demanding and active in attempting to claim greater reform, 
which brought them into conflict with secular power structures. With priests holding 
sacral influence over their laity while also being instrumental to the secular authorities, 
it was inevitable that the priesthood would become embroiled in conflicts. Thus, the 
complexity of changing social and political factors during this period changed the 
dynamics of relations in communities and led to conflicts between secular and religious 
representatives of power. 
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In Galicia, the conflict between the priest and the local administration (starosta) 
frequently began apolitically and gradually took on political and national perspectives. 
Both the representatives of the Church and the state were often in competition for power 
and influence over the peasants. The parishioners, intelligentsia and the press took an 
increasingly active role in developing and escalating this struggle. Simultaneously, the 
peasants began to understand that they were at the core of the competition between 
clergy and local administrators and started to influence this competition in their own 
way. In some cases, the laity defended the priest against accusations from the starosta, 
while in others they demanded the replacement of their priest. Parishioners threatened 
the ecclesiastical authorities in an attempt to have their demands fulfilled. Legal 
proceedings in which both priests and peasants were involved served as important factors 
for mobilizing participants to play an active role in defending their own convictions. 
Relations inside village communities were changing because widening political 
rights, which resulted in intensifying the competition for power. With the development 
of the mass mobilization process, loyalty to priests and local officials was put into 
question. The laity had could pick new identities, support certain political parties, and 
trust specific sources of information, either sacral or secular. Thus, not only local 
officials but also priests and other church authorities were questioned and needed to 
demonstrate that they had a solution to the social and political problems of their 
followers.  
The Catholic churches and violence in mass mobilization 
Violent clashes were another form of mass participation that combined secular and 
religious tensions and showed the potential of new ideas and identities in politics to 
mobilize the citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The specificity of such events 
was to have a long-lasting effect and provoked a wide discussion in the public domain. 
Additionally, different political powers used such events to shape society and gain 
popularity. 
A close analysis of violent clashes during the Galician elections reveals how 
priorities in the interpretation of violence changed between 1897 and 1907. In 1897, the 
laity protected and supported the parochial clergy against the accusations of gendarmes 
and the local administration. Simultaneously, the clergy focused on explaining to the 
peasantry why it was important to participate in elections. By 1907, after years of 
increasing mass mobilization, the relationship between the priest and laity had shifted. 
For example, in 1907 the laity became more critical towards priests and were even ready 
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to physically attack them (in the case of Horucko). Similar political views between the 
clergy and laity proved to be, in some cases, an important factor in garnering sympathy 
and support towards the clergy. The manner in which violent events were interpreted in 
the press and public domain also changed in this decade. In the 1890s, the Galician press 
focused on describing the unfair position of peasants in society: this shifted to discussing 
the unfair position of the national group in 1907-08.  
The culmination of the violent tensions was the assassination of the governor of 
the province in 1908. The assassination caused an intense reaction in both religious 
communities and provoked a discussion on the importance of moral and Catholic service 
to the nation. At the same time, the hierarchy of the Church was deeply concerned with 
the active involvement of the clergy in the nation-building process. The Church aimed 
to preserve overall neutrality in the political sphere, as an excessive engagement in 
politics could threaten the hierarchy of the Church from within. Thus, the Greek Catholic 
and Roman Catholic churches searched for a balance between the clergy participating 
actively in the political life of their parishioners and the preservation of distance from 
political parties that could turn the clergy into political agitators. This strategy was 
intended to preserve the influence and control of the clergy over the politicization and 
mobilization of the laity while avoiding clashes rooted in political differences. The laity, 
however, demanded that the clergy participate in public debates and suggest effective 
responses to the challenges of the times. Thus, the churches were not outside the 
influence of the nationalization process or the politicization of public life, but were an 
influential actor in them.  
The active position of the churches in mass mobilization aimed to guarantee the 
defeat of socialism or other anti-clerical movements and maintain the close ties between 
the secular and religious spheres. In comparison to other provinces, the Catholic Church 
in Galicia, with its different rites, was often torn apart from within, while its 
representatives were involved in violent clashes. However, the Church managed to 
distance itself from the political interpretation of violence and emphasize the moral side 
of it. Due to this strategy, the Catholic Church remained very influential in the province, 
even after the end of Habsburg Empire and the dissolution of Galicia in 1939. It has 
continued to be an important agent in the political and social space to this very day. The 
mechanism of this success was developed and tested at the beginning of mass 
mobilization and continued into the new century.   
The Catholic churches and the nation-building process 
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The extension of universal male suffrage increased the politicization of the laity and 
presented new challenges to both the religious and secular authorities, with growing 
nationalist and socialist ideas questioning the traditional political dividing lines. The 
secular and religious authorities rarely competed directly against each other, as both 
were aware of the need to redefine their positions, strengthen their existing connections 
and pursue new sources of support. Whilst cooperation between Church and State was 
overall smooth and well established between the upper hierarchs of both bodies, at the 
local level clashes between representatives of the provincial administration and the 
clergy were often unavoidable. Consequently, at a more local level, Church and State 
can be seen to have been in constant, informal competition with each other, and thus an 
uneasy tension often boiled over into conflict. In pursuit of maintaining influence and 
redefining their position (so as to retain support), the priests of both Catholic churches 
utilized the opportunities presented by the close connections between religious and 
national identities.  
These national distinctions held the potential to cause further tension between 
the two rites and between the Polish and Ruthenian nationalists. National ideas shaped 
the relations between clergy and their laity: both sides became more and more involved 
in the question of which nation they belonged to. The national idea was becoming a 
dominant one in the new 20th century because it offered a solution to social and economic 
issues (such as overcoming inequality in access to power and the opportunity to build 
their own states or autonomous regions with a fairer form of government) and easily 
matched Christian values and religious practices.  
In first decade of the 20th century, the clergy of the Greek and Roman Catholic 
churches had already built close relationships with their laity whilst also being 
influenced by national ideas. In the next few decades, this became visible during the 
Polish-Ukrainian struggle after the fall of the empire in 1918 and in the new Polish state. 
Later, the Greek Catholic Church became the guardian of Ukrainian identity, while the 
Roman Catholic Church defended the Polish one. Similar processes of nationalization in 
the Catholic churches were typical for other provinces. The particularity of Galicia lay 
in the variety of religious groups, its borderland position and the presence of a contested 
territory where at least two nationalities planned to build their own national states. A 
fruitful angle for further research could be a focus on the Habsburg legacy, in particular 
with regards to the active role of the Catholic Church in the public sphere, its cooperation 
with the secular authorities in the new nation-states and relations between different 
religious groups. 
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Future research on the churches’ role in the mobilization process at the time of 
dissolution of the Austrian Empire and the emergence of the Polish state could provide 
a more detailed picture of the political and social role of the Catholic Church in building 
public societies and nation-states. After the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy, Galicia 
became an even more intense subject of struggle between the Poles and the Ukrainians. 
The occasional violence at the beginning of the century turned into everyday clashes 
during the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1918-19. Such circumstances were extremely 
challenging for the Catholic Church. On one hand, Catholics were involved in both sides 
of the conflict, but, on the other, the October Revolution in Russia that brought the 
Bolsheviks to power on the border of Galicia was even more dangerous to the Catholic 
Church. Further research on the role of rite in Galicia will be very beneficial, as it will 
reveal how relations between national communities and rites were modified during state- 
and nation-building. Some steps in this direction have already been taken by the 
Ukrainian historian Liliana Gentosh in her research Vatykan i vyklyky modernosti. 
Skhidnoyevropeys'ka polityka papy Benedykta XV ta ukrayins'ko-pol's'kyy konflikt u 
Galychyni (1914-1923) [The Vatican and the Challenges of Modernity. The East 
European Policy of Pope Benedict XVI and Ukrainian-Polish Conflict in Galicia (1914-
1923)]. However, there are still a lot of uncovered questions. From my perspective, it 
would be extremely useful to research deeply how the relations between clergy and the 
local administration continued to change, especially after the disappearance of the 
arbitration of the multinational empire.  
The processes of mass mobilization that occurred in the first decade of the 20th 
century opened a new page for the Catholic Church, one that was full of opportunities in 
political and social life. Across Europe, political Catholicism was one of the strongest 
movements in a variety of contexts.534 In Galicia, the Church not only maintained its 
strong influence, but reinforced it for future decades. The clergy of Galicia, as well as in 
other parts of Europe, embraced the ideas of Rerum Novarum and social Catholicism. 
The construction of national states intensified the nationalization of different parts of the 
Catholic Church and brought its laity to the point of even more conflict. However, the 
practices of mass mobilization established at the beginning of the century continued to 
work and prosper. 
                                                          
534 Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway, Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1965, (Oxford, 1996),  1.  
Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway also highlighted that “the structures, mentality, and character of 
Catholicism differed markedly in individual states of Europe as a consequence of a rich heritage of 
historical factors.”. Buchanan, Conway, Political Catholicism, 8. 
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The Catholic Church continued to play an important role in the public domain 
during the crisis and war that started in 1914. This was possible because of the mass 
mobilization experience between the 1890s and the 1910s. During food and supply 
shortages, humanitarian disasters and, especially, the occupation by the Russian Empire 
in 1914, the Catholic Church provided the kind of support that all other institutions could 
not. When the Polish state was formed with the leading participation of the Roman 
Catholic Church, the position of Greek Catholics worsened: however, while both 
churches continued to promote the idea of a connection between a specific rite and 
nationality, the need for Catholics of both rites to remain tolerant towards each other 
continued to be emphasized.   
The experience of mass mobilization in the fin de siècle proved to be very fruitful 
for the clergy and laity of both churches in terms of providing responses to the challenges 
of a politicizing world. Thanks to their active involvement in social and political 
questions, the representatives and laities of the churches cooperated and influenced each 
other in order to build a new type of relationship necessary for modernizing Europe. As 
a result, the Catholic churches managed to remain influential in the territory of Galicia 
for the entirety of the 20th century. 
182 
 
Bibliography 
 
Archival sources 
 
Archivio Segreto Vaticano [The Vatican Secret Archives], Rapporti politici, 
prevalentemente riguardanti le questioni d’Austria (1904-1911), Fond 733, 
fascia 1.  
Tsentral'nyy derzhavnyy istorychnyy arkhiv Ukrayiny y Lvovi [Central State Historical 
Archive of Ukraine in Lviv], Galician Vice-Regency, Fond 146, opys 4. 
 
Published sources 
 
“Arhypastyrskoe neblagorazumye” [A bishop’s imprudence], Galychanin, June 9, 1907. 
Baudouin de Courtenay, Romualda. Sylwetki polityczne: ksiądz Stanisław Stojałowski, 
Ignacy Daszyński, Jakób Bojko, Jan Stapiński, Karol Lewakowski. Kraków, 
1897. 
“Chogo Hochut Radycaly?” [What do the radicals want?], Nyva, December 15, 1908. 
“Сhyya Vyna?” [Whose Fault?], Nyva, September 15, 1906. 
“Czy zrobili co dobrego?” [Have we done something good?], Wieniec-Pszczolka, May 
5, 1907.  
“Demonstracye we Lwowie” [Demonstrations in Lviv], Czas, April 14, 1908. 
“Deshcho pro zhinoche pytannya” [Something about the woman question], Nyva, 
December 15, 1912 
“Do fiziognomii' social'noi' demokratii'” [To the physiognomy of social democracy], 
Nyva, July, 15, 1907.  
“Do hvyli” [To the wave], Nyva, October 15, 1907. 
“Do polek” [To Polish women], Niewiasta, January 19, 1908 
“Dopys z krugiv duhovenstva: hto vynen” [Message from clergy circles: Who is to 
blame], Dilo, May 31, 1907. 
“Epitaph” Wieniec-Pszczolka, October 6, 1907. 
“Epyskop odnoj partyy” [The bishop of one party], Galychanin, March 27, 1907. 
Feldman, Wilhelm. Stronnictwa i programy polityczne w Galicyi 1846-1906. Kraków, 
1907. 
“Feuilleton”, Nasha Dolia [Our Fate] 3, (1896). Last modified November 25, 2017, 
http://anno.onb.ac.at/cgicontent/annoplus?aid=zbi&datum=1896&page=5&size=55 
“Galicyjscy ‘antysemici’” [Galician ‘anti-Semites’] Wieniec-Pszczolka, September 14, 
1902. 
“Golosy z Krugiv Dyhovenstva” [Voices from clergy circles], Nyva, May 1, 1908, June 
1, 1908. 
“Gorutskij process” [Horucko’s trial], Galychanin, October 30, 1907, October 31, 1907, 
February 7, 1908, February 11, 1908. 
Grushevski, Mykhailo. “Krov” [Blood], Literaturno-naukovyj visnyk [Literary-scientific 
Herald] 5, (1908). 
“Horucko v svitli pravdy” [Horucko in the light of the truth], Dilo, July 15, 1907, July 
16, 1907. 
“Jeshhe v spravi nashoi' organizacii'” [More about our organization], Nyva, August 1, 
1907. 
“Khlops’ki Strayky” [Peasants’ strikes] Dilo, July, 17, 1902. 
“Kil'ka uvag pid hvylju” [Several notes for the wave], Nyva, February 1, 1906. 
“Koropec'ki podii' pered sudom” [The events in Koropiec in the trial], Dilo, February 
19, 1908, October 21, 1908, October 22, 1908, October 23, 1908. 
“Krovavi podii' v Davydovi i rozruhy u L'vovi” [Bloody events in Dawidów and the 
violence in Lemberg], Dilo, March 13, 1897. 
183 
 
“Krwawe zajscia w Horucku” [Bloody occurence in Horucko], Glos narodu, May 28, 
1907. 
Ksiądz  Stojałowski  w  świetle  swoich  własnych  słów  i  listów.  Przyczynek  do  historii 
Galicji.  Londyn  1898. 
“Kurenda vseopreosvyashchenoho mytropolyta” [Kurenda of His Eminence, the 
Metropolitan], Ruslan, July, 30, 1902. 
“Leon XIII umarł!” [Leo XIII died], Wieniec-Pszczolka July 26, 1903. 
“List Pasterski Biskupow Ruskich” [The pastoral letter of the Ruthenian bishops], Czas, 
May 9, 1908. 
“Memorial zhydachivs'kogo povitu do kardynala mytropolyta” [The appeal of 
Zhudachiv district to the Cardinal and Archbishop], Dilo, April 3, 1897. 
“Mowa ks.Posła St. Stojałowskiego” [The speech of priest deputy Stanislaw 
Stojalowski], Wieniec-Pszczolka, August 31, 1902. 
“Myroslav Sichyns'kyj pered sudom” [Miroslav Sichynsky at the trial], Dilo, June 30, 
1908, July 1, 1908. 
“Mytropolyt gr. Sheptytski pro Atentat” [Archbishop Count Sheptytsky about murder], 
Dilo, April 25, 1908. 
“Na chasi” [On the time], Nyva, May 15, 1907. 
“Na smert!” [For death!], Dilo, July 1, 1908. 
“Ne Vbyi” [Do not kill], Nyva, November 1, 1908. 
“Nowy  trzydziesty trzeci  rok” [New 33rd year], Wieniec-Pszczolka, January 6, 1907.  
“Obrachunek  polityciny” [Political account], Wieniec-Pszczolka, January 10, 1904.  
“Obrachunek  polityczny  po  29  latach” [Political account after 29 years], Wieniec-
Pszczolka, January 3, 1904. 
“Ostateczny  wynik  wyborów  w  Galicyi” [The final result of the Galician elections], 
Wieniec-Pszczolka, June 9, 1907. 
“Pastyrs'ke poslannja” [The bishop’s letter], Ruslan, April 20, 1907, April, 23 1907, 
April 24, 1907. 
Perlmutter, Salomea. “Polozenie lwowskich robotnic chrzescijanskich,” Nowe slowo 8, 
20, (Krakow). 
“Płonne  obawy” [Poignant fears] Wieniec-Pszczolka, March 18, 1906. 
“Po Zasudi” [After the Condemnation], Osnova, July 9, 1908. 
“Pochalysja ‘Galyc'ki vybory’” [The Galician elections have started], Osnova, February 
12, 1908. 
“Pogromy Rysuniv u Lvovi” [Pogroms of Ruthenians in Lviv], Dilo, April 14, 1908. 
“Pogrzeb Namiestnika” [The funeral of the governor], Glos Narodu, April 16, 1908. 
“Povyborchyj Proces o Paragrafi 308” [Court trial after elections according to paragraph 
308], Dilo, April 20, 1897. 
“Praca zarobkowa a kobieta” [Earning work and a woman], Niewiasta polska, February 
27, 1910. 
“Pravda o ukraynskom epyskope” [The truth about the Ukrainian bishop], Galychanin, 
April 9, 1907, April 10, 1907, April 11, 1907, April 12, 1907, April 13, 1907. 
“Proces Davydovs'kyj,” Dilo, May 31, 1897, June 5, 1897, June 8, 1897, June 9, 1897. 
“Proces o. Aleksandra Rotka” [The trial of the priest Aleksandr Rotko], Dilo, September 
6, 1897. 
“Proces o.Andrija Sumyka” [The trial of the priest Andrij Sumyk], Dilo, August 25, 
1897. 
“Proces o.Jeronima Barysha” [The trial of the priest Jeronim Barysh], Dilo, July 2, 1897. 
“Proekt vyborchoi' reformy zi stanovyshha cerkovnyh i suspl'nyh interesiv” [The project 
of election reform from the perspective of the Church’s and societal interests], 
Nyva, December, 15, 1908. 
“Protses iz-za krest'yanyna Kagantsa v Koroptse” [The process because of the peasant 
Kaganets from Koropec], Galychanin, October 4, 1908. 
184 
 
“Przebudzenia dlia kobiet” [The awakening of a woman], Nyva, September 15, 1911. 
“Reforma supruzhoho zakona” [Reform of marriage law], Osnova, December, 19, 1906. 
“Rozruchy v Dawidówie” [The violence in Dawidów], Czas, March 13, 1897, June 11, 
1897. 
“Ruś dla Rusi” [Ruthenia for Russia], Pszczółka April 1, 1897. 
Sheptyts'kyi, Andrei. Monumento Ucrainae Histórica, 14 vol. (Rome, 1964), vol. 14. 
Sidor, Michal. “W sprawie udzialu duchowienstwa w zyciu politycznem I spolecznem” 
[On the participation of the clergy in political and social life], Gazeta koscielna, 
March 6, 1908. 
Skorowidz wszystkich miejscowości z przysiółkami w Królestwie Galicyi, Wielkim 
Księstwem Krakowskim i Księstwie Bukowińskim [Index of all villages with 
hamlets in the Kingdom of Galicia, the Grand Duchy of Krakow and the Grand 
Duchy of Bukowina]. Lwów 1918. 
“Slovo pro klerykaliv” [Aword about clericals], Ruslan, May 12, 1907. 
Słownik geograficzny Królestwa Polskiego i innych krajów słowiańskich [Geographical 
Dictionary of Polish Kingdom and other Slavic countries]. Warszawa 1880-1914. 
“Sobytija v Horucku” [The event in Horucko], Galychanin, May 29, 1908. 
Stojałowski, Stanisław. “Stanowisko polityczne chrześcijańsko-ludowego stronnictwa: 
pierwsza mowa posła X. Stanisława Stojałowskiego wypowiedziana w 
parlamencie wiedeńskim na 8 posiedzeniu nocnem rady państwa z dnia 31 marca 
na 1 kwietnia 1898.” Accessed April 11, 2017. 
http://polona.pl/item/4740011/2/  
Stowarzyszenie Sług Katoliczek pod wezwaniem św. Zyty [the Association of the Catholic 
Servants of St. Zyta]. Niewiasta polska, January 20, 1904. 
“Straykovi Spravy” [Strikes’ deeds], Ruslan, July, 26, 1902. 
“Stronnictwo  chrześcijańsko-ludowe“ [Christian People’s Party] Wieniec-Pszczolka, 
March 15, 1908. 
Teodorowicz, Józef. “Enuncyacye wskutek reform wyborczej” [Enuncyacye as a result 
of electoral reform], Przeglad powszechny, 153 (1907). 
Teodorowicz, Józef. “Wobec zblizajacych sie wyborow w Galicji” [In view of the 
upcoming elections in Galicia], Przeglad powszechny 154, (1907): 1-23. 
Ts-skyy, Hnat. “Zadachi svyashchenychoho zhinotstva v nashiy tserkovno-suspil'niy 
pratsi”  [The tasks of the priestly women in our church social work] Nyva, June 
15, 1911, July 1, 1911, September 1, 1911. 
“Ubijstvo Namisnyka: Mytropolycha Propovid a Literaturno-Naukovyj Visnyk” [The 
killing of the governor: the sermon of the rchbishop and the Literary-scientific 
Herald], Nyva, August 1, 1908. 
“Ubytje namisnyka gr.Potoc'kogo” [The killing of the governor Count Potocky], 
Osnova, April 17, 1908. 
“V Spravi Napasti Dila na Mytropolyta” [About the accusation of the archbishop by 
Dilo], Nyva, September 1, 1908. 
Volianskyj, Onufriy. “V spravi relihiynoho usvidomlyuvannya nashoho 
svyashchenychoho zhinotstva” [On the religious awareness of our priestly 
women], Nyva, June 15, 1909. 
“W sprawie reform wyborczej“ [Due to the reform of the election], Gazeta koscielna,  
November, 16, 1908. 
Wołczański, Józef, ed. Listy ks. Stanisława Stojałowskiego do arcybiskupa Józefa 
Bilczewskiego z lat 1901-1902. Kraków: Instytut Wydawniczy Księży 
Misjonarzy "Nasza Przeszłość", 1998. 
“Wyborcze “naduzycia”” [Election abuses], Glos narodu, June 15, 1907. 
“Wybory do Sejmu” [The elections to the Sejm], Gazeta koscielna, February 14, 1908. 
“Z  Nowym  Rokiem  1908” [Happy New Year 1908], Wieniec-Pszczolka, January 1, 
1908. 
185 
 
“Z krugiv duhovenstva: po vyborah” [From the circles of the clergy: after the election], 
Dilo, June, 14, 1907. 
“Z powodu ostatnich wyborow do sejmu” [Due to the recent elections to the Sejm], 
Gazeta koscielna, April 10, 1908. 
“Z pryvodu zahodiv kolo stvorennja klerykal'noi' partii'” [About the idea of establishing 
a clerical party], Dilo, October 30, 1907. 
“Zamitky nad proektom zasnovannja klerykal'noi' partii'” [Notes about the project of the 
establishment of a clerical party], Dilo, November 14, 1907. 
“Zi Sviatom Voskresennia” [With the Resurrection], Osnova, April 23, 1908. 
 
 
Secondary literature: 
 
Adelsgruber, Paulus, Cohen, Laurie and Kuzmany, Börries. Getrennt und doch 
verbunden: Grenzstädte zwischen Österreich und Russland 1772–1918. Wien, 
2011. 
Arkusha, Olena. “Andzhei Pototskyi: Biohrafiia Polityka na Tli Ukrainsko-Polskykh 
Vidnosyn. Chastyna II: Halytskyi namisnyk” [Andrzej Potocki: the biography of 
the politician in the context of Ukrainian-Polish relations. Part II: The Galician 
governor]. Visnyk LNY 45, (2010): 169-282. 
http://clio.lnu.edu.ua/Vipusk_45_files/45_169-282.pdf  
Bartal, Israel and Polonsky, Antony ed. Focusing  on  Galicia:  Jews,  Poles,  and 
Ukrainians, 1772–1918. Portland, 1999. 
Bayly, C. A.The birth of the modern world, 1780-1914: global connections and 
comparisons. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2004. 
Babiński, Grzegosz. Pogranicze Polsko-Ukraińskie: Etniczność, Zróżnicowanie 
Religijne, Tożsamość [Polish Ukrainian borderland: ethnicity, religious diversity, 
identity]. Kraków, 1997. 
Binder, Harald. “Galizien in Wien. Parteien, Wahlen, Fraktionen und Abgeordnete im 
Übergang zur Massenpolitik.” Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 40. Wien 2005. 
Berenger, Jean. A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1700-1918. London, 1997. 
Bremer, Thomas. “Introduction” in Religion and the Conceptual Boundary in Central 
and Eastern Europe: Encounters of Faiths, edited by Thomas Bremer. Palgrave, 
2008. 
Bohachevsky-Chomiak, Martha. Feminists despite themselves: women in Ukrainian 
community life, 1884-1939. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 
University of Alberta, 1988 
Boyer, John W. “Political Catholicism in Austria, 1880-1960”, in Religion in Austria, 
edited by Gtinter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, Hermann Denz. New Brunswick, 2005. 
Boyer, John. “Power, Partisanship, and the Grid of Democratic Politics: 1907 as the 
Pivot Point of Modern Austrian History.” Austrian History Yearbook 44 (2013): 
148-174. 
Buchanan, Tom and Conway, Martin. Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1965. 
Oxford, 1996. 
Buchen, Tim. “Religiöse Mobilisierung im Reich.” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 40 
(2014). 
Buchen, Tim. Antisemitismus in Galizien. Agitation, Gewalt und Politik gegen Juden in 
der Habsburgermonarchie um 1900, [Antisemitism in Galicia. Agitation, 
Violence, and Politics against Jews in Fin-de-siecle Habsburg Monarchy]. 
Berlin: Metropol, 2012. 
Buzalka, Juraj. Nation and Religion: the Politics of Commemoration in South-East 
Poland. LIT, 2006. 
Casanova, José. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago, 1994. 
186 
 
Chadwick, Owen. A History of the Popes 1830-1914. Oxford, 1998. 
Cohen, Gary B. “Nationalist Politics and the Dynamics of State and Civil Society in the 
Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914”. Central European History, Vol. 40, no. 2 
(2007): 241-278. 
Chyra-Rolicz, Zofia. Kościół katolicki a ruch kobiecy przed 1939 rokiem. Społeczno 
kulturalna działalność Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce XIX i XX wieku, edited by 
Regina Renz, Marta Pawlina-Meducka. Kieleckie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1994. 
Colloti, Enzo. “Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, Socialism and Political Catholicism as 
Expressions of Mass Politics in the Twentieth Century” in Fin de Siècle and its 
Legacy, edited by Mikulas Teich and Roy Porter. Cambridge, 1990. 
Choliy, Serhiy. Mobilizatsiya na peryferiyi. Viyskovyy obov'yazok yak faktor 
modernizatsiyi imperiyi Habsburhiv 1868-1914. Kyiv, 2016. 
Davie, Grace. Religion in Modern Europe: a Memory Mutates. Oxford, 2000. 
David, Katherine. “Czech Feminists and Nationalism in the Late Habsburg Monarchy: 
"The First in Austria."” Journal of women’s history 3, (1991): 26-45. 
Demkovych-Dobrians'kyi, Mykhailo.  Ukra'ins'ko-pol's'ki stosunky u XIX storichchi. 
Munich, 1969. 
Fidelis, Malgorzata. “"Participation in the Creative Work of the Nation:" Polish Women 
Intellectuals in the Cultural Construction of Female Gender Roles, 1864-1890.” 
Journal of Women's History 13 (Spring 2001): 108-125. 
Fiołek, Krzysztof, Stala, Marian, ed. Kraków i Galicja wobec przemian cywilizacyjnych 
(1866–1914). Kraków, 2011. 
Francikova, Dasa. “Female Friends in Nineteenth-Century Bohemia: Troubles with 
Affectionate Writing and "Patriotic Relationships."” Journal of Women's History 
12 (Autumn 2000): 23-28. 
Frank, Alison, Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia. London, 2007. 
Foret, François and Itçaina, Xabier. “Introduction.” In Politics of Religion in Western 
Europe: Modernities in Conflict?, edited by Francois Foret and Xabier Itçaina. 
London, 2011. 
Hann, Chris M. “The limits of Galician syncretism: pluralism, multiculturalism and the 
two Catolicism.” In Galicia: a multicultured land, edited by Chris Hann and Paul 
Robert Magosci. Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2005. 
Himka, John-Paul. “Dimensions of a Triangle: Polish-Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in 
Austrian Galicia.” Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry 12 (London, 1999): 25-48. 
Himka, John-Paul. Priests and Peasants: The Greek Catholic Pastor and the Ukrainian 
National Movement in Austria, 1867-1900. Cambridge, 1986. 
Himka, John-Paul. The Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian Society in Austrian 
Galicia. Cambridge, 1986. 
Himka, John-Paul. Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: the Greek Catholic 
Church and the Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867-1900. Montreal, 
1999. 
Himka, John-Paul. Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the 
Nineteenth Century. Macmillan press, 1988. 
Himka J.-P. Socialism in Galicia. The Emergence of Polish Social Democracy and 
Ukrainian Radicalism (1860-1890), Cambridge, 1983. 
Hentosh, Liliana, Vatykan i vyklyky modernosti. Lviv, 2006. 
Hryniuk, Stella, Peasants with promise. Ukrainians in Southeastern Galicia 1880-1900. 
Edmonton, 1991. 
Holub Beata. “Historical-geographical study of the nationalities in Eastern Galicia in the 
light  
 of the population censuses in the years 1890-1910.” Annales UMCS, 
Geographia, Geologia, Mineralogia et Petrographia 2 (2013): 15-40. Last 
accessed August, 30 2017. 
187 
 
 https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Beata_Holub/publication/265292407_Hist
orical-
geographical_study_of_the_nationalities_in_Eastern_Galicia_in_the_light_of_t
he_population_censuses_in_the_years_1890-
1910/links/5429ce240cf277d58e86fed3/Historical-geographical-study-of-the-
nationalities-in-Eastern-Galicia-in-the-light-of-the-population-censuses-in-the-
years-1890-1910.pdf?origin=publication_list  
Janta, Aleksander. We Lwowie, Pewnej Palmowej Niedzieli [In Lviv on specific Palm 
Sunday]. Warsaw, 1982. 
Jobst, Kerstin S. “Die antisemitischen Bauernunruhen im westlichen Galizien 1898. 
Stojałowski und die polnischen Sozialdemokraten.” In Zwischen Abgrenzung 
und Assimilation. Deutsche, Polen und Juden.Schauplätze ihres 
Zusammenlebens von der Zeit der Aufklärung bis zum Beginn des Zweiten 
Weltkrieges, edited by Robert Maier, Georg Stöber. Hannover, 1996).  
Jenks, William. The Austrian electoral reform of 1907. Columbia University Press, 
1950. 
Judson, Pieter M.  “Introduction: Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe” in 
Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe, edited by Pieter Judson and 
Marsha Rozenblit. Berghahn Books, 2005. 
Judson, Pieter M. Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of 
Imperial Austria. Cambridge, 2006. 
Judson, Pieter. The Habsburg Empire: A New History. Harvard University Press, 2016. 
Kann, Robert A. A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918. Berkeley, 1977. 
Kieniewcz, Stefan. Galicja w dobie autonomicznej, 1850-1914. Wydawn. Zakładu 
Narodowego im. Ossolińskich, 1952. 
Kloczowski, Jerzy. A History of Polish Christianity. Cambridge, 2000. 
Kumor, Bolesław. Historia Kościoła: Czasy Najnowsze, 1815-1914 [History of the 
Church: Modern Times, 1815-1914]. Lublin, 2001. 
Kudłaszyk, Andrzej. Katolicka myśl społeczno-polityczna w Galicji na przełomie XIX i 
XX wieku. Wydawn. Politechniki Wrocławskiej, 1980. 
Kudlaszyk, Andrzej. Ksiądz Stanisław Stojałowski: studium historyczno-prawne. 
Dolnośląskie Wydawnictwo Edukacyjne Wrocław, 1998. 
Kuzmany, Börries. “Center and Periphery at the Austrian-Russian boarder: The Galician 
border town of Brody in the Long Nineteenth Century.” Austrian History 
Yearbook 42 (2011): 67-88. 
Kuzmany, Börries. Brody: Eine galizische Grenzstadt im langen 19. Jahrhundert. Wien, 
2011. 
Lane, Hugo. “Class Interest and the Shaping of a ‘Non-historical’ Nation: Reassessing 
the Galician Ruthenian Path to Ukrainian Identity” in Cultures and Nations of 
Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk, edited by Zvi 
Gitelman, Lubomyr Haida, John Paul Himka, Roman Solchanyk. Cambridge, 
2000. 
Markovits, Andrei, and Sysyn Frank E., ed. Nationbuilding and the Politics of 
Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia. Cambridge, 1982. 
Masiak, Dariusz, Proba porozumenia polsko-ukrainskiego w Galicii w latach 1888-
1895. Warszawa, 2006. 
Monalatij, Ivan. "Galyc'kyj kompromis 1914 roku: start chy finish ukrai'ns'ko-pol's'kogo 
prymyrennja?” ["Galician" compromise in 1914: start or finish of the Polish-
Ukrainian reconciliation?], Ji 64 (2010). Last accessed May 18, 2014. 
http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n64texts/monolatij_kompromis.htm   
Najdus, Walentyna. “O prawa obywatelskie kobiet w zaborze austriackim.” In Kobieta 
i świat polityki. Polska na tle porównawczym w XIX i w początkach XX wieku, 
edited by Anna Żarnowska and Andrzej Szwarca. Warszawa 1994. 
188 
 
Orlevych, Iryna, ed. Natsionalna identyfikatsiya ukrayintsiv Halychyny u XIX - na 
pochatku XX stolittya. Lviv, 2016. 
Osadczy, Wlodzimierz. “Roman Catholic-Uniate Relations and the National Question 
in Eastern Galicia in the 19th and Early 20th centuries” in Politics and Religion 
in Central and Eastern Europe: Traditions and Transitions, edited by William 
H. Swatos. Westport, 1994. 
Paletschek, Sylvia. Women's emancipation movements in the nineteenth century: a 
European perspective. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2004. 
Pajakowski, Philip. “The Polish Club, Badeni, and the Austrian Parliamentary Crisis of 
1897”, 
  Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes 35 (March-June 
1993): 103-120. 
Porter-Szücs, Brian. Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland. New 
York, 2011. 
Prusin, Alexandr Victor, Nationalizing a Borderland. Alabama, 2005. 
Renz, Regina, Pawlina-Meducka Marta, ed. Społeczno kulturalna działalność Kościoła, 
katolickiego w Polsce XIX i XX wieku. Kieleckie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1994. 
Rémond, René. Religion and Society in Modern Europe. Wiley, 1999. 
Rodriguez-Ruiz, Blanca, ed. The struggle for female suffrage in Europe: voting to 
become citizens. Leiden: Brill, 2012. 
Schorske, Carl E. Fin-de-siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture. London, 1980. 
Schorske, Carl E. “Politics in a New Key: An Austrian Triptych”. The Journal of Modern 
History 39 (1967): 343-386. 
Seul, Jeffrey R. “Ours is the Way of God’: Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict”. 
Journal of Peace Research 36 (1999): 553-569. 
Shanes, Joshua Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern. “An Unlikely Alliance: The 1907 Ukrainian 
Jewish Electoral Coalition.” Nations and Nationalism 3 (2009):. 483-505. 
Shanes, Joshua. Diaspora Nationalism and Jewish Identity in Habsburg Galicia. 
Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
Shedel, James. “Emperor, Church, and People: Religion and Dynastic Loyality during 
the Golden Jubilee of Franz Joseph.” The Catholic Historical Review 76 (1990): 
71-92. 
Shedel, James. “Religion, Public Morality and the Rechtsstaat in the Habsburg 
Dominions”, in Churches, states, nations in the Enlightenment and in the 
nineteenth century, edited by Mirosław Filipowicz. Lublin, 2000. 
Nemes, Robert and Unowsky Daniel, ed. Sites of European Antisemitism in the Age of 
Mass Politics, 1880-1918. Brandeis University Press, 2014. 
Sosnowska, Danuta. Inna Galicja. Warsaw, 2008. 
Stauter-Halsted, Keely. “Nationalism and the Public Sphere: the Limits of Rational 
Association in the Nineteenth-Century Polish Countryside.” In Cultures and 
Nations of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of 
Roman Szporluk, edited by Zvi Gitelman, Lubomyr Haida, John Paul Himka, 
Roman Solchanyk. Cambridge, 2000. 
Stauter-Halsted, Keely. The Nation in the Village: The Genesis of Peasant National 
Identity in Austrian Poland, 1848–1914. Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 2001. 
Struve, Kai. Bauern und Nation in Galizien: über Zugehörigkeit und soziale 
Emanzipation im 19. Jahrhundert. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005. 
Struve, Kai. Peasants and patriotic celebrations in Habsburg Galicia. In Galicia : a 
multicultured land / edited by Chris Hann and Paul Robert Magosci. Toronto; 
Buffalo : University of Toronto Press, 2005. 
Struve, Kai. “Citizenship and National Identity: The Peasants of Galicia During the 19th 
Century.” In Societal Change and Ideological Formation Among the Rural 
189 
 
Population of the Baltic Area 1880–1939, edited by Piotr Wawrzeniuk. 
Huddinge : Södertörns högskola, 2008. 
Taylor, A. J. P.  Habsburzka Monarkhiia, 1809-1918: Istoriia Avstriiskoi Imperii ta 
Avstro-Uhorshchyny [The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918. A History of the 
Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary (Chicago, 1976)]. Lviv, 2002. 
Tilly, Charles. Durable Inequality. Berkeley, Calif : University of California Press, 
1998. 
Tokarski, Slawomir, Ethnic conflict and economic development: Jews in Galician 
agriculture 1868-1914. Warsaw, 2003. 
Unowsky, Daniel. Pomp and politics, of Patriotism: Imperial Celebrations in Habsburg 
Austria, 1848-1916. Purdue University Press, 2005. 
Vulesica, Marija. “How Antisemitic was the Political Catholicism in Croatia-Slavonia 
around 1900?” Quest. Issues in Contemporary Jewish History. Journal of 
Fondazione CDEC 3 (July 2012). Last accessed November 26, 2017. 
 http://www.quest-cdecjournal.it/focus.php?id=301 
Wendland, Anna Veronika. Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische Konservative 
zwischen Österreich und Russland, 1848–1915. Wien, 2001. 
Wróbel, Piotr. “The Jews of Galicia under Austrian-Polish Rule, 1869–1918.” Austrian 
History Yearbook 25 (1994): 97–138. 
Wolff, Larry. The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture. 
Stanford, 2010. 
Zaleska, Ilona. “Wokół idei stronnictwa katolickiego w Królestwie Polskim” [Around 
the idea of the Catholic party in the Polish Kingdom]. Last accessed May 18, 
2014 
 http://wydawnictwoumk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/KLIO/article/viewFile/KLIO.
2013.003/618 
Zhernokleyev, Oleh. Ukrayinska sotsial-demokratiya v Halychyni (1899-1918). Kyiv, 
2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
